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Abstract
Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed changes to the
disclosure of risk information in the annual 10-K reports. Based on these changes, large firms in
the US are required to disclose risk factors in Item 1A of their 10-K. This study contains three
essays that review the current literature on Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and employ empirical
methods to test the usefulness of this disclosure.
The first essay reviews the existing literature on RFDs and provides direction for future
research. This review discusses the strengths and limitations of current research in the field and
suggests further research relating to the call for comment by the SEC, the contents and topics in
RFDs, the usefulness of RFDs to investors, in contractual settings, and the market in general.
In the second essay, I develop a new measure of RFDs that captures managerial discretion in risk
factor reporting to examine the usefulness of RFDs in the private and public debt markets. In both
debt markets, I find that RFDs are informative and that the risk profile of firms is reflected in their
cost of debt. In the private debt market, I find that firms with RFDs above expectation have lower
cost of debt as possible reward for transparency. Similarly, firms with RFDs below expectation
also have lower cost of debt, suggesting banks already know that the firms are less risky. In the
public debt market, I find that firms with RFDs above expectation have higher cost of debt while
firms with lower risk disclosure than expected have lower cost of debt. The results suggest public
lenders take RFDs as representative of firm risk.
The third essay examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in
reporting RFDs and the subsequent impact on cost of debt. To examine this effect, I focus on firms
that pay a penalty for perceived higher risk in the public debt market. I find evidence that corporate
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governance promotes transparency in reporting RFDs. I also find that risky firms with either strong
or weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt, suggesting corporate governance may not
be important to public lenders.
The findings in this dissertation suggest that RFDs are both informative and useful to
borrowers and lenders. The findings are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure
requirements, debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and management in implementing
organizational corporate governance structures.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for
large companies to disclose the most significant risks relating to the company or its securities in
Item 1A-Risk factors of the annual 10-K report. This disclosure aims to provide investors with a
clear and concise summary of the material risks faced by the issuer. Risk Factor Disclosures
(RFDs) have, however, been criticised as boilerplate (Business Wire, 2016). The SEC has
responded to this criticism by encouraging companies to improve on the quality of the disclosure
(Johnson, 2010), while also issuing a call for comments on how to improve the disclosure (SEC,
2016).
Although recent research provides evidence that RFDs are useful, predominantly in the
equity market, there are unanswered questions on the usefulness of RFDs in other settings. For
example, questions remain as to how RFDs and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs affect
the cost of debt including the impact of strong corporate governance on discretions in reporting
RFDs. To contribute to the literature on RFDs, in chapter 2, I conduct a review of the current
RFD literature and suggest directions for future research. In chapter 3, I develop a new measure
to capture managerial discretion in reporting RFDs and then examine the effect of RFDs and
managerial discretion in reporting RFDs on cost of debt in the private and public debt market. In
chapter 4, I extend the findings from chapter 3 and investigate the effect of strong corporate
governance on managerial discretion in reporting RFDs and the effect on cost of debt for firms
that are perceived as risky in the public debt market.
I find that RFDs are indeed informative and useful in the private and public debt markets.
In the private debt market, firms with RFDs above expectation have lower cost of debt, which may
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be a reward for transparency. Firms with RFDs below expectation also have lower cost of debt,
suggesting banks know these firms are less risky and do not penalize them. In the public debt
market, disclosing higher risk than the expectation is associated with higher cost of debt. On the
other hand, firms disclosing less risk than that expected have lower cost of debt. The results
suggest public lenders take RFDs as representative of firm risk. In addition, I find evidence that
strong corporate governance promotes transparency in reporting RFDs in the public debt market. I
also find that risky firms with weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt. There is
however no cost of debt mitigating effect for risky firms with strong corporate governance.
This dissertation is the first study to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on
RFDs, thereby providing a platform for future research in the field. It is also the first study to
introduce a measure to capture discretionary reporting in RFDs and examine the effect of this
measure on cost of debt in the private and public debt markets. Furthermore, it is the first study
to examine the role of strong corporate governance on discretions in reporting RFDs and the
subsequent impact on cost of debt in the public debt market.
The findings discussed herein are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure
requirements, debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and management in implementing corporate
governance structures in their organization.
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Chapter 2: Essay One

Risk Factor Disclosures: A Review and Directions for Future
Research

4

Abstract
To a large extent, prior research has examined the disclosure of corporate risk information
in firms’ annual reports. Beginning in 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
proposed changes to the disclosure of risk information in annual 10-K reports. These changes
mandated large firms in the US to disclose risk factors in a specific section of their 10-Ks, referred
to as Item1A. While research on the impact of this change is still in its infancy, some studies has
suggested that RFDs are vague, repetitive, and boilerplate. 1 As a result, the SEC has called on
managers to ensure that the risks disclosed reflect the risks faced by their firms. Furthermore, the
SEC is reviewing RFDs and has requested comments on how to improve the disclosure.
In light of the importance of risk information disclosure and the interest of the SEC in
improving this disclosure, this chapter reviews the existing literature on RFDs to determine how
informative this disclosure is. My findings suggest that RFDs are not boilerplate. Rather, they
contain information that is useful to both investors and regulators. Following from this review, I
identify directions for future research that can be informative for academic scholars, regulators,
and other stakeholders that rely on RFDs in decision making.

1

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160121005251/en/Corporate-Risk-Disclosures-Dominated-NonSpecific-%E2%80%9CBoilerplate%E2%80%9D-Fail
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2.1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide an exhaustive review and synopsis of the current state
of the literature on RFDs which will serve as a springboard for future research on the content and
usefulness of this disclosure. Disclosure of risk factors in Item 1A of the annual 10-K became
mandatory for large public firms in the United States beginning in 2005. Based on SEC regulations,
firms are required to identify the most significant factors that make their stock offering speculative
or risky. This disclosure aims to provide investors with a clear and concise summary of the material
risks faced by the issuer. Management disclosure of RFDs has, however, been criticised as
boilerplate after it was made mandatory by the SEC (Business Wire, 2016). This criticism has
resulted in the SEC encouraging companies to improve on the quality of the disclosure (Johnson,
2010). To ensure that the risk disclosures are informative, the commission further emphasizes that
companies are expected to disclose risks that are specific to their operations and not risks that could
apply to any issuer.
Recent studies assessing the information content of risk disclosures found evidence of some
information content in the disclosure. Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), Filzen
(2015), Campbell, Cesshini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2016) found that RFDs are informative
to investors, while Brown, Tian, and Tucker (2014) found the information useful to regulators. To
enhance our understanding of this disclosure and to identify opportunities for future research, this
chapter presents the existing literature on RFDs and proposes directions for further research. The
papers reviewed in this chapter are categorized into the following themes: RFD words and topics,
investor and contracting usefulness, and market-wide usefulness.
Papers on RFD words or topics identify and group common themes that address specific
risks. The risk categories identified include financial, regulatory, tax, macroeconomic, systematic,
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legal, and idiosyncratic risks. Among other findings, these papers showed that the number of risk
factor topics included in RFDs has increased over time and that specific firm characteristics, such
as research and development (R&D) intensity, are associated with the type of risk disclosed.
Identifying relevant topics and words included in RFDs provides an opportunity to examine the
risk category that is most informative for users of the report as well as a platform to examine how
the contents of RFDs have changed over time.
Studies on the usefulness of risk disclosures to investors have examined various topics
including the relationship between risk disclosure and information asymmetry, future cash flow,
future stock returns, volatility of stock returns, stock market reaction, analyst risk assessment, and
changes between voluntary and mandatory regimes (Campbell et al., 2014; Campbell et al.,2016;
Hope, Danqi, & Hai, 2016; Nelson & Pritchard, 2016). The main finding from these studies was
that RFDs are informative and not boilerplate as speculated. There is still potential for further
research in this field especially in relation to value relevance of risk disclosure and cost of equity.
On the other hand, research on contracting usefulness of risk disclosure is still in its infancy and
to date there is only one identified study on both debt contracting (Chiu, Guan, & Kim, 2017) and
compensation contracting (Israelsen & Yonker, 2017). Chiu et al., (2017) find that RFDs improve
information transparency and are useful to credit investors while Israelsen & Yonker (2017) find
that RFDs relating to key man life insurance are associated with negative market reactions. Future
studies could investigate the impact of RFDs on cost of debt or other debt market features, such as
debt default risk and yield to maturity. Studies could also examine the relationship between RFDs
and various measures of managerial risk-taking incentives, such as the sensitivity of managerial
wealth to stock return volatility and stock price.
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Studies relating to the general market have also examined various RFD topics, including
how risk disclosures change after SEC comment letters are received and the impact of RFDs on
industry and product market competition (Brown et al., 2014; Yen, Li, & Chen, 2016). In general,
these studies found that firms change their RFDs after receiving comment letters from the SEC
and that receiving a comment letter has a spillover effect across the industry. However, questions
remain as to the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on RFDs and the relationship between
firm level characteristics and the extent of risk disclosure.
A summary of the papers reviewed, including the topic of the paper, methods used, time
period covered in the study, sample, and findings is presented in Table 1. The methods used to
collect data on RFDs are mainly through content analysis employing both manual and automated
methods to extract key words or key topics discussed. The studies vary from examining only RFD
topics (Bao &Datta, 2012; Huang & Li, 2011) to examining both the topics and testing the
usefulness of the disclosure (Campbell et al., 2014; Mirakur, 2011). The period of research mainly
covers the post-mandatory disclosure period after 2005 to as recent as 2017, and the sample
selection is mostly based on firms that have reported risk factor disclosure in the annual 10-K and
fall within the definition of large firms as required by SEC. 2
To identify papers on RFD, I first conducted a search using Google Scholar with the key
phrase (in quotation marks) ‘risk factor disclosure’ to identify both published and working papers
in the field.3 I focused only on articles that examine Item1A risk factor disclosures and exclude
papers on general risk disclosure. Then, I did another search to identify Item 1A risk factor
disclosure anywhere in the article from 2005 to date; this search returned over 17,000 articles.

2

SEC defines small companies as those with less than $75m market capitalization. Thus, we can infer that large
accelerated filers have market capitalization greater than $75m: https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/26523/adavernslides081005.pdf
3
This search included reviewing the citations of papers generated by Google Scholar.
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Upon further examination, only 300 of these articles appeared to be relevant. 4 The final search was
conducted through Social Science Research Network (SSRN), which did not identify any new
article,5 thus providing reasonable assurance that all relevant studies on RFD had been identified.
The papers were read and the findings analyzed and categorized into various groups based on the
key research questions of each study. As a result of this analysis, gaps in the literature were
identified to provide opportunities for future studies that can contribute to our understanding of
RFDs.
This analysis is, to date, the only study to provide a comprehensive review of the literature
on RFDs and it provides a platform for future research in this field. The findings discussed herein
inform both users of the annual report as well as regulators on the usefulness of the disclosure and
how the disclosure can be improved to enhance its informativeness.
The remaining sections of this chapter are structured as follows: in the second section, I
examine Item1A-RFDs and review papers that examine either the topics or the content of this type
of disclosure. In the third section, I review studies on investor relevance of risk disclosure relating
to value relevance, risk relevance, future cash flow, and information asymmetry. The fourth section
reviews studies on contracting relevance of risk factor disclosure. In the fifth section, I review
studies on market-wide usefulness of RFDs which are not directly related to investing or
contracting usefulness. The sixth section concludes this study. Sections three to five conclude with
suggestions for further research.

4
5

By the 200th article the search was returning irrelevant articles.
Google Scholar returned a search of both published and working papers.
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2.2. Item 1A Risk Factor Disclosure
2.2.1 Risk factor disclosure regulation
Beginning in 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for large
firms to report risk factors as Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K. This requirement became effective
for fiscal years ending on or after December 1, 2005. In addition, the SEC required firms to include
qualitative disclosures of risk factors in Item 1A of the annual 10-K filing. This disclosure is
described by the SEC as a “discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering
speculative or risky” and is aimed at providing investors with a clear and concise summary of the
material risks in the issuer’s securities. Furthermore, the SEC provided guidelines for reporting
this information, including examples of relevant risk factors. Specifically, the SEC required that
the section be written in “plain English”, updated in quarterly reports, and avoid the unnecessary
restatement and repetition of risk factors. The following guidance was provided by the SEC for
Item 1A:
Where appropriate, provide under the caption “Risk Factors” a discussion of the most
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky. This discussion must be
concise and organized logically. Do not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any
offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being offered. Set forth
each risk factor under a sub caption that adequately describes the risk. (SEC, 2005)
The SEC also provided guidelines on the content to be included in risk disclosures, suggesting that
risk factors could include: (1) lack of an operating history; (2) lack of profitable operations in
recent periods; (3) financial position; (4) the business or proposed business; or (5) lack of a market
for common equity securities or securities convertible into or exercisable for common equity
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securities. An example of Item 1A disclosure is presented in Appendix A. 6 This sample disclosure
discusses risks related to the business in terms of profitability, cash reserves, dependence on the
chief executive officer, exposure to currency fluctuations, market and industry risks, and risks
related to stock ownership.
One of the goals of including risk factor disclosures in forms 10-Q and 10-K, as outlined
by the SEC, is to further enhance the value of forward looking statements in informing investors
and markets. RFDs are not required to be audited externally. Criticism of this disclosure
requirement has been based mainly on the fact that firms do not have to quantify this risk and
managers are not held liable for the quality of the disclosure. Despite guidance from the SEC, the
quality of the disclosure has been criticized as lacking information content. To address this
criticism, in 2016 the SEC issued a request for comment on issues relating to the disclosure (SEC,
2016). The main concern of the SEC is that the risk factor disclosures are generic in nature and not
tailored to reflect the registrant’s particular risk profile. This request for comment, numbered 145
to 156, addresses twelve main topics on RFDs including how to improve risk factor disclosure and
whether registrants should be asked to discuss how the risks disclosed will be addressed, as well
as if said risks can be quantified. Other issues addressed in the request for comment include
whether registrants should be encouraged to provide more detail in their description of risks and
whether generic risks should be included in the RFD. Table 2 presents a summary of the request
for comments by the SEC and potential avenues for future research, discussed further in section
2.2.2.

6

The disclosure is for Dynacq [Ticker: DYII] for the 2012 fiscal year and includes only a section of the full
disclosure.
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2.2.2 Proposed future research questions on risk factor disclosure regulation
The following research questions can provide insight to the SEC on improving RFDs based on
the call for comment summarized in Table 2.
1.

Is there a relationship between the level of specificity or detail of risk factor disclosure and
its usefulness? Hope et al. (2016) provided initial evidence of an association between the
level of detail in RFDs and both market reaction to 10-K filling and analyst assessment of
fundamental risk. Other investor usefulness research areas, such as future cash flows and
firm value, can also be examined to provide more evidence on the specificity of RFDs.

2.

Is there an association between the length of Item 1A disclosure and understandability of
the disclosure? Dyer et al. (2016) showed that Item 1Arisk factor disclosure is mostly
responsible for the increase in length of annual 10-K fillings, thereby suggesting that the
length of this disclosure has significantly increased in recent years. Future studies can
address the association between the length of 10-K filling and other measures of
understandability such as the Fog index.7

3.

Are generic risk disclosures useful? Are there incremental benefits to providing more
specific risk factor disclosures? It would be interesting to develop a measure of generic risk
disclosure and examine the information content in comparison to specific risk disclosure;
this will guide the SEC in determining whether more specific disclosure is necessary.

4.

What are the costs versus benefits of requiring additional disclosure? How will increasing
the length of RFDs affect its usefulness? Additional disclosure comes at a cost and also
increases the length of the disclosure. It is important to capture the negative implications
of asking registrants to provide more information and how this request can affect firms.

7

The Gunning Fog index is a weighted average of the number of words per sentence and the number of long words
per sentence: http://gunning-fog-index.com/index.html. A higher Fog index implies the text is less readable.

12

5.

How are risk disclosures useful in debt and compensation contracts? Is the risk profile of
firms reflected in these contracts? Most of the studies on RFDs focus on investors. As seen
in comment 155 in Table 2, the SEC is interested in whether there are other audiences that
value this disclosure. Examining the debt market provides an interesting opportunity to
examine the usefulness of this information for other audiences.

Research on RFDs is still at an early stage and most of the studies to date have focused on the
content and informativeness of the disclosure, particularly in relation to the stock market. The need
to further examine RFDs is significant considering that this disclosure has greatly increased in
content over the years and it is one of the three topics responsible for practically all of the increase
in the length of the annual 10-K8 (Dyer et al., 2016). In the sections that follow, I discuss research
that examines various aspects of RFDs and how these studies can provoke future research that will
enhance the usefulness of the disclosure for both market participants and regulators.
2.2.3 Risk factor disclosure content or topics
Based on my review, only two papers focus solely on the content or topics discussed in Item 1A
risk factor disclosures: Huang and Li (2011) and Bao and Datta (2012). Huang and Li developed
a new approach by applying a computational method to quantify textual information. Their
multilabel text classification algorithm, called ML-CKNN, can identify 25 types of risk factors in
Item 1A of the 10-K report. According to Huang and Li, this new method generates information
similar to that of Natural Language Processing (NLP), but the approach is more advanced in the
quantification of textual information.9 The method involved reading through hundreds of annual
reports to identify 25 types of risk factors (Table 1). Four student researchers were recruited to

8

Out of the 150 topics examined, fair value, internal controls, and risk factor account for virtually all the increase in
10-K length between 1996 and 2013.
9
Other methods include: content analysis using packaged software, counting keywords, and text classification.
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label 10,000 risk factors into the 25 risk factor types. This process resulted in 3,153 risk factors
from 4,267 companies’ RFDs in 2007.The ML-CKNN algorithm works by computing a similarity
score for each label category and ensuring that the risk factors are properly classified. The
algorithm also enhances transparency of the parameters and can be adjusted to recognise
homogenous and heterogeneous risk factor disclosures. To test the algorithm, 21,077 10-K files
from January 2006 to May 2010 were collected from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system. The algorithm was able to classify roughly 75% of risk factors and
99% of labels. To validate the results, the performance of the algorithm was compared to other
similar multi-label algorithms, and ML-CKNN outperformed the others in terms of accuracy based
on five performance metrics.
The risk factor categories (Table 3) identified by Huang and Li can be useful in textual
analysis research in accounting and finance. This study indirectly contributes to the accounting
literature on RFD by shedding light on the types of information disclosed in RFDs. The main
weaknesses of the study, as noted by the authors, are that ML-CKNN ignores the
interdependencies between different labels and that the algorithm requires a long time to run.
Bao and Datta (2012) addressed the two limitations found in Huang and Li (2011). These
limitations relate to the manual process of pre-defining the risk types before categorization and the
substantial effort required to label the training data in the algorithm. The authors claimed that their
paper is the first study on automatic discovery of risk and mapping of risk factors to a risk type.
Bao and Datta utilized all disclosed risk factors as inputs to derive a set of risk types which were
then matched to the most probable risk types. In extracting the set of risk types, a modified form
of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) – a natural language processing tool used to analyse data –
extracted the risk types. According to Bao and Datta, this algorithm, called sent-LDA, is 50 times
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faster and can generate more meaningful topics compared to normal LDA models. Using 14,799
RFDs from Item 1A of the 10-K forms, the authors generated 30 risk topics that were successfully
matched to the 25 risk topics found in Huang and Li (2011), thus ensuring that all risk types
identified in Huang and Li were included. These topics were grouped by the most probabilistic
words,10 which are not descriptive but rather groups of words that address similar risks. For
example, cost, regulation, environmental, law, operation, and production risk types were all
grouped together as one category, topic 4, while cost, contract, operation, plan, increase, pension,
and delay were grouped together as another category, topic 9. One problem with Bao and Datta’s
classification, which the authors do not acknowledge in the study, is the classification of the same
word under multiple topics. For example, the word ‘price’ appears under topics 2, 3, and 15, and
the word ‘financial’ is classified under topics 1, 5, 6, 15, 17, 25, 26, and 28. It remains to be seen
how this multiple classification can be managed in future research studies.
Bao and Datta also examined trends in the use of these words or topics between 2006 and
2010. The authors showed an increase in the discussion of some topics over the study period. For
example, the use of the term ‘macroeconomic risks’ increased significantly between 2008 and
2010 probably due to the financial crisis. The findings from Bao and Datta’s study can be used by
researchers, financial analysts, business managers, and those who need to interpret large amounts
of textual data.
Mirakur (2011) also explored the content of RFDs in Item 1A with the purpose of
examining whether this disclosure is associated with firm performance. The study was conducted
in three stages. The first stage involved categorizing risk factors and identifying key risk words for
a random sample of 122 firms selected from Compustat in the year 2009. The next stage involved

10

The topics are presented in Table 3.
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running descriptive statistics for the 122 firms to identify the risk disclosure that can be considered
repetitive or boilerplate and then identifying the disclosures that will likely provide relevant
information. Finally, Mirakur examined the relationship between various accounting measures of
firm performance and risk factor categories including the influence of industry on risk disclosure.
Initially, 116 general or high-level categories were identified, this was further compressed into 29
risk topics: accounting, acquisitions, calamities, capital expenditures, capital structure, cash,
competition, contracts, credit risks, customer concentration, distribution, government, industry,
intellectual property, international, inventory, investments, key personnel, labor, legal, macro,
marketing, operations, regional, solvency, stock price, suppliers, and takeover. This descriptive
analysis also included comparisons across industries to determine the influence of industry on risk
disclosure. The results of this descriptive analysis showed that the most common risk categories
mentioned by companies are: capital structure, leverage, inability to pay interest, competition,
government, key personnel, and macro risks such as recession, inflation, and financial crisis.
However, Mirakur did not find any industry influence, suggesting that RFDs are firm-specific and
do not capture industry-wide risk. Further, the study examined the relationship between four
accounting measures (leverage, capital expenditure scaled by Property, Plant, and Equipment
(PPE), operating risk (cash scaled by total assets), and cash acquisitions scaled by PPE) and found
evidence of an association between RFD and both capital expenditure and operating risk.
The paper concludes by proposing several avenues for future research, including using
automated methods to process data, investigating whether risk factor can be used to replace stock
volatility or earnings volatility, studying the relationship between risk and firm financial
performance, efficient capital allocation, and market-based risk measures, and examining the
association between firm risk and key person life insurance. Interestingly, the proposed research

16

on key life insurance was subsequently examined by Israelsen and Yonker (2017), which will be
discussed in section 2.5 in relation to market-wide usefulness of RFDs. There are two major
limitations in Mirakur (2011) including the small sample size and lack of control variables in the
regressions. These limitations affect the ability to generalize the findings reported in the paper.
Both Israelsen (2014) and Campbell et al. (2014) examined whether RFDs are informative, albeit
from different perspectives. While Israelsen assessed stock return, beta, and stock volatility,
Campbell et al. examined risk factor disclosure and pre-disclosure proxies of firm risk, postdisclosure measures of firm risk, information asymmetry, and abnormal return around the 10-K
filing. Similar to Bao and Datta (2012), Israelsen (2014) employed LDA to extract the risk factor
disclosures from the SEC filings. The author used computer scripts to search through 10-K filings
from 2006 to 2011 and then extracted section 1A from these filings. In cases where the software
was not successful, a manual search was also conducted to extract the section. Together, the
automated and manual search yielded 27,339 risk factor sections which were then divided into
paragraphs to more easily identify the risk words. Thirty topics were eventually extracted by the
LDA and each topic was classified based on how closely the risk factors are associated. The 30
identified words are presented along with associated risk words in Table 3.Campbell et al. (2014),
on the other hand, developed bespoke software for the purpose of their study. After downloading
annual 10-K filings from the EDGAR database, the software was used to extract counts of
identified risk words based on the key words identified by Nelson and Pritchard (2007). To verify
the accuracy of their data, 300 firms were randomly selected and manually checked to confirm that
the correct subsection was extracted. The results showed over 98% accuracy to extract the correct
sections. Thirty percent of the key risk words identified were further classified as financial,
litigation, or tax risks. The remaining risk words were classified as either other-systematic or other-
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idiosyncratic depending on whether the risk factors are firm-specific or economy-wide. The risk
words identified by Campbell et al. (2014) are also presented in Table 3.
Israelsen (2014) examined the specific firm characteristics that are most closely associated
with the 30 identified factors. These firm characteristics are: size, Book-to-Market (BTM), firm
age, R&D intensity, sales, general & administrative expenses, earnings to price ratio, advertising
expenses, capital expenditure, productivity, profitability, leverage, capital-to-labor ratio, and
industry classification. The results for this test showed that firm characteristics vary with the type
of risk disclosure topic. For example, small value firms with low R&D intensity, low advertising
expenses, high investment-to-capital, low leverage, and greater labor-intensity are more likely to
disclose risks relating to the ‘accounting’ factor, while more seasoned firms with high BTM ratios
and little R&D are more likely to disclose risks relating to ‘credit’. This result is similar to the
result obtained by Campbell et al. (2014) in examining the relationship between RFDs and predisclosure firm risk measures. Using a final sample of 9,076 firm-year observations from 2005 to
2008, Campbell et al. (2014) found that RFDs are associated with nine of the 13 different proxies
of pre-disclosure firm risk (expected returns, size, BTM, leverage, stock return volatility, turnover,
big N auditor, analysts following, Beta, skewness, net income, and institutional ownership)
suggesting that firms with more risks disclose more risk factors and that the type of risk the firm
faces determines how much of the disclosure addresses that risk.
Israelsen (2014) further examined the relationship between RFD and stock return volatility
to confirm if the risks are reflected in equity market returns. Using daily volatility and idiosyncratic
volatility as volatility measures, the results show significant association between 15 of the 30 risk
factors and daily volatility. Some of the risk factor topics, such as those relating to Credit,
Dividends, International, and Legal, are associated with higher volatility while other topics,
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including Demand, EnviroReg, and FinMarket, are associated with lower volatility. The results for
idiosyncratic risks were similar to that of volatility except that the word contractual risk is no
longer significant while Demand becomes significant. The other tests conducted involved
examining the association between the disclosed risks and systematic risks, which was estimated
using factor loading for each Fama-French 4-Factor model, and examining the relationship
between asset pricing risk factors and the risk factors disclosed by the firms. The results of the test
for systematic risk show that more risk disclosures relating to customer demand, cost of input,
supply chain, international markets, ability to access credit markets, and ability to develop new
products are associated with higher market betas. However, firms with risk disclosure associated
with health care, insurance, litigation, information technology, systems failure, real estate, new
product and service development, and more general disclaimers have lower market betas,
suggesting that these firms are risk-averse. The results for the asset pricing risk factors show that
for market returns, most of the risk factors have either positive significant coefficient or are not
statistically significant, while for the Small minus Big (SMB) portfolio, many of the factors have
negative coefficients, and explain about half of the variation in the SMB portfolio. For High minus
Low (HML), the disclosure portfolio explains about 69% of the HML variation, while it explains
about 50% of the variation for the momentum strategy returns (UMD). In sum, the style analysis
results show that, on average, returns in small value firms and SMB and HML factors are related
to disclosed risk about access to credit and aggregate financial markets.
To explore whether the disclosures are informative and whether investors incorporate the
information into their risk assessment, Campbell et al. (2014) examined the association between
post-disclosure measures of firm risk and the unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure which
was obtained by controlling for the pre-disclosure measures of firm risk. The results show that the
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unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure is positively associated with post-disclosure, marketbased measures of firm risk (beta and stock return volatility), thereby suggesting that investors
incorporate risk factor disclosures into these market-based measures. Other tests examined the
association between the unexpected portion of RFDs and post-disclosure, market-based measures
of information asymmetry, the timeliness in which investors incorporate information from RFDs,
which was done by examining the association between short-window, abnormal stock returns
around the 10-K release and RFDs, and the association between the unexpected portion of RFDs
and abnormal returns surrounding the 10-K release. The results of these tests reveal that the
unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure is negatively associated with information asymmetry,
suggesting that RFDs decrease information asymmetry. The results also show that RFDs are
negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. Thus, investors incorporate risk factor
disclosures into firm stock price.
Overall, the results in both studies provide support that RFDs are neither generic nor
boilerplate and are informative to investors. Although, the main focus of Israelsen (2014) was asset
pricing, the paper contributes extensively to the literature on qualitative disclosures in accounting
and the information content of disclosures in the annual 10-K. The analysis by Campbell et al.
(2014) offers insight into the effect of disclosure on costs of capital by providing evidence that the
type of risk a firm is exposed to affects the type of risks that are disclosed.
In Table 3, I present a comparison of the topics extracted from Item 1A risk factor disclosure, with
the exclusion of Mirakur (2011) because of the noted sample size limitation, and map these topics
by identifying common themes of risk topics. I start by outlining the topics identified in Bao and
Datta (2012), adjust for Huang and Li’s (2011) list, and then include Israelsen (2014) and Campbell
et al.’s (2014) risk topics or key words. Through this mapping process, I further compressed the
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topics into six main categories of RFD: financial, regulatory (legal), macroeconomic,
idiosyncratic, legal, systematic, and tax. I propose that these compressed categories of risk topics
can be further explored to study the determinants of RFDs among other interesting research
opportunities relating to RFD topics discussed below.
2.2.4 Proposal for future research on risk factor disclosure content/topics
In this section, I offer some unexplored areas that can guide future researchers as they examine
the risk words that are used in RFDs and how this research can influence regulation.
1.

Which of the determinants of risk factor disclosure has the most influence on the quality of
the disclosure? Identifying the most common or most influential category of RFDs will
help researchers better understand RFDs.

2.

Are these determinants of equal usefulness to investors? Should users of annual reports be
more concerned about certain categories of disclosure than others? This information will
be useful to the SEC in proposing changes to RFDs.

3.

Can RFDs be decomposed into a normal component that reflects firm risk and an abnormal
component that reflects managerial discretion in reporting? If so, what are the likely
implications of managerial discretion to inform or misinform capital market participants?
Are firms punished for misinforming the market? Due to the negative nature of RFDs,
managers are biased against disclosing too much information. Therefore, identifying the
managerial discretion component of RFD will provide insight into how managers negotiate
the conflict between protecting their self-interest and complying with regulations.

2.3. Investor Usefulness of Risk Factor Disclosure
More effort has gone into examining the investor usefulness of risk factor disclosures compared to
other accounting research areas. The focus on investors is not surprising however, as the SEC states
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that risk factor disclosure is aimed at providing investors with a clear and concise summary of
firms’ material risks. Studies on investor usefulness of RFDs have focused on risk and value
relevance of the disclosure, the impact of RFDs on future cash flow, how disclosure of risks affects
information asymmetry, the effect of disclosure on analyst risk assessment, and how changes in
RFDs have affected investors risk assessment. I discuss the details of these papers below.
2.3.1 Value relevance, future cash flow, information asymmetry, and risk assessment
Broadly speaking, value relevance can be explained as the ability of accounting information to
capture firm value. In some accounting literature, value relevance is measured as the ability of
earnings to explain variation in returns; the greater the explanatory power, the more decision useful
the financial information (Francis, Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004). The effect of information
on firm value can be captured through stock market reaction, stock returns, or other measures of
firm value. Studies on investor usefulness have examined market based measures of risk and the
relationship between risk disclosure and value relevance of the disclosure (Campbell et al., 2014;
Israelsen, 2014; Riley &Taylor, 2014; Filzen, 2015; Campbell et al., 2016; Filzen, McBrayer, &
Shannon, 2016; Hope et al., 2016; Gaulin, 2017; Hu, Johnson, & Liu, 2017), association between
tax RFD and future cash flow (Campbell et al., 2016), RFD and information asymmetry (Campbell
et al., 2014), RFD and analysts’ assessment of firm risk (Hope et al., 2016), and RFDs and investors
risk assessment (Nelson & Pritchard,2016). Two of the papers, Campbell et al. (2014) and Israelsen
(2014) were discussed in detail above. This section will focus on the remaining studies on investor
usefulness.
Filzen (2015), Filzen et al. (2016), Campbell et al (2016), and Hope et al. (2016) examined
different measures of RFDs and both stock return and stock market reaction. Filzen (2015)
investigated the informativeness of risk factor disclosure in the 10-Q filing by examining whether
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updates to risk factor disclosures are negatively associated with short-window stock returns and
negative earnings shock. This study was extended by Filzen et al. (2016) who assessed the
association between future returns and quarterly risk factor updates to provide insights into whether
the market fully incorporates updates to risk factor disclosure. Campbell et al. (2016), on the other
hand, continued the research in Campbell et al. (2014) by examining the relationship between RFD
and both future cash flows and firm value. Hope et al. (2016) examined the relationship between
the level of detail in risk factor disclosure and both stock market reaction to 10-K reporting and
reliability of analysts’ fundamental risk assessment.
Filzen (2015) and Filzen et al. (2016) focused on updates to RFDs. The requirements for
quarterly RFDs differ from those of the annual 10-K report; for example, while the annual report
requires firms to report all risks they are exposed to, quarterly reports are only necessary when
there is an update to the risk disclosed in the annual report. Based on disclosure theory’s prediction
that managers tend to withhold bad news and disclose good news, and the potential legal penalties
that can arise if a material risk emerges, Filzen (2015) speculated that managers weigh the
perceived costs of disclosing against the expected cost of non-disclosure when deciding whether
or not to disclose bad news. Therefore, if updates to RFDs provide investors with information
about potential negative outcomes they should have adverse outcomes in future periods and a
negative effect on future cash flows and stock returns. Similarly, Filzen et al. (2016) expected
quarterly risk factor updates to create uncertainties regarding future cash flow to the firm in both
magnitude and likelihood if the risk materializes, making it difficult to predict the future state of
the firm. Campbell et al. (2016) conducted their study in a tax setting because future cash flows
associated with taxes can be directly captured in tax measures, such as effective tax rate and cash
taxes paid, unlike future cash flow implications of other risk factors that are dispersed throughout
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the financial statement. According to the authors, high levels of tax risk disclosures can have two
implications; it can indicate that firms have engaged in some risk-taking activities that will lower
future tax payments and increase future cash flow, or it can imply that the firm has taken tax
positions that will expose the firm to taxes and penalties which will lower future cash flow and
increase tax payment. Building on the assumptions that the market possesses some degree of
efficiency and that analysts make use of public information, Hope et al. (2016) examined whether
and how investors and analysts benefit from more specific disclosures. Specificity was
operationalized as words or phrases that convey specific information about the firm.
Filzen (2015) predicted lower abnormal returns around the 10-Q filing for firms with risk
factor updates relative to firms without risk factor updates. If the risk disclosures provide investors
with information about future negative earnings, firms with risk factor updates should have more
adverse outcomes in the future. Filzen also predicted that firms with risk factor updates are more
to likely experience adverse effects on future earnings relative to firms without risk factor updates.
This expectation is continued in Filzen et al. (2016). Based on the same rationale, Filzen et al.
(2016) predicted that quarterly risk factor updates will be negatively associated with future stock
market returns and extends the prediction to the effect of the language of disclosure. The authors
expected that the negative stock market reaction will be stronger for weak updaters, firms that
avoid the use of strong language to describe the risk, compared to strong updaters. In the study,
strong updaters were defined as firms who use many words related to firm fundamentals. Campbell
et al. (2016) expected current tax risk factor disclosure to be associated with future stock return if
investors fully incorporate the implications of the disclosure. If investors find the disclosure
complex and difficult to comprehend, then there should be no relationship between tax risk
disclosures and future stock returns. However, if the high tax disclosure is regarded as tax
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aggressiveness that will lower future tax payments, then investors will react to that information
resulting in positive stock returns. Considering the usefulness of RFDs for investors, and relying
on the assumption that more precise disclosures imply greater information content that should
elicit more market reaction, Hope et al. (2016) expected investors to put more weight on risk
disclosures with greater specificity, which should facilitate the incorporation of risk information
into stock price. This is because research has shown that uncertainty about the variance of a firm’s
cash flow is priced and that more precise signals receive greater weight (Heinle & Smith, 2017).
Hope et al. (2016) predicted a positive association between stock market reaction to the 10-K
report and the level of specificity of risk factors. They also expected that more specific RFDs will
provide further information that analysts can use to assess a firm’s fundamental risk. In summary,
updates to RFDs should be associated with stock returns, earnings shock, and future stock market
returns, while tax RFDs should be associated with future firm value and future stock returns, and
the level of specificity of RFDs should be associated with stock market reaction and reliability of
analyst risk assessment.
In both Filzen (2015) and Filzen et al. (2016), the authors used the same python
programming language to extract Item1A from SEC filings. In Filzen (2015), the study period was
from 2006 to 2010 and the final sample was 13,165 firm-quarters, excluding firms with market
value of less than $100 million.11 For Filzen et al. (2016), the study period was from 2006 to2014,
with a sample of 52,955 10-Q fillings for 4,343 unique firms. The variable of interest in both
papers, UPDATER, was equal to 1 for firms with risk factor updates in the 10-Q filing, otherwise
the value is zero. For a firm to be considered as an UPDATER, a risk factor section must be
extracted from the 10-Q, the extracted section must be more than 200 words, and the section must
11

The regulation excludes small firms, which are firms with market capitalization of less than $75m. The author uses
an exclusion level of$100m to be more conservative.
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be at least 100 words longer than the previous quarter for the second and third quarters. In addition,
Filzen et al. (2016) classified firms in the top quartile as strong updaters and those in the bottom
third quartile as weak updaters based on a defined word list. 12 The method in Campbell et al.
(2016) was based on the same procedure as Campbell et al. (2014) with updated tax keywords that
capture tax related risks, such as “foreign tax, haven, tax provision, taxable income, and tax law”.
The sample period was from 2005 to 2010, although the actual period extends into 2013 to meet
the requirement of three-year forward data for some of the variables. The sample sizes were 7,234,
6,735, and 6,312 for the one one-year forward, two-year forward, and three-year forward sample,
respectively. Hope et al. (2016) used a technique called Named Entity Recognition (NER) to
identify and extract specific measures under different categories, including identified names of
persons, locations, organizations, and quantitative values in percentages, money values in dollars,
time, and dates. To test stock market reaction, the final sample was 14,865 firm-year observations
from 2006 to 2010 and to examine analyst risk assessment 627 firms were classified into the top
and bottom quintile.
Filzen (2015) tested the stock market reaction as the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
three days around the day of 10-Qfiling. In addition, quarterly earnings surprise was calculated as
the change in earnings, scaled by total assets and then multiplied by 100. Similar to Filzen (2015),
Hope et al. (2016) measured stock market reaction as the absolute value of three-day abnormal
returns around the 10-K filing date. They also examined analyst fundamental risk assessment

12

The complete word stem list used was: bankrupt, busi, cash, charg, competit, condit, cost, custom, cyclic, demand,
divis, earn, economi, environ, expens, financi, incom, lawsuit, legal, liquid, litig, market, oper, product, profit,
revenu, sale, season, servic, settlement, solvenc, spend, sue. The complete word list is as follows: bankrupt, business,
cash, charge, competition, competitive, competitor, conditions, cost, customer, cyclical, demand, division, earnings,
economy, environment, expense, financial, income, lawsuit, legal, liquidity, litigation, market, operations, product,
profit, revenue, sales, seasonal, services, settlement, solvency, spending, and sue.
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measured as the absolute value of the difference between the one-year ahead realized raw return
and one-year ahead stock price forecast in the first analyst report. Filzen et al. (2016) measured
market return as three-month buy-and-hold annual return, while Campbell et al. (2016) used the
annual buy-and-hold return for each firm. Future cash taxes were measured as one-year, two-year,
or three-year cash taxes paid in Campbell et al. (2016), while effective tax rate was used as an
alternate measure.
Overall results confirm the informativeness of RFDs and stock market reaction to
information in the 10-K. Specifically, Filzen (2015) confirmed significant negative association
between UPDATER and both cumulative abnormal returns and earnings surprise, suggesting that
firms that release quarterly updates of their risk factors have lower CAR around the 10-Q filing
and a downward shift in the distribution of unexpected earnings in all three quarters following the
update. However, in terms of earnings surprise, the result becomes less statistically significant as
the period increases. The results discussed by Filzen et al. (2016) reveal a negative association
between quarterly RFD and future stock returns and also show that the reaction is more negative
for weak updaters compared to strong updaters. These results suggest that completeness of reaction
to an update is affected by the content of the update. Alternate tests using a trading strategy further
confirm these findings. Campbell et al. (2016) showed a negative association between future cash
taxes (for all three subsequent years) and tax-related risk words, implying that tax risk disclosure
signals an increase in cash flow through a decrease in future cash taxes paid. This result also holds
when effective tax rate is used as an alternate test. Other results show a positive association
between returns and tax risk disclosure over one-year and two-year horizons, but the results
become more positive as the horizon increases suggesting that investors do not immediately price
the information in tax risk disclosure. The results in Hope et al. (2016) show that specificity is
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negatively related to proprietary cost and accruals and positively related to many other variables
including specificity of 10-K, length of 10-K, return volatility, and analyst forecast error. The
results to test market reaction provide evidence that a higher level of specificity leads to stronger
market reaction to the 10-K report. Further tests showed that specificity of the quantitative
disclosures (money, percentage, date, and time) are more significant, but when the disclosure
categories are considered individually, money and date are the most significant. Alternate tests,
such as using abnormal trading volume to test stock market reaction, examining the period before
SEC requirement of RFD, and splitting the sample by proprietary cost, confirmed the study
findings. The results also show that greater specificity helps analysts make better estimations.
These papers provide evidence of the informativeness of RFDs for future cash flows, firm
value, stock returns, earnings surprises, and analyst risk assessment. The methods used enable
researchers to examine different aspects of qualitative disclosures in evaluating the completeness
and accuracy of such disclosures. Specifically, Hope et al. (2016) provided empirical evidence that
supports the SEC’s call for more specific risk disclosures by showing the benefit of improved risk
disclosures to investors. These studies clearly demonstrate that RFDs are not boilerplate.
There are four other research papers relating to usefulness of RFDs for investors: Riley and
Taylor (2014), Nelson and Pritchard (2016), Gaulin (2017), and Hu et al. (2017). Riley and Taylor
(2014) examined the effects of readability of RFDs, varying the degrees of familiarity of the RFDs
from familiar, moderately familiar, to unfamiliar in an experimental setting. Nelson and Pritchard
(2016) studied how the change from voluntary to mandatory reporting affects the disclosure of risk
factors by examining the association between securities fraud litigation and RFDs. They also
assessed firms’ responses to SEC’s 2005 disclosure mandate and the relevance of risk factor
disclosure to investors. Gaulin (2017) examined whether managers disclose risk factors that warn
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of future adverse outcomes by testing whether managers disclose risk factors in a timely manner
and whether the demands for risk factors from the various stakeholders affect managerial
disclosure decision. In a theoretical setting, Hu et al. (2017) examined the effect of parameter
uncertainty in the pricing of risk by providing evidence that differences in priors 13 result in
differential pricing of risk for the same set of assets. The authors used RFDs as a novel instrument
to proxy investors’ priors on a firm exposure to risk factors.
Because RFDs must be written in plain English with no legal jargon, and based on the
management obfuscation hypothesis, Riley and Taylor (2017) expected that managers have an
incentive to make annual reports difficult to read so investors are unable to incorporate adverse
information into stock prices. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) explained that the provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) provided as an incentive for firms to voluntarily
disclose risk factors in order to enjoy the safe harbour provision, thereby shielding firms from
liability for forward-looking statements which could reduce likely litigation costs. Similar to Riley
and Taylor (2014), Nelson and Pritchard (2016) examined the SEC’s requirement of plain
language, meaning that disclosures must go beyond boilerplate discussion of risks and should be
thorough, updated year to year, and readable. The expectation is that under the PSLRA, firms with
greater probability of litigation have greater expected benefits from disclosing risk factors
compared to firms with less likelihood of being sued. Therefore, it is expected that firms with
greater risk of litigation will provide more RFDs that are more specific and readable than firms
with lower risk of litigation. Also, an increase in litigation risk will trigger more meaningful,
readable, and less boilerplate risk factor disclosure for these firms. Furthermore, under a voluntary
disclosure regime, firms at greater risk of litigation will provide more RFDs that are less generic

13

Priors refer to uncertain quantity in the probability distribution under Bayesian statistics.
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and more readable while under a mandatory disclosure regime, risk factor disclosures will be
similar across firms with both low and high litigation risk. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) also
expected meaningful RFDs to improve investors’ assessment of expected future cash flow as seen
through the positive association between RFDs and market assessment of firm risk. Gaulin (2017)
expected managers to be motivated to provide risk information not only because it is a SEC
requirement but because investors demand this information as an early warning of negative
outcomes, which can subsequently reduce the expected cost of class-action securities litigation
under the litigation shield. This shield, however, can only be invoked if the disclosure complies
with SEC’s regulation on specificity and level of detail. These three studies emphasize the
importance of clarity and understandability of RFDs.
The method in Riley and Taylor (2014) involved a survey sent out to 44,000 people. The
final study participants were 365 non-professional investors. Using a 1 X 3 mixed research design,
participants were randomly assigned to the treatment conditions of more or less readable for a
fictional company. The risk words were developed using similar risk factors from a random sample
of 100 of the Fortune 500 companies and cover the areas of sales, data security, and control over
financial reporting. The familiar risk scenario described risks from a competitive environment and
potentially negative effects of changing customer preferences. The second risk factor scenario
discussed the moderately familiar risk of holding sensitive client data, while the third risk scenario
addressed the unfamiliar risk that an internal control weakness may compromise the reliability of
the financial reports. Participants were then asked to provide their initial perception of each risk
factor for probability of economic loss, size of economic loss, worry, and overall risk and then
provide information on their expected stock price, buy/sell recommendation, and perceptions of
managements’ reporting credibility. In Nelson and Pritchard (2016), the study examined the period
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of voluntary disclosure from 1996 to 2004 and the mandatory regime from 2005 to 2010. Firms
were classified as high or low litigation risk based on an estimate of firm-specific ex-ante litigation
risk. Five percent of the firms were selected for the high risk sample for a total of 181 firms.
Similarly, 5% of the firms in the low risk sample were randomly selected for a total of 112 firms.
The three proxies used for RFD characteristics are the risk factor disclosure word count, the
resemblance score for non-boilerplate disclosure, and the Fog index for readability. Gaulin (2017)
followed the procedure described in Campbell et al. (2014) to extract RFDs, and the final sample
in the study included 31,549 firm-years from 2005 to 2015. Three proxies are used to track risk
factor evolution over time: total number of risk factors, number of new risk factors, and number
of dropped risk factors from the previous filing. To identify new and dropped risks, for each risk
factor across the years, a search for an exact match was performed allowing for a minimum of 50%
character-level match. If no match was found, the risk factor was considered “new”. Where a match
was found in year t, the matched risks were dropped in year t-1.Therefore, the remaining risks in
year t-1 represented risks that no longer featured in year t and were counted as dropped risks.
Definitiveness of the risk factors was measured based on the language in the disclosure (i.e.,
whether it used general language or named a specific entity or location; similar to Hope et al.
2016), the percentage of words that were numeric such as numbers, percentages, currencies, or
dates, and the average words per risk factor. Adverse outcomes were considered as negative net
income, negative operating income, sales declines, and business or non-securities litigation.
Hu et al. (2017) first developed a model to show that differences in perceived risk exposure
can arise due to different priors for the same asset which can then result in different required
returns. The dummy variable to proxy for the dichotomous prior distribution of the beta on a risk
factor takes the value of one if a risk factor appears in item 1A of the 10-K report and zero
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otherwise. Investors priors on the firm’s exposure to the risk was classified as low beta prior if
specific risk words or phrases (interest rate, currency and exchange rate, commodity, and economic
downturn and recession) do not appear in Item 1A or high beta prior if a word or phrase appear at
least once. Interest rate risk factor was measured as the difference between the return on 10-year
government bond and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Exchange rate risk was considered as the
monthly return of the U.S. dollar against a range of major world currencies. Commodity risk was
the monthly return of the All Commodity Price Index and downturn/recession risk was the spread
between the five-year bond yield and the yield of the three-month Treasury bill. The sample period
was from January 2006 to December 2014 and the authors used Fama-MacBeth regressions to
examine the difference between the slopes of the return-factor beta for the two groups (i.e., the
high beta and low beta group). For each of the four categories of risk, the sample was divided into
whether a firm discloses the risk or not, and the risk exposure to the risk category was calculated
using monthly returns data for the previous five years. The firms were then sorted into quintile or
tercile portfolios, which are held for one year and rebalanced in January. The average excess return
per annum, average exposure to each risk category, average return for long-short portfolios, and
the 3-factor model were presented. The difference between return-factor beta slopes for reporting
and non-reporting firms was tested by cross section regression of portfolio returns on the cross
section of beta.
Riley and Taylor (2014) confirmed that readability affects non-professional investors’
assessments of risk and that this effect was different for familiar versus unfamiliar risk. Their
results also showed that there is no effect on investment decisions between participants that receive
disclosures in readable versus less readable language. Similarly, presentation style had no effect
on non-professional investors’ assessments of management credibility, and readability had no
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effect on whether non-professional investors read and rely on management-provided risk
disclosures. Nelson and Pritchard (2016) offered evidence that the amount of disclosure increases
with firm risk and high risk firms provide less boilerplate RFD; however, this result is less
significant when reporting is mandatory. The study also shows that during the mandatory regime
high risk and low risk firms are similar in their use of boilerplate disclosures. The test for
readability confirms that firms with more readable Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A)
provide more meaningful RFDs. Furthermore, firms disclose more risk factors if litigation risk
increases but do not substantially change their risk factors in response to a decrease in litigation
risk, i.e., risk factor disclosure is sticky. This is contrary to the results reported in other studies on
updated RFDs (Filzen, 2015; Filzen et al., 2016; Gaulin, 2017). Additionally, Nelson and Pritchard
(2017) provided evidence that RFD is positively associated with investor risk assessment for high
risk firms only under a voluntary regime and for both high risk and low risk firms when reporting
is mandatory. Gaulin (2017) showed a positive association between new risk factors and dropped
risk factors for all the measures of future economic outcomes confirming that managers are
updating risk factors in an informative and timely manner. The results also suggest that managers
disclose more specific risk factors in advance of adverse outcomes and managers respond to private
law enforcement by increasing the new risk factors they identify, thereby increasing the total
number of risk factors discussed. This increase persists for multiple years for private security
litigation but not for SEC comment letters. Also, the results provide evidence that managers react
to public enforcement by increasing the definitiveness of their RFDs. The results from Hu et al.
(2017) showed that the return-factor beta slope for non-reporting firms is higher than that of
reporting firms for all the four risk categories. Furthermore, investors form priors about risk
exposure by combining information provided directly by firms with other data, and the relation
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between required return and risk factor betas is steeper under low beta prior than high beta prior.
These results confirm that the return-factor beta slope is steeper for firms that do not disclose a
given risk factor.
The results discussed in Riley and Taylor (2014) provided information about another type
of investor, non-professional investors, and the study used an experimental setting which is unique
from the other studies discussed herein. The major limitation of the paper was the low response
rate of around 1% which threatens the validity of the results. Nelson and Pritchard (2016)
highlighted the significance of RFDs to managers and legal counsel for formulating a disclosure
strategy and to regulators and courts in evaluating disclosure quality for assessing the risks posed
by firms. Gaulin (2017) showed that managers update their disclosure in a timely manner and do
not merely copy and paste, while Hu et al. (2017) demonstrated the importance of RFDs as a source
of information about firms’ risk exposures. Overall, these four studies highlight the importance of
clear and precise RFDs and the subsequent impact on firms’ risks.
2.3.2 Proposal for future research on investor usefulness
Although there is extensive work already done on investor usefulness of risk factor disclosure,
there is still opportunity for further research in this area. The following research questions are
proposed for future studies on investor usefulness:
1.

What is the effect of risk factor disclosure on the cost of equity capital? Campbell et al.
(2014) reported a reduction in information asymmetry effect; examining the effect of this
reduction on capital costs will be interesting.

2.

How are firms’ risk disclosures considered by market participants? Are the firms
considered as riskier or more transparent? Risk disclosure is negative by nature and
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different from most disclosures in the annual report. Whether more RFD is considered more
risk or better quality remains to be investigated.
3.

Are firms with better risk disclosures able to raise capital more easily?

4.

How do stock markets react to the release and update of risk factor disclosure? 14Is it
possible to isolate the effect of RFD from other information in the 10-K?

5.

How are risk disclosures related to the firms’ information environment such as investors’
and analysts’ trading behaviour? Hope et al. (2016) report some benefits of more specific
RFD for analysts. Other analyst characteristics can also be examined to better understand
these benefits.

2.4. Contracting Usefulness
Studies on contracting usefulness tend to focus on compensation and debt contracting. There is
currently only one paper on the usefulness of RFDs in the debt market. There is vast potential for
research on the impact of RFDs in the debt market. Apart from the SEC’s interest in the benefit of
RFDs for other users of the annual 10-K report, examining the debt market is important as debt
financing is the predominant source of external financing in the US. The securities issue report for
US corporations published by the Federal Reserve Bank shows that over $1.6 trillion bonds were
issued in 2016.15 Section 2.4.3 includes recommendations on research opportunities relating to
RFDs and debt contracting.

14

Since Item 1A is released along with other information, it may be difficult to examine the direct impact.
This data is available from the Federal Reserve Bank current releases:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm.
15
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2.4.1 Debt Contracting
Chiu et al. (2017) examined the relationship between RFDs and the pricing of credit default swap.
The study builds on the expectation that more transparent or precise accounting disclosures will
help reduce credit stakeholder’s uncertainty about the underlying firm risk. The authors examined
the effect of RFDs on credit default swap spread and whether this effect is greater for firms with
high information uncertainty. The sample period extends from 2003 to 2007 and the final sample
size is 7,504 firm quarter observations for 535 unique firms. The authors use both level and change
research models to examine the research objectives. RFD is measured as a dummy variable that
takes the value of one for firms that comply with Item 1A disclosure and zero otherwise. Credit
default swap pricing is measured as the natural log of the spread on the first day of trading after
SEC filing. Information uncertainty is operationalized as analyst forecast dispersion, number of
business segments, and number of credit default swap quote contributors.
The authors find that credit default swap spread reduces from pre-RFDs period to postRFDs period, suggesting that credit investors incorporate RFDs in their pricing of credit default
swap. The authors also use content analysis to examine the association between credit default swap
and the length of RFDs. Similar to Campbell et al. (2014), the authors find a positive association
between credit default swap spread and RFDs further confirming RFD is priced in credit default
swap spreads. The results also show that the effect of RFDs on credit default swap is more
pronounced when there is greater information uncertainty. Overall results confirm the usefulness
of RFDs in the debt market and opens up further research on the usefulness of RFDs to other
audiences other than equity investors. Next, I discuss the only paper on compensation contracting
by Israelsen and Yonker (2017).

36

2.4.2 Compensation contracting
Israelsen and Yonker (2017) examined the human capital risks posed by key employees, defined
as an employee who possesses a large fraction of the firm’s human capital. In their study,
disclosure relating to “key man life insurance” was used as a measure of human capital risk. The
human capital possessed by key employees is difficult if not impossible to replace, for example
scientists who develop high-tech products and some Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Thus,
companies exposed to key human capital risk may obtain key man life insurance policies due to
dependence on such employees or in accordance with loan covenant requirements.
To develop the data, Israelsen and Yonker conducted a search of filings from every firm
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAR, and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) to identify disclosure of key man insurance. A computer script was written to search for
phrases such as “key person life insurance”, “key woman life insurance” and similar derivatives.
Identified firms were further classified as to whether key life employees are disclosed and insured
(Disclosure/Yes) or disclosed but not insured (Disclosure/No). Key human capital was set as an
indicator variable equal to one for the Disclose/Yes firms and zero for the Disclose/No firms. The
sample in the study was 51,316 firm-year observations for 8,013 unique firms from 1996 to 2009.
Of the firms that disclose and have insurance, those that state the policy amount were further
classified.
To investigate the characteristics of firms that are exposed to key human capital risk, the
authors examined differences between firms that insure key employees and those that do not. The
results showed that smaller, younger firms with better growth opportunities, lower asset tangibility,
and greater propensity to make disclosures are more likely to be key human capital intensive. Also,
there is some evidence that these firms have weak governance and most are run by the CEO.
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Furthermore, insuring firms tend to be smaller, have poorer growth opportunities, and fewer
tangible assets compared to firms with human capital that is not insured. To test whether key
human capital firms were riskier, the volatility and abnormal returns for firms with higher key
human capital were examined where stock volatility was measured as the daily standard deviation
of stock returns and stock idiosyncratic volatility was the standard deviation of the residual from
a regression of daily stock returns on the 3 Fama-French factors. The results of this test showed
that volatility is higher for firms that make key man insurance disclosures, but there is no difference
in the level of risk between firms that choose to insure and those that do not. To test market reaction
to the announcement of key employees, firms with key human capital (KHC) intensity were further
split into high KHC and low KHC based on the median score in the sample. The results showed
that when key executives leave high KHC firms, there is a more negative market reaction but
hardly any reaction when key executives depart from low KHC firms. The authors then examined
whether firms with key human capital are more innovative than those without, where innovation
was measured as the natural log of number of patents filed during the calendar year and the number
of citations the patents received. The results showed that firms with key human capital produce
more patents than similar sized industry peers. Also, firms with key employees holding MD and
PhD degrees produce more patents than firms whose key employees are not doctors. The final test
to examine whether key human capital represents a systematic source of risk to an investor did not
show any statistical difference between the high and low KHC portfolios; however, when tercile
portfolios were created, the results show a difference between the two groups suggesting that
investors require compensation for holding firms with key human capital risk.
This study contributes to the literature by identifying and investigating a new type of
human capital – key human capital – and providing evidence of the risks associated with key
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human capital. Furthermore, focusing only on key employees and not all executives highlights the
importance of identifying the type of human capital that is important to firms.
2.4.3 Future research on contracting usefulness
Compared to research on investor usefulness of risk disclosure, the literature on contracting
usefulness is very limited. A possible reason is the regulation’s focus on investors to the detriment
of other financial statement users. In light of the SEC’s recent interest in understanding how other
users can benefit from this disclosure, we can expect research to increase on contracting usefulness
of RFDs. To advance this line of research, I propose the following questions for researchers to
consider in examining the topics relating to contracting usefulness of RFDs.
1.

Is the risk profile of firms reflected in their risk factor disclosure? Campbell et al. (2014)
found that the RFD of firms reflects the type of risks they are exposed to; can RFDs be
used as a proxy of risk?

2.

How are risk disclosures used by the debt market? The focus of RFD research has been on
the equity market. However, understanding its usefulness in the debt market is also
relevant.

3.

Are risk factor disclosures related to managerial risk-taking incentives and managerial risk
aversions? Since managers have the discretion to report more or less risk, understanding
how managerial qualities or characteristics are reflected in RFD is important.

4.

What is the effect of director’s equity-based pay on the quality of risk disclosure? Li (2006)
explained that managers have career concerns regarding disclosure of negative information.
Examining the association between the quality of RFD and managerial pay incentives will
be interesting.
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2.5. Market-wide Usefulness
In this section, I discuss other papers on RFDs that do not directly relate to investor or
contracting usefulness but benefit the market at large. These papers relate to the effect of SEC
comment letters and product market competition. The findings from these papers also enrich our
knowledge of RFDs and their application in other management fields outside accounting and
finance.
2.5.1 Risk factor disclosures and SEC comment letters
Brown, Tian, and Tucker (2014) and Beatty, Cheng, and Zhang (2015) examined the effect of SEC
comment letters related to RFDs. Brown et al. (2014) investigated whether a firm changes its risk
factor disclosure after observing SEC comments on its peers’ disclosures, while Beatty et al.
(2015) assessed the relationship between increased financial constraints risk disclosure and
changes in underlying financial risk outcomes for the period before and after the financial crisis
and the period before and after a firm receives SEC RFD comment letters. These two periods are
significant because the former is associated with changes in underlying financial constraint risk
while the latter puts regulatory pressure on the firm which may or may not reflect underlying
economic risk. As explained by Brown et al. (2014), the SEC can issue a comment letter after a
full review of a firm’s filings, a financial statement review, or a targeted review examining only
specific issues in the filing. Firms can respond to the comment letter by providing additional
information, amending the filing, or disclosing additional information in future filings. Firms avoid
receiving SEC comment letters related to RFDs because of the negative consequences of this
disclosure, for example the significant amount of time and resources needed to resolve the issues
identified, which can lead to uncertainties and distractions for management. In addition, the
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comment letter can negatively affect investors’ perceptions about the firm which may affect the
firm’s market return.
Brown et al. (2014) examined how a no-letter firm (a firm that did not receive a SEC
comment letter) reacts to comment letters received by the leaders in their industry (at least 20%
share), a close industry rival, a large number of industry peers, and an industry peer with the same
auditor. The data was obtained from 10-K filings in the EDGAR and Audit Analytics databases
for the period between January 2005 and December 2010. The final sample was made up of 13,254
Item 1A filings. The sample firms were grouped into four categories: (1) risk letter firms are firms
that receive comments on the risk factor disclosure; (2) 10-K non-risk-letter firms receive
comments on 10-K issues other than risk factor disclosure; (3) other-letter firms receive comments
on filings other than 10-K; and (4) no-letter firms do not receive any SEC comment letter. RFD
modification was measured based on a similarity score and the absolute change in the number of
words in the RFD. Beatty et al. (2015) tested the association between the extent of disclosure of
financial constraints risk and measures of expected financial constraints and litigation risks. They
also tested the association between realized financial constraints and the extent of financial
constraints RFDs over the financial crisis period and the association between realized financial
constraints and the extent of financial constraints RFDs after receiving an SEC comment letter.
The sample for the study was drawn from all 10-K filings from 2006 to 2013 on EDGAR and
consisted of 22,434 firm-year observations from 4,658 unique firms. Financial constraint
disclosure relates to external capital, leverage, and cash flows.
The results in Brown et al. (2014) confirmed a spillover effect based on industry leader,
close rival, or a large number of industry peers receiving SEC comment letters, i.e., a no-letter firm
will significantly modify the following year’s risk disclosure in response to the comment letter
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received by other companies in these situations. The result, however, was not significant when an
industry peer with the same auditor receives a comment letter. Beatty et al. (2015) confirmed that
risk factor disclosures reflect expected financial constraint but this did not change for the pre-,
during, and post-crisis period for the financial constraint measure. It did, however, change for the
litigation risk measure, suggesting that RFDs are more sensitive to litigation risk. The results also
showed that the quality of RFDs reduce from the pre- to the post-crisis period and that firms
increase their disclosures after receiving a SEC comment letter; however, this effect diminishes
one-year after receiving the SEC comment letter.
These studies contribute to the RFD and public enforcement literature by showing that
there is some reaction to SEC comment letters on risks that have market-wide implications.
2.5.2 Product market competition
Yen, Li, and Chen (2016) examined whether and how firms in more concentrated industries
(higher proprietary costs) avoid divulging information to competitors through risk factor
disclosures. The study builds on proprietary cost theory and the willingness of managers to provide
more or less information when faced with competition. Firms can choose to disclose less to avoid
the proprietary cost of disclosure or more when the benefit of sharing cost is higher than the cost.
Also, the threat of entrants and litigation risks can influence the level of risk disclosure due to the
negative nature of this disclosure. The authors examined the association and similarity between
industry concentration and both overall risk disclosure and idiosyncratic RFD.
The sample was drawn from all non-financial firms in Compustat from 2006 to 2009, with
a final sample consisting of 8,509 firm-year observations and 1,155 industry years. The risk
measures were based on the five RFD categories identified in Campbell et al. (2014). The
similarity score followed comparable literature that uses cosine similarity scores, while industry
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concentration was measured using the U.S. census-based four-firm concentration ratio. The results
showed that firms in more concentrated industries actually increase the number of RFDs in
Item1A; they do not decrease the disclosure to avoid divulging information. Furthermore, firms in
more concentrated industries may reduce the informativeness of their disclosures by making them
similar to their competitors rather than reduce the amount of risk disclosure.
The finding that firms avoid divulging information by making their disclosure content
similar to those of their competitors highlights a strategy that firms can use to reduce the
informativeness of their disclosure. Future studies can explore the effect of RFDs in other
management fields such as organizational behaviour and marketing.
2.5.3 Future research on other topics
Below are some suggested research topics on risk factor disclosures that are not related to investor
or contracting usefulness of the disclosure but have some market-wide implications.
1.

How do a firm’s characteristics determine the type of risk disclosure? Studies can examine
the relationship between firm characteristics such as firm size, auditor type, industry, and
RFD.

2.

Are risk disclosures reflected in firms’ performance? Studies can examine accounting and
market-based measures of performance to understand the relationship between firm
performance and RFD.

3.

What is the influence of corporate governance on risk factor disclosures? How do
governance attributes, such as board characteristics, influence risk factor disclosures?
Several internal and external governance characteristics can be examined and corporate
governance indexes can be developed to research the topic.
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4.

What is the implication of risk disclosure for litigations? Are ‘riskier’ firms exposed to
higher litigation risk?

5.

What is the relationship between risk factor disclosure and firms’ risk of bankruptcy or
fraud?

2.6. Conclusion
This chapter reviews and proposes directions for future research on RFDs. This review focuses on
the history and background of the regulation, contents or topics disclosed, studies on investor and
contracting usefulness, and research on market-wide usefulness of RFDs, such as effect of SEC
comment letters and product market competition. Beginning in 2005, SEC made it mandatory for
large firms in the US to disclose risks that significantly affect their businesses or securities in Item
1A of the 10-K report. Following criticisms on the generic nature of this disclosure, the SEC has
called for more specific disclosures and also asked the public to provide comments on how to
improve risk factor disclosures.
The review of recent research findings shows that this disclosure offers some information
that is useful to investors, analysts, and other annual report users, confirming that the RFDs are
not boilerplate as speculated earlier. This review maps out the current state of the literature and
suggests areas for future research relating to the content of RFDs, investor and contracting
usefulness of RFDs, and market-wide usefulness of the disclosure. Directions for future research
include analysing the cost versus benefit of improving the disclosure, assessing the usefulness of
RFDs for potential users in the debt market, and understanding the association between RFDs and
corporate governance attributes.
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To date, this review is the only identified study to provide a comprehensive review of the
RFD literature. The findings and suggestions provide a platform for future research in this field
and are informative to users of the annual report and regulators.
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Appendix
Item 1A.Risk Factors.
The value of an investment in Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. is subject to significant risks, certain
of which are specific to our Company, others are inherent in our business and the industry in
which we operate, and still others are market related. If any of the matters described in the risk
factors listed below were to occur, our business and financial results could be materially adversely
affected. The Risk Factors described below apply to the current operations and market for the
common stock of the Company, and do not address risks that may arise in the future.
Risks Related to our Business
We continue to incur substantial losses, and we have no current prospect of generating
operating profits.
For the fiscal years ended August 31, 2012 and 2011, our business generated a net loss of
approximately $12.2 million and $21.0 million, respectively. In recent years, our net patient
revenues have declined, relative to historical levels, due to declines in patient referrals. While we
continue to seek out additional sources of patient referrals, we have not been able to realize the
substantial increase in patient referrals we require in order to generate the revenues needed to offset
our operating losses. Our industry is highly competitive, and we have not been able to identify and
execute any business plan that might result in an operating profit or even in decreased losses. We
are currently evaluating strategic alternatives in an attempt to reverse our historical trend of
operating losses, although there can be no assurance that we will be able to reverse this trend. If
we are unable to generate positive net income on a consistent basis going forward, we may not be
able to continue our operations.
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Our cash reserves cannot continue to support the level of losses we have incurred in recent
years.
As of August 31, 2012, we had approximately $30.8 million in net assets, including
approximately $10.6 million in cash and cash equivalents, available for continuing operations.
These reserves are being steadily depleted by our losses, which totalled approximately $33.2
million in our last two fiscal years. If we are unsuccessful in implementing an alternative business
plan to increase revenues and improve performance, or are otherwise required to continue to use a
substantial portion of our current assets in order to continue our day to day operations, then our
continued operations will not be sustainable.
A significant percentage of our revenues are generated through relatively few physicians.
For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2012, approximately 90% of our gross revenues of our
Pasadena facility were generated from 7 surgeons. For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2011,
approximately 91% of our gross revenues of our Pasadena facility were generated from 11
surgeons. A physician from our medical staff, who accounted for 19% and 7% of gross revenues
for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2012 and 2011, respectively, passed away in August 2012.
The loss of this physician led to a reduction in our revenues and adversely affected our results of
operations. The loss of other physicians who provide significant net patient revenues for the
Company may adversely affect our results of operations.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary of Literature
Article

Topics

Bao & Datta
2012

Topic Modelling

Beatty,
Cheng,
&Zhang,
2015

Financial crisis
period and response
to SEC comment
letters

Brown, Tian,
& Tucker,
2014

Campbell,
Chen,

Method

Time
Period
Modified version of 2006LDA to identify
2010
topics
Content analysis to 2006identify sentences
2013
on financial
constraint risk

Sample

Findings

14,799 10-K
filings

Identified 30 risk topics covered in risk
factor disclosure.

22,438 firmyear
observations

Spillover effect of
SEC comment letters

Change in
disclosure using
Vector Space
Model and change
in length of
disclosure

20052010

13,254 firmyear
observations

Information content

Word
Categorization

20002008

9,076 firmyear
observations

Financial constraints risk disclosures
are positively associated with financial
constraints risk outcomes pre-financial
crisis period, but the association
disappears during the crisis and postcrisis after the firm receives SEC
comment letters, i.e., increased
regulation.
Firms that did not receive any
comment letter from SEC tend to
modify a subsequent year’s risk
disclosure if the SEC commented on
the risk disclosure of its industry
leader, a close rival, or numerous
industry peers;
After the release of an industry leaders’
comment, firms that did not receive
any letter make their subsequent risk
disclosure more firm-specific.
Firms facing greater risk disclose more
risk factors and the type of risk faced
by a firm determines how much of the
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Article

Topics

Method

Time
Period

Dhaliwal, Lu,
& Steel, 2014

Campbell,
Cecchini,
Cianci,
Ehinger, &
Werner, 2016

Future cash flow and
stock returns

Content analysis
based on key words

Chiu, Guan,
& Kim, 2017

The Effect of Risk
Content analysis.
Factor Disclosures on
the Pricing of Credit
Default Swaps.

20032007

Filzen, 2015

Informativeness of
risk factor disclosure
in 10-Q

20062010

Automated Python
programming
language

20052010

Sample

Findings
section is dedicated to describing that
risk;
Information in risk factor disclosure is
reflected in idiosyncratic risk,
information asymmetry, systematic
risk and firm value.
Significant positive association
between tax risk disclosure and future
cash flow;
Tax risks are positively associated with
future stock returns.

7,234 for oneyear forward
6,735 for twoyear forward
6,312 for
three-year
forward
6,944 for value
relevance test
7,504 firmCredit Default Spread (CDS) decreased
quarter
after disclosure of risk factors. CDS
observations.
increases with the length of RFDs and
the number of risk words. Also, CDS is
more pronounced for firms with greater
information asymmetry. CDS volatility
also decreases from the pre- to the
post-disclosure period.
13,165 firmFirms with quarterly updates to their
quarters
risk factor have lower cumulative
abnormal returns around the 10-Q
filing;
Quarterly update is associated with
downward shift in the distribution of
unexpected earnings three quarters
following the update.
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Article

Topics

Method

Time
Period
20062014

Sample

Findings

Filzen,
McBrayer, &
Shannon,
2016

Future stock returns
and stock market
efficiency around
quarterly update
language
Whether mangers
disclose risks to warn
of future outcomes
Topic Labelling

Automated Python
programming
language

52,955 firmquarters

Evidence of stock market under
reaction for firms that do not use words
that describe the impact of their risk on
firm fundamentals.

Regression analysis

20052015

31,549 firmyears

Managers update their disclosure in an
informative manner.

20062010
20062011

21,077 10-K
filings
14,865

Identified 25 risk types.

Level of detail

Multi-label text
classifier
Automated analysis
based on Campbell
et al. (2014)

Hu, Johnson,
& Liu, 2017

Effect of uncertainty
on pricing of risk

Theoretical research 20062014

108 monthly
returns

Israelsen,
2014

Topics of disclosure
and firm and industry
characteristics
associated with
disclosure type
Key Human Capital

Topic modelling
using Latent
Dirichlet
Application (LDA)

20062011

21,077 firmyear
observations

Content analysis;
Key word search

19962009

51,316 firmyear
observations

Gaulin, 2007
Huang & Li
2011
Hope, Danqi,
& Hai, 2016

Israelsen and
Yonker, 2017

Absolute value of market reaction to
10-K filing is significantly positively
associated with the level of detail;
Analysts are better able to assess a
firms’ fundamental risk when risk
factor disclosures are more detailed.
Investors form priors about risk
exposure. Truthful disclosure of risks
can reduce cost of capital.
Average returns in small value firms
and in SMB and HML factors are
related to the disclosed risks about
access to capital and aggregate
financial markets.
Firms with key human capital and
firms with greater exposure to key
human capital are riskier;
Stock returns decline at 4% on average
following the departure announcement
of key employee;
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Article

Topics

Method

Time
Period

Sample

Mirakur 2011

Disclosure content
Manual content
and firm performance analysis to identify
topics

2009
filings

122 random
firm-year
observations

Nelson &
Pritchard,
2016

Voluntary vs.
Mandatory risk
disclosure regime

19962010

181 firms
(High risk)

Manual extraction
of risk factor
section.

112 firms
(Low risk)

Riley
&Taylor,
2014

Effect of readability
on risk factor
disclosure

Experimental
survey

Not
applicable

365 nonprofessional
investors

Yen, Li, &
Chen, 2016

Product market
competition

Automated content
analysis

20062009

8,509 firmyear
observations

Findings
Investors require a premium for
exposure to firms with key human
capital risk and firms with key human
capital are generally more innovative.
The 5 most common risk disclosure
categories are: capital structure,
competition, governance, key
personnel, and macro;
The risk classifications are not driven
by firms’ industry and only some risk
categories are predictive of capital
leverage and cash, but not for leverage
and acquisitions.
During voluntary disclosure regime,
firms with high litigation risk disclosed
a greater number of risk factors that are
less boilerplate and easier to read than
firms with low litigation risk. This
difference disappeared during the
mandatory regime. Therefore, firms
with high litigation risk use disclosure
to mitigate expected cost of litigation.
Readability affects non-professional
investors’ assessment of risk but has no
effect on presentation style or reliance
on risks.
Firms in more concentrated industries
do not reduce the amount of risk factor
disclosures but rather provide more
similar disclosure to their competitors.
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Table 2: SEC Request for Comment Summary
1145
1146

1147

1148

1149

Request for Comment
How could we improve risk factor disclosure? For example, should
we revise our rules to require that each risk factor be accompanied
by a specific discussion of how the registrant is addressing the risk?
Should we require registrants to discuss the probability of
occurrence and the effect on performance for each risk factor? If so,
how could we modify our disclosure requirements to best provide
this information to investors? For example, should we require
registrants to describe their assessment of risks?
How could we modify our rules to require or encourage registrants
to describe risks with greater specificity and context? For example,
should we require registrants to disclose the specific facts and
circumstances that make a given risk material to the registrant?
How should we balance investors’ need for detailed disclosure with
the requirement to provide risk factor disclosure that is “clear and
concise”? Should we revise our rules to require registrants to
present their risk factors in order of management’s perception of
the magnitude of the risk or by order of importance to
management? Are there other ways we could improve the
organization of registrants’ risk factors disclosure? How would this
help investors navigate the disclosure?
What, if anything, detracts from an investor’s ability to gain
important information from a registrant’s risk factor disclosure? Do
lengthy risk factor disclosures hinder an investor’s ability to
understand the most significant risks?
How could we revise our rules to discourage registrants from
providing risk factor disclosure that is not specific to the registrant
but instead describes risks that are common to an industry or to

Suggestions for Future Research

Research can build on the work done by Hope et al.
(2016) to examine whether the level of specificity or
detail is associated with usefulness of risk factor
disclosure.

Studies can examine the relationship between the
length of Item 1A disclosure and understandability of
the disclosure. Different proxies of understandability
such as the Fog index or other lexical quality proxies
can be examined. Other factors apart from length can
also be examined.
Studies have shown some spill-over effect from
disclosures. It is possible that generic risks also
provide some information to investors. Investigating
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1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

Request for Comment
registrants in general? Alternatively, are generic risk factors
important to investors?
Should we specify generic risks that registrants are not required to
disclose, and if so, how should we identify those risks? Are there
other ways that we could help registrants focus their disclosure on
material risks?
Should we retain or eliminate the examples provided in Item
503(c)? Should we revise our requirements to include additional or
different examples? Would deleting these examples encourage
registrants to focus on their own risk identification process?
Should we require registrants to identify and disclose in order their
ten most significant risk factors without limiting the total number of
risk factors disclosed?
If so, should other risk factors be included in a separate section of
the filing or in an exhibit to distinguish them from the most
significant risks? Alternatively, should we require registrants to
provide a risk factors summary in addition to the complete
disclosure? Would a summary help investors better understand a
registrant’s risks by highlighting certain information? Are there
challenges associated with requiring a summary of the most
significant risks?
Are there ways, in addition to those we have used in Item 503, our
Plain English 153.Rules and guidance on MD&A, to ensure that
registrants include meaningful, rather than boilerplate, risk factor
disclosure?
Risk profiles of registrants are constantly changing and evolving.
For example, registrants today face risks, such as those associated
with cyber security, climate change, and arctic drilling, 494 that
may not have existed when the 1964 Guides and 1968 Guides were
published. Is Item 503(c) effective for capturing emerging risks? If
not, how should we revise Item 503(c) to make it more effective in
this regard?

Suggestions for Future Research
the informativeness of generic risks can provide more
evidence in this field of research.

Studies can examine the cost versus benefit of
requiring additional disclosure in terms of a summary
which will also contribute to increasing the length of
the 10-K report.
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1155

1156

Request for Comment
What types of investors or audiences are most likely to value the
Item 503(c) disclosures?

Suggestions for Future Research
Studies can examine whether other audiences benefit
from risk disclosures. A potential area of future
research is examining debt and compensation
contracts in line with the risk profile of firms.

What is the cost of providing the disclosure required by Item
503(c), including the administrative and compliance costs of
preparing and disseminating this disclosure? How would these
costs change if we made any of the changes contemplated here?
Please provide quantified estimates where possible and include
only those costs associated with providing disclosure under Item
503(c).
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Table 3: Summary of RFD topics

1

Huang & Li
(2011)
Shareholder's
interest risk

2

Regulation
changes

3

Input prices
risks

4

Shareholder's
interest risk

Bao & Datta
(2012)
Topic 0:
Investment,
property,
distribution,
interest,
agreement

Campbell et al.
(2014)
Financial: Investment
in plant, investment in
equipment, leases,
improvements, sale of
productive assets,
locked-in,
construction
Topic 1:
Legal & Regulatory:
Regulation,
Deregulation,
change, law,
regulatory, regulatory
financial,
approval, regulatory
operation,
change, regulatory
tax,
compliance,
accounting
regulatory
environment, new
standard, new method,
possibility of
restatements,
uncertainties in
estimates
Topic 2: Gas, Other systematic: gas,
price, oil,
fuel, gasoline,
natural,
petroleum, metal(s),
operation,
mineral(s), mining,
production
natural gas, oil, ore,
silver, steel, housing,
capacity, gold,
housing starts, coal,
obsolescence,
overstocked, price
pressure, prices,
pricing power, raw
material, unsalable
inventory
Topic 3:
Financial: stock
Stock, price,
market listing, stock
share, market, price drop, stock price
future,
volatility, decline in
dividend,
stock price, dividends,
security,
illiquid market,
stakeholder
underwriting, limited
trading, penny stock

Israelsen
(2014)
Dividends
Stakeholder

Risk
represented
Financial

Regulation

Regulatory/Leg
al

Oil

Macroeconomic

Stock Price
Disclosure

Financial
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5

Huang & Li
(2011)
Regulation
changes

6

Financial
condition risks

7

Potential/ongoi
ng lawsuits

8

Competition
risks

9

Human
resource risks

Bao & Datta
(2012)
Topic 4:
Cost,
regulation,
environment,
law,
operation,
liability

Campbell et al.
(2014)
Legal and regulatory:
casualty, charged,
defendant, adverse
judgment, anti-trust,
environmental,
hazardous, product
liability, regulation,
Superfund
Topic 5:
Financial: financial
control,
condition, antifinancial,
takeover, dilution,
internal, loss, Other idiosyncratic:
reporting,
asset impairment,
history
asset securitization,
cost control,
downsizing,
economies of scale,
underlying
Topic 6:
Legal & Regulatory:
financial,
class action,
litigation,
compliance, comply,
operation,
contamination, injury,
action, legal, litigation, pay
liability,
damages, penalty,
regulatory,
enforcement (of
claim, lawsuit judgment),fines,
pending lawsuit,
plaintiff, potential
lawsuit, safety,
remediation
Topic 7:
competitive,
industry,
competition,
highly,
market
Topic 8: cost, Other idiosyncratic:
operation,
key personnel, labor,
labor,
labor relations, labor
operating,
unions, keep & retain
employee,
top mgt, mgt
increase,
retention, strike,
acquisition
personnel, redundancy

Israelsen
(2014)
Environment
al Regulation

Risk
represented
Regulatory/
legal

Accounting
Costs

Financial
Idiosyncratic

Legal

Legal

Competition

Systematic

Human
Capital

Idiosyncratic
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10

Huang & Li
(2011)
New product
introduction
risks

11

Restructuring
risk
Merger and
acquisition risk

12

Human
resource risks

13

Potential
defects in
products

Bao & Datta
(2012)
Topic 9:
product,
candidate,
development,
approval,
clinical,
regulatory

Campbell et al.
(2014)
Other idiosyncratic:
clinical, new product
acceptance, new
product dev, product,
product dev, product
performance, product
mix, production,
preclinical, patent,
advertising,
certification, backlog,
commercialize,
concentration,
copyright, licence,
market acceptance,
marketing innovation,
new construction,
publicity, research and
development
Topic 10: tax, Other idiosyncratic:
income, asset, brand recognition,
net, goodwill, brand, consolidation,
loss,
intangible, integrate,
distribution,
intellectual, internal,
impairment,
investment in
intangible
subsidiaries,
restructuring,
restructuring
implementation,
Topic 11:
Other idiosyncratic:
interest,
corporate culture,
director, trust, material weaknesses,
combination, reporting controls,
share, conflict Sarbanes-Oxley
Topic 12:
Financial: insider
product,
sales
liability,
claim,
market,
insurance,
sale, revenue

Israelsen
(2014)
Product
Approval
Product
Development
1 and 2

Risk
represented
Idiosyncratic

Accounting

Tax

Human
Capital

Idiosyncratic

Demand

Idiosyncratic
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Huang & Li
(2011)

Bao & Datta
(2012)
Topic 13:
loan, real
estate,
investment,
property,
market, loss,
portfolio

15

Human
resource risks

Topic 14:
personnel,
key, retain,
attract,
management,
employee

16

Volatile stock
prices risk

17

Funding Risks
Merger and
Acquisition
Risks

Topic 15:
stock, price,
operating,
stockholder,
fluctuate,
interest,
volatile
Topic 16:
acquisition,
growth,
future,
operation,
additional,
capital,
strategy

14

Campbell et al.
(2014)
Other idiosyncratic:
maintenance,
insurance coverage,
secret, limited
operating history,
MBS, M.B.S,
Mortgage backed
securities, mortgage
servicing rights, MSR,
M.S.R
Other systematic:
Mortgage, real, real
estate investment
trust, REIT, R.E.I.T
Financial: defined
benefit, family,
reorganization,
postretirement, OPEB,
O.P.E.B, funded
status, unfunded
pension, mandatory
contribution, adequate
staffing, training,
union election
Financial: volatility of
revenue, operating
results, sales

Israelsen
(2014)
Real Estate

Risk
represented
Financial

Human
Capital

Idiosyncratic

Stock Price

Financial

Other idiosyncratic:
Growth
acquisition, goodwill,
goodwill impairment,
impairment, joint
venture, merger, SPE,
S.P.E, Special purpose
vehicle, synergy,
trademark, variable
interest entity, VIE,
V.I.E, Proprietary

Idiosyncratic
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18

19

Huang & Li
(2011)
Macroeconomi
c risks
Industry is
cyclical

Bao & Datta
(2012)
Topic 17:
condition,
economic,
financial,
market,
industry,
change,
affected,
downturn,
demand

Infrastructure
risk
Disruption of
operations

Topic 18:
system,
service,
information,
failure,
product,

Campbell et al.
(2014)
Other systematic:
economy, EU, Euro,
E.U, European union,
fiscal policy, foreign
currency, aggregate
demand, foreign
exchange, general
business risks, general
conditions, seasonal,
GDP, G.D.P, GNP,
G.N.P, general
economic condition,
industry, industry
environment,
inflation, currency
collapse, currency,
cyclical, demand,
economic (condition,
downturn, growth),
political climate,
political instability,
pound, middle east,
monetary policy, peso,
recession, RMB,
Rubble, Rupee,
terrorism, U.S. dollar,
war, Yen, Yuan,
Enron, economic
uncertainties,
electricity, energy,
complement,
concentration,
consumer confidence,
consumer spending,
consumption, market
(demand, supply,
place), materials
operating environment
Other idiosyncratic:
internet, IT, I.T.,
information
technology, security,
software, systems,
technological

Israelsen
(2014)
International

Risk
represented
Macroeconomic

Systems
Internet

Idiosyncratic
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Huang & Li
(2011)

Bao & Datta
(2012)
operation,
software,
network,
breach,
interruption

20

Suppliers risk

Topic 19:
cost, contract,
operation,
plan,
increase,
pension,
delay

21

Rely on few
large
customers
Suppliers risks
Downstream
risk

22

Intellectual
property risk
Licensing
related risks

23

Volatile
demand and
results
competition
risks

Topic 20:
customer,
product,
revenue, sale,
supplier,
relationship,
key, portion,
contract,
manufacturin
g, rely
Topic 21:
property,
intellectual,
protect,
proprietary,
technology,
patent,
protection,
harm, licence
Topic 22:
product,
market,
service,
change, sale,

Campbell et al.
(2014)
obsolescence,
technologies,
technology, web
security, website(s),
embargo, expand,
expanding, export,
facilities,
franchise(ee),expansio
n, online
Other systematic:
saving, substitute
Other idiosyncratic:
delivery, distribution,
distributor, single
supplier, reliance on
key supplier, contract,
sole supplier,
suppliers, supply
chain, shortages,
vendor
Other idiosyncratic:
customer
concentration,
customer control,
single customer,
reliance on key
customer

Israelsen
(2014)

Risk
represented

Legal and regulatory:
infringe, intellectual
property

Intellectual
Property

Regulatory/Leg
al

Other systematic:
commodity,
competition,
competitor, tariff,

Demand
Competition

Systematic

Supply Chain Systematic
Contractual

Supply Chain Idiosyncratic
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Huang & Li
(2011)

24

Potential/ongoi
ng lawsuits

25

Regulation
changes

26

Financial
condition risks

27

Funding risks

Bao & Datta
(2012)
demand,
successfully,
technology,
competition
Topic 23:
provision,
law, control,
change,
stock,
prevent,
stockholder,
Delaware,
charter,
delay, bylaw
Topic 24:
regulation,
government,
change,
revenue,
contract, law,
service

Topic 25:
capital,
credit,
financial,
market, cost,
operation,
rating, access,
liquidity,
downgrade
Topic 26:
debt,
indebtedness,
cash,
obligation,
financial,
credit,
covenant

Campbell et al.
(2014)
trade, no current
operations,

Israelsen
(2014)

Risk
represented

Legal and regulatory:
conflict of interest,
related party

Contractual
Legal

Regulatory/Leg
al

Legal and regulatory:
IFRS, I.F.R.S,
inquiry(ies),
investigation,
legislation,
government
investigation,
government policy,
government approval,
government
investigation, FDA
approval, Federal,
Fraud
Financial: capital,
credit rating,
downgrade, liquidity,
rating, working
capital, Maturity,
negative operating CF

Regulation

Regulatory/Leg
al

Financing
Credit

Financial

Financial: credit,
Financial
covenant, credit risk,
Market
bank debt, obligations,
loan, debt burden,
default, indebtedness,
collateral, chapter 11,
chapter 7, chapter 9,
leverage(d), financing

Financial

67

Huang & Li
(2011)

Bao & Datta
(2012)

Campbell et al.
(2014)
costs, refinance(ing),
renegotiation, new
financing

Israelsen
(2014)

Risk
represented

28

International
risks

Topic 27:
operation,
international,
foreign,
currency,
rate,
fluctuation

International

Macroeconomic

29

Financial
condition risks

Insurance

Financial

30

Catastrophes

Topic 28:
loss,
insurance,
financial,
loan, reserve,
operation,
cover
Topic 29:
operation,
natural,
facility,
disaster,
event,
terrorist,
weather

Other systematic:
exchange rate,
financial crisis,
foreign currency,
Asian crisis, business
conditions, forward,
growth rates, hedging,
Iraq, call, Hedge,
Option, Peso,
Derivative,
discounting,
Renminbi, swap,
short,
Financial: operating
losses, reinsurance,
reserves, revolver

31

Other idiosyncratic:
Natural disasters,
weather, SARS,
September (11th)

Tax: uncertain tax,
VAT, Value added
tax, aggressive tax,
back taxes, deferred
tax, excise, FIN 48,
IRS, I.R.S, Internal
Revenue Service, IRS
audit, IRS judgment,
Loss (carry forward,
carry backs), property
tax(es), provision for

Macroeconomic

International
Revenue

Tax

68

Huang & Li
(2011)

32

Bao & Datta
(2012)

Campbell et al.
(2014)
income tax(es), state
tax(es), tax(es), tax
audit, tax
authority(ies), tax
liability(ies), tax
penalty(ies), taxable

Israelsen
(2014)

Risk
represented

Health Care

Idiosyncratic
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Chapter 3: Essay Two

Risk Factor Disclosures and the Cost of Private and Public Debt
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Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) in the annual 10K report and the cost of debt in both the private and public debt markets. I examine this
relationship from two perspectives: the direct effect of RFDs on cost of debt, and the indirect
effect on cost of debt through Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD). ARFD is a new measure
proposed to capture managerial discretion in risk factor reporting and it is estimated as the residual
from the regression of RFD on its determinants. To measure RFDs, I use the total number of words
in Item 1A-RFD and the aggregate and categorical risk words developed by Campbell, Chen,
Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014). To extract RFDs from company filings in the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval Systems (EDGAR) database, I employ an automated content
analysis method. I find that firms with greater numbers of RFD words have higher cost of debt in
both the private and public debt markets. This finding supports previous research findings that
RFDs reflect the risk profiles of firms. I also find that firms in the private debt market are
rewarded for transparency with lower cost of debt when there is more risk factor disclosure than
expected. However, firms are not penalized with higher cost of debt for risk factor reporting below
expectation. In the public debt market, more risk disclosure is associated with higher cost of debt,
while less risk disclosure attracts lower cost of debt. This is consistent with the expectation that
public debt lenders rely on public disclosures for information. In addition, I find that risk words
relating to financial risk tend to be associated with cost of debt, suggesting financial risks are
highly relevant in the debt market. The results are consistent when applying the same risk
disclosure measures for Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of the 10-K report.
The findings in this chapter suggest RFDs are both informative and useful to audiences (borrowers
and lenders) outside of equity investors.
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3. Introduction
Beginning in 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it mandatory for
large companies16 to disclose the most significant risks that apply to the company or their
securities in Item 1A-Risk factors of the annual 10-K report. The objective of this disclosure is to
inform financial statement users on the risks to which companies are exposed. Recently, the SEC
has issued comment letters asking for suggestions on how to make this disclosure more
meaningful. Chapter 2 of this dissertation discussed in detail the requirements of Item 1A and
reviewed the current literature.
Recent studies have shown some association between Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and
earnings and returns (Kravet & Muslu, 2013), investors’ risk perception (Campbell et al., 2014),
assessment of fundamental risk by analysts (Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016), and creditor investors (Chiu,
Guan, & Kim, 2017). These results suggest that RFDs are informative and are useful in decision
making. Whether this usefulness of this information extends to the cost of debt, however, remains
an empirical question. Furthermore, studies have used a variety of methods to measure RFDs.
Campbell et al. (2014) use total number of words and total number of risk words, while Hope et al.
(2016) use the specificity of risk factor words. Herein, I introduce a new measure to capture
managers’ discretion in reporting RFDs: Abnormal RFD (ARFD). This measure is obtained by
decomposing RFDs into normal and abnormal components based on the determinants and then
examining the effect of managerial discretion in reporting RFDs on the debt market.
The debt market is comprised of the private and public debt markets, and the characteristics
of the borrowers and lenders in these two markets differ significantly. Lenders in the private debt
market (predominantly banks) have access to private information, are more sophisticated, and are
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Large companies are defined as firms with more than $75m in assets.
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better able to process information compared to lenders in the public debt market (bondholders).
Furthermore, borrowers in the private debt market have lower accounting and disclosure quality
compared to public debt borrowers (Bharath, Sundar, & Sunder, 2008; Dhaliwal, Khurana, &
Pereira, 2011b). Due to the negative nature of the disclosure, RFDs create an incentive for
managers to exercise discretion when reporting to avoid adverse impacts on the managers’
reputation and career. Recognizing the likelihood of inaccurate disclosure through discretionary
reporting, banks may choose to use other private information at their disposal to estimate firm
risks. Bondholders, on the other hand, do not have access to private information and rely solely on
public information. Considering the institutional differences between these two markets, how
banks and bondholders interpret managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is an empirical question
that can be both insightful and useful.
To my knowledge, there is no study that has examined the direct effect of RFDs and the
indirect effects of Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosures (ARFD) on cost of debt. A related study on
the debt market by Chiu et al. (2017) examined how RFDs affect Credit Default Swaps (CDS).
While Chiu et al. measured RFD using a dummy variable, my study measures RFD based on the
number of risk words. In addition, I focus not only on the direct effect of RFDs in the debt
markets, but also on the indirect effect through discretionary reporting of RFDs. In addressing
some of the gaps in the literature, this study seeks to provide answers to the following research
questions: (1) Do RFDs affect the cost of debt in the private and public debt markets? (2) What is
the impact of ARFD on the cost of debt in the private and public debt market?
Understanding the impact of RFDs in the debt market is significant for three main reasons.
First, debt financing has been observed to be the predominant source of external financing in the
United States. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) report that between 1946 and 1987, 85% of capital

73

was sourced from the debt market compared to 7% sourced from the equity market. This is also
supported by the new securities issue report for U.S. corporations issued by the Federal Reserve
Bank which shows that over $1.6 trillion bonds were issued in 2016. 17 Second, private and public
lenders are more sophisticated than equity investors. While private lenders are mostly banks,
public lenders are mostly institutional investors (Jiang, 2008). Third, the return in the debt market
is fixed compared to that in the equity market. As a result, lenders in the debt market face higher
downside risk compared to equity investors. Although this downside risk is mitigated through loan
covenants and a higher ranking in repayment in cases of bankruptcy, lenders can still lose their
investment if there are no significant assets for sharing. Compared to equity investors, lenders do
not have the privilege of sharing in the company’s profit. For the above reasons, lenders should be
interested in information that can be used to assess the riskiness of borrowers.
This study adopts an automated content analysis method to extract and measure RFDs. I
use the risk words developed by Campbell et al. (2014) as well as the total number of words in
Item 1A to measure RFDs. As an additional test, I also examine whether another disclosure in the
annual 10-K report, Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), contains risk
information that is useful in the debt market. The two measures of cost of debt employed in the
study are All-in Spread (AIS) for the private debt market, and RATING for the public debt market.
AIS is measured as the number of basis points (bps) above LIBOR, as obtained from the DealScan
database, while RATING is a numeric conversion of the Standard & Poor (S&P) issuer bond rating
for the public debt market. RATING has been used in similar studies as a measure of cost of debt
(Jiang, 2008; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005) and is obtained from the Compustat
database.
17

Data available from the Federal Reserve Bank current releases
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm
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For both debt markets, managerial discretion in risk factor reporting (ARFD) is measured
as the residual obtained from the regression of RFDs on its determinants. This measure is further
categorized as positive (PARFD) or negative (NARFD) depending on the sign of the residual. For
private debt, the sample size to examine the direct relationship between RFDs and both the cost of
debt and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is 1,326 loan-years after excluding firms with
incomplete data. For public debt, the final sample size is 3,007 firm-years. The study period covers
2005 to 2015.
In the private debt market, I find a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt
which suggests that RFDs are informative. This association also implies that the information in
RFDs is associated with the data used by banks when setting new loans, thereby confirming that
RFDs reflect the risk profile of firms. Specifically, the results show that an average increase of 1.1
in the number of financial risk words and 0.8 legal risk words increases cost of debt by 0.04 bps.
The results of the effect of managerial discretion on cost of debt show that firms disclosing more
risk factors than expected (PARFD) have a lower cost of debt. This is consistent with my
expectation. However, for firms disclosing less risk information than expected (NARFD), the
results did not show the assumed higher cost of debt. A likely explanation for this result is that
banks already know the risk level of firms and thus reward risky firms for honesty. However, less
risky firms are not penalised for lack of transparency since banks already know these firms are less
risky.
In the public debt market, similar to the private debt market, I also find positive
associations between RFDs and cost of debt. On average, firms in the public debt market have a
lower rating for every 1% increase in number of RFD words. 18 In line with the expectation that

18

This decrease in rating, however, is not large enough to move from one debt rating category to another.
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public debt lenders rely on RFDs, the results for the evaluation of the effect of managerial
discretion on RFDs reveal higher costs of debt for firms disclosing more risk factors (PARFD) and
lower cost of debt for firms disclosing less risk factors (NARFD). These findings suggest public
debt market lenders react to RFDs and likely consider the risk information as representative of
firm risk. The results for the supplementary tests using Item 7-MD&A also support the findings for
both private and public debt markets that the risk profile of firms are reflected in their cost of debt.
The results of the supplementary tests, however, only partly support the effect of managerial
discretion in reporting RFDs on cost of debt. Overall, the results confirm that RFDs are reflected
in the cost of debt and are useful in the debt market.
The finding of a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt is consistent with
Campbell et al. (2014),who argued that firms facing greater risks disclose more risk factors, and
also with Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) who found that banks use tighter loan contract terms, such
as higher spread, to overcome borrower risk. Furthermore, this study makes five main
contributions to the literature. Primarily, to my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to
examine RFDs in the debt market, and the only study to examine the association between RFDs
and cost of debt in the private and public debt market. RFDs are important because of the effect of
risk on cost of debt. Uncertainties in the business environment and the fact that Item 1A-Risk
factor disclosure is a relatively recent disclosure makes understanding the nature and usefulness of
this section a significant aspect in the evaluation of the overall usefulness of the annual report.
Studying the relationship between RFD and cost of debt contributes directly to the disclosure and
debt contracting streams of literature.
Second, this study introduces ARFD as a measure of risk information. Compared to RFD,
ARFD captures managerial discretion in disclosing risk information. This measure enables us to
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examine the level of transparency managers are using in reporting risk disclosures and the
subsequent effect on cost of debt. Considering the negative nature of RFDs, this study provides an
interesting opportunity to observe the positive effect of increased disclosure versus the negative
effect of disclosing higher risk within the same setting.
Third, this study extends and complements prior research by documenting a relationship
between disclosure quality and the cost of debt. Sengupta (1998), Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, and
Wilkins (2011a), and Chen and Yi-Ping (2015) used disclosure quality ratings, internal control
disclosures, and segment disclosure quality, respectively, as proxies of disclosure quality to
examine this relationship. By demonstrating a relationship between RFDs and cost of debt, the
current study supports the importance of disclosure quality in formulating debt contracts.
Fourth, this study provides empirical evidence underpinning the SEC’s call for information
regarding the type of investors or audience that are most likely to value Item 1A-Risk factor
disclosure. Providing evidence of the usefulness of this disclosure in both debt markets contributes
to the understanding of the differences in these markets and shows that RFDs are not only
important to equity investors but also to stakeholders in debt markets.
Finally, through the objectives of this study, I offer valuable insights to debt providers on
the usefulness of financial disclosures, thereby responding to Li’s (2010) call for further research
integrating large-sample textual disclosures with debt contracting and also to the call by Kravet
and Muslu (2013) for research on how debt markets or credit rating agencies respond to risk
disclosures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 develops the ARFD
measure; section 3.2 discusses the background literature; section 3.3 presents the hypotheses;
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section 3.4 discusses the research design; section 3.5 presents the results; and section 3.6 presents
the robustness tests. Section 3.7 concludes the discussion.

3.1. Risk Factor Disclosure Measures
3.1.1 Risk Factor Disclosure Measures in the Literature
Literature on RFDs has used manual or automated content analysis to extract and derive a measure
of risk disclosure. A common measure is the count of the risk words developed by Campbell et al.
(2014). Other measures that have been used in the literature include specificity of the words in
RFDs (Hope et al., 2016), readability of risk disclosure (Nelson & Pritchard, 2014; Riley &
Taylor, 2014), and an indicator variable representing firms that are required by the SEC to report
Item 1A-RFD (Chiu et al., 2017). These various measures aim to capture the information content
in RFDs to establish whether or not the disclosures are boilerplate. Contrary to the expectation that
RFDs are uninformative, these studies actually find that RFDs provide useful information about
firm risk.
To extend the literature in this field, I develop a new measure, referred to as Abnormal
Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD), that captures managerial discretion in risk reporting and is
discussed further below.
3.1.2 New Measurement of Risk: Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure
ARFD is analogous to discretionary accruals or abnormal returns and is measured as the residual
from the regression of the determinants of risk disclosure on RFD. Studies that have used a similar
approach in the accounting literature focus on a variety of topics, including: abnormal audit fees
measured as the residual of the regression of audit fees on audit fee determinants (Asthana &
Boone, 2012; Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2012); abnormal loan loss provision measured as the
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residual from the regression of loan loss provision on the determinants (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan,
& Lobo, 2010); abnormal positive tone measured as the residual from the regression of the
measure of tone in earnings press releases against tone determinants as established in the literature
(Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, Tone Management, 2014); and abnormal Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) disclosure measured as residual from the regression of CSR disclosure measure against
factors determining CSR activities (Cahan, De Villers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2015). ARFD
captures managerial discretion in RFDs by decomposing this disclosure into a normal component
based on the determinants of RFDs and an abnormal component, thus representing the
discretionary part of the disclosure. This abnormal component is the residual from the regression
of the actual RFDs on the determinants. ARFD is useful in understanding how the debt markets
interpret the managers’ choice to disclose more or less risk information than expected.
To derive this measure, I first extract Item 1A-Risk factor disclosures from the annual 10-K
filing and measure the actual RFDs. I discuss the details of this extraction process in section 3.4.
Then, I derive the determinants of RFDs from the findings of three papers that review the topics
and contents of RFDs. The first paper, Campbell et al. (2014), identified five major categories of
risk. The second paper, Bao and Datta (2012), identified 29 risk topics, while the third paper,
Huang and Li (2011), identified 25 risk topics. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I discuss these
papers and present a manual matching of the risk topics across the three papers. This matching
process enables the compression of all identified RFD topics into six major categories of risk:
regulatory or legal; financial; tax; litigation; macroeconomic; and idiosyncratic or operational. 19
Regulatory risk refers to the exposure of firms to laws and regulations. Financial risk includes
liquidity, leverage, share-price drop, takeover possibilities, credit, and other securities risk. Tax
19

In identifying the major risk groups, I allocate the different risk categories into a general risk area. Although this is
a subjective process, I endeavour to match similar risks to the most closely related category.
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risk measures exposure to tax liability, and litigation risk covers risk of lawsuits from business
operations. Macroeconomic risk captures risks such as currency risk, political risk, economic
downturn, natural disasters, and wars, while idiosyncratic (operational) risk is firm specific risk,
including other risks associated with the firm’s operations.
These six categories are my determinants of RFDs and I expect RFDs will not vary
significantly from these determinants. To develop ARFD, I assign proxies to each of the
determinants based on measures established within the literature. Relying on Watts and
Zimmerman (1986), I use firm size (SIZE) as a proxy for regulatory risk measured as the log of
equity market value. It is expected that larger firms are exposed to more regulatory scrutiny and as
such face higher regulatory and legal risk. For financial risk, I use the proxy of leverage (LEV)
which is measured as the book value of debt divided by total assets. This proxy was identified by
Campbell et al. (2014) to have the largest coefficient and statistical significance for all disclosures
related to financial risk. For tax risk, the proxy used is effective tax rate (ETR). Similar to
Campbell et al. (2014) and Campbell, Cecchini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2016), this variable
is measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. The proxy for litigation risk (LIT)
follows Hope et al. (2016). I assign a code of 1 to firms that are within the SIC codes 2833-2836,
3570-3577, 3600-3676, 5200-5961, 7370-7374 and 8731-8734,or zero otherwise, based on the
evidence that firms within these SIC codes are prone to litigation. 20 The proxy for macroeconomic
risk is the monthly rate of change in Consumer Price Index (CPIChange) obtained from CRSP
Treasury and Inflation index. Finally, as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk, I use the standard deviation

20

The SIC Codes are as follows: 2833-2836 – Medical/Pharmaceutical; 3570-3577 – Computers/I.T.; 3600-3676 –
Electrical/Electronics; 5200-5961 – Retail; 7370-7374 – Services (I.T.); 8731-8734 – Services (Biological research).
Details available at https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm.
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of quarterly firm earnings (SD_EARN) over the last three years where quarterly earnings data is
earnings before interest, obtained from Compustat.
ARFD is represented by the expression below. In addition to the determinants of RFD, I
control for disclosure comprehensiveness using the total number of words in the annual 10-K
(FILE_TW):
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 𝑅𝐹𝐷 − [𝛼 + 𝛼 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝛼 𝐿𝐼𝑇 + 𝛼 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛼 𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 + 𝛼 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛼 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛼 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌] … … … … … … . (1)
For the private debt market, I use a lag model to derive a measure of ARFD such that the
discretion in reporting RFD will precede the effect on cost of debt. This will limit endogeneity in
the model. The lag model takes the following form:
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷

= 𝑅𝐹𝐷

− [𝛼 + 𝛼 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸

+ 𝛼 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒

+ 𝛼 𝐿𝐸𝑉

+ 𝛼 𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁

+ 𝛼 𝐸𝑇𝑅

+ 𝛼 𝐿𝐼𝑇

+ 𝛼 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊

+ 𝛼 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅

+ 𝛼 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌] … … … … … … . . . (2)

3.2. Background Literature
3.2.1 Debt Market
Heflin, Moon, and Wallace (2016) noted two main differences between lenders and stockholders.
First, lenders only face downside risk and do not benefit from increased liquidity. This is because
buying and selling of debt occurs less frequently than equity. Second, the return in the debt market
is fixed hence lenders have more at stake compared to stockholders. Jiang (2008) also showed that
bondholders are mostly institutional investors, more sophisticated than other investors, and have
access to firm specific information. In the debt market, financing can be obtained from the private
market, which is dominated by banks, or from the public market which is mainly the bond market.
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These two markets differ in terms of the characteristics of the participants and are further
discussed below.
3.2.2 Private debt versus public debt market
Extant research reveals some unique characteristics of private and public debt market borrowers.
Bharath et al. (2008) observed that private debt market borrowers have low accounting quality
compared to the borrowers in the public debt market. Dhaliwal et al. (2011a) also found that
borrowers from the private debt market have low disclosure quality compared to those in the
public debt market. Denis and Mihov (2003) observed that the decision to borrow from the private
or public debt market is influenced by the borrower’s credit quality and default risk. In addition,
the authors found that public debt market borrowers are larger, more profitable, and have higher
credit ratings than private borrowers. These results corroborate the findings in Diamond (1991)
that private debt market borrowers are mostly firms that are trying to establish financial credit and
are usually young, less successful, and have a high probability of default.
A recent paper by Morellec, Valta, and Zhdanov (2015) developed and tested a model of
financing and investing decisions which allows firms to choose both the amount and the type of
debt to issue. The findings in the study show that firms with more growth options, higher
bargaining power of shareholders, and those operating in a more competitive product market or
facing lower credit supply are more likely to issue bonds. Their findings also support Lin, Ma,
Mlatesta, and Xuan (2013) whose results suggest that firms with divergence between controlling
shareholders’ cash-flow rights and control rights tend to rely more on public than private debt
financing. These findings indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders tend to choose public
debt over bank debt to avoid scrutiny.
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Overall, the above characteristics of borrowers in both debt markets suggest that public
debt market borrowers will be more transparent in their disclosure as they are relatively successful
and are better able to absorb the likely reaction from disclosing negative information. Borrowers in
the private debt market, however, are still trying to establish a reputation and will likely manage
the risk information they disclose to avoid tighter loan covenants.
Furthermore, research findings reveal the advantage banks have in gathering and
processing information and incorporating this information into loan contracts (Diamond, 1991).
Banks are more efficient at monitoring debt than bondholders as bondholders are relatively
unsophisticated and do not have the resources to commit to debt monitoring due to free-rider
problems (Bharath et al., 2008). Banks also use a combination of priced and non-priced terms to
design loan contracts compared to bondholders that mainly use only priced terms. The
combination of possession of superior information by banks, coupled with low accounting and
disclosure quality noted for private debt borrowers, suggest that banks will rely less on public
disclosures in designing loan contracts. However, banks can use public disclosures to validate the
information they possess in cases where lenders are not truthful and withhold information that can
affect their default risk (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005).
Overall, previous research suggest that public debt borrowers are larger, more successful,
and have better accounting and disclosure quality than private debt borrowers. In addition, they
have higher credit ratings, are controlled by larger shareholders, and have more growth options
(Bharath et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b; Diamond, 1991; Lin et al., 2013; Morellec et al.,
2015). Private lenders on the other hand are more sophisticated, have access to private
information, and are better at information gathering and processing, and debt monitoring compared
to public lenders (Bharath et al., 2008; Diamond, 1991).
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3.3. Hypotheses development
3.3.1 Risk factor disclosure and cost of debt
Recent research on RFDs provides evidence that risk factor disclosures are informative (Campbell
et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2016; Chiu et al. 2017; Hope et al. 2016). Campbell et al. (2014)
showed that riskier firms disclose more risks and that the type of risk a firm is exposed to
determines how much of the disclosure is devoted to that risk. These findings suggest RFDs reflect
the risk profile of borrowers and are informative in the equity market.
In the private debt market, RFDs may not be informative because borrowers in this market
have lower accounting and disclosure quality, are smaller in size, and are less profitable compared
to public debt borrowers (Bharath et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b). Furthermore, banks may
use both price and non-price terms in defining loan terms. For example, firms that are considered
risky may attract tighter loan covenants, such as collateral or shorter maturity, to compensate for
the additional risk. Thus, the riskiness of firms may be reflected in both the cost of debt and the
loan terms. Graham et al. (2008) show that loans initiated after restatements have high loan
spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions.
Furthermore, private debt lenders may consider other factors, such as reputation and relationship,
in loan decisions.
On the other hand, previous studies have established an association between disclosure and
the debt market (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005; Sengupta, 1998). Recent evidence by Campbell et
al. (2014) and Chiu et al. (2017) indicate that RFDs are informative to both equity investors and
debt providers, suggesting that RFDs are useful to diverse stakeholders. In line with these recent
findings, I expect that information in RFDs will be associated with the private information used by
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banks in loan contracts. Thus, a positive association is expected between RFDs and cost of debt.
The following hypothesis is proposed for the private debt market:
H1a: There is a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt in the private debt market.
Compared to private debt lenders, bondholders do not have access to private information
and are considered less sophisticated than banks. Also, bondholders cannot afford to incur costs in
monitoring debt due to free-rider problems (Bharath et al., 2008). The lack of access to private
information gathering and processing resources and the inability to monitor debt suggests
bondholders will rely more on public disclosures than private lenders. Furthermore, since
borrowers in the public debt market have better accounting and disclosure quality (Bharath et al.,
2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011b), I expect that the RFDs of public debt borrowers will adequately
reflect the level of firm risk.
Similar to the literature on private debt, there is evidence of an association between
disclosure and public debt markets. Using bond yields and interest cost to proxy for borrowing
cost, Sengupta (1998) found that a firm’s disclosure quality is useful to lenders and underwriters in
estimating a firm’s default risk. Overall, I expect RFDs will also be important in the public debt
market and the cost of debt will reflect the risk profile of the borrowers. As a result, I expect a
positive association between RFD and cost of public debt. The hypothesis below is thus proposed:
H1b: There is a positive association between RFDs and cost of debt in the public debt market.
3.3.2 Abnormal Risk Disclosure and Cost of Debt
Signalling theory predicts that managers use the disclosure of information to communicate the
quality of management. This signal can demonstrate transparency and strong management
practices that differentiate firms from their competitors. Considering the negative nature of RFDs,
managers can also choose to provide limited risk information in an attempt to mislead the market
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or protect their careers. The disclosure literature predicts that more disclosure should reduce
information asymmetry and consequently reduce the cost of capital (Verrecchia, 1983). Following
from this literature, we would expect that more risk factor disclosure should result in lower cost of
debt. However, considering RFDs provide negative information, the effect of disclosing more or
less risk information may not necessarily translate to cost of debt benefits.
My measure of managers’ discretion to disclose more or less risk factors than expected
(ARFD) is further split into positive (PARFD) and negative (NARFD) to observe the varying
effects of positive versus negative deviations. Given the expected level of firm risk factor
disclosure based on its determinants, when actual RFDs exceed this expected level ARFD is
positive and referred to as PARFD. When actual RFD is less than the expected level, RFD is
negative and referred to as NARFD.
Financial reporting transparency reflects the extent to which financial reports reveal a
firm’s underlying economics which includes the entity’s resources, cash flows, and the risk it faces
(Barth & Schipper, 2008). Managers can choose to bias reports in order to manipulate the market’s
valuation of the firm for some expected benefits (Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). Bias in reporting
affects firm transparency which can subsequently have an impact on cost of capital through the
effect of information asymmetry (Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Verrecchia, 2001). In the private debt
market, the choice to disclose more or less risk factors should not influence loan contracts since
banks have access to reliable private information and can evaluate a firm’s risk level. However,
public disclosures can save banks the cost of searching for information and can be used to confirm
private information. Furthermore, Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that despite the market’s
rational expectation that managers will be biased when reporting, managers may be better off to
bias reports when the market cannot perfectly adjust for this bias. This observation suggests that
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while banks can evaluate firm level of risk, they may not be able to perfectly adjust for the bias in
the loan pricing terms since banks do not know the intention of the reporting bias. Therefore,
transparency in reporting RFDs should be useful to banks.
The choice of reporting more or less than what is expected does not have the same
consequences for firms. Specifically, when a firm discloses more than the expected level, it reveals
to the market that its level of risk is high, which can have a negative impact on its market value.
Since it is costly for the firm to disclose more risk, banks are likely to recognize that the firm is
honest and that increased disclosure reduces the information asymmetry that banks face. In such a
case, banks are likely to reward such behaviour by reducing the interest rate. However, when a
firm discloses less than what is expected, the firm does not bear additional cost and banks may
view this disclosure as dishonest. Consequently, in such a case, banks could penalize such
behaviour by increasing the interest rate. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2a: There is a negative (positive) association between PARFD (NARFD) and cost of debt for
firms in the private debt market.
Compared to banks, bondholders rely more on public disclosures to inform lending
decisions, and there is no incentive for the bondholder to incur costs to search for information on
public debt borrowers. A reason for this is the diffuse ownership of public debt and the associated
free-rider problems, thus making it ineffective to incur monitoring cost (Diamond, 1991).
Furthermore, bondholders are less sophisticated than banks and may lack the necessary skills to
process RFDs in order to identify the true level of firm risk. An implication of the naivety of
bondholders is that in the absence of contrary information and ability to process the disclosure
information, RFDs may be considered as the true level of firm risk. Therefore, I expect that
controlling for the level of firm risk, firms disclosing more risk information (PARFD) will be
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considered higher risk and incur greater cost of debt, while firms with less risk disclosure
(NARFD) will incur lower cost of debt as they are considered to be less risky. The hypothesis
below is thus proposed:
H2b: There is a positive (negative) association between PARFD (NARFD) and cost of debt for
firms in the public debt market.

3.4. Research Design
3.4.1. Sample Selection
The initial sample for private debt was all loan facilities issued between 2005 and 2015 in the
DealScan database. A total of 106,183 facilities were identified. For firms with multiple facilities
within the same year, I used the sum of all facilities per year to calculate the weighted average of
the AIS (spread) and the loan maturity to form panel data. Non-U.S. firms, firms with negative AIS,
and firms classified as private in DealScan were excluded from the sample, resulting in 8,543 loanyear observations. After excluding observations with no EDGAR or Compustat data and with less
than 30 words in Item 1A-RFD, the final sample includes 1,326 loan-year observations.
To obtain the sample for public debt, all firms with S&P issuer debt ratings from 2005 to
2015 were obtained from Compustat resulting in 205,191 monthly ratings data. The Compustat
data was matched to the ratings data by date corresponding to three months after the fiscal year,
yielding 15,187 observations. Similar to the private debt sample, I excluded firms with Item 1A of
less than 30 words to be sure that the firms actually discussed risk as opposed to general
statements pointing to other sections in the annual 10-K that discuss risk information (Filzen,
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2005; Hu, Johnson, & Liu 2017).21 The final data for the public debt sample was 3,007 loan-year
observations. The sample summary for private and public debt is presented in Table 1.
3.4.2. Method
To develop the RFD measure, which is the independent variable of interest for H1a and H1b and
the first stage dependent variable for H2a and H2b, I rely on the risk words developed by
Campbell et al. (2014) in addition to the total number of words in Item 1A. Campbell et al.
identified five categories of risk words including financial risk, other idiosyncratic risks, other
systematic risks, legal risks, and tax risks. I amended some of the risk words to avoid duplication
in the word count.22 The six measures of RFDs in this study are the total number of words in
Item1A, the total number of risk words, and risk words from four of the five risk categories based
on Campbell et al. Compared to the determinants of RFDs identified earlier, financial,
idiosyncratic, and tax risk are common to both Campbell et al. (2014) and my study. These risk
words are presented in Appendix 1 with the amended words identified with an asterisk. 23
The risk words were extracted from the annual 10-K filing using content analysis software.
First, I extracted the links to the 10-K filling from EDGAR database form Z. Then, I downloaded
the actual files from EDGAR using both file transfer protocol (ftp) and WGET software. 24 I then
processed the files through the content analysis software to extract the total number of words and
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Filzen (2015) excluded less than 200 words while Hu et al. (2017) excluded less than 30 words. I follow Hu et al.
2017 to limit further data loss.
22
The software is not designed to disallow suffix or prefix in words. Some words such as ‘operating’ can therefore
be counted as both ‘operating’ and ‘rating’. In such instances, I use a phrase such as ‘operating loss’ rather than a
single word.
23
I exclude the tax risk words as I was losing large amounts of data when forming a final sample. For example, in
the private debt sample, data with zero tax words are 1,474 loan-years. Also, the tax words are not very robust.
Campbell et al. (2016) added many more words to this category to study tax risk. Including the tax risk has no
significant effect on the results.
24
I used Windows FTP to download the 10-K files. However, effective Dec. 31, 2016 FTP was disabled on
EDGAR.
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the number of risk words for the private and public debt sample. To test the software, I randomly
selected 100 files from the full data set to confirm the correct section was extracted and manually
tested 10 files for accuracy of the risk word count using the financial risk word list. This test
yielded an accuracy level of 70% for the extracted sections and 100% for the risk word count. 25
The details of this software are presented in Appendix 2.
To test H1a and H1b, I used six measures of RFDs as follows: the natural log of (1) the
total number of words; (2) the number of all risk words; (3) the number of financial risk words; (4)
the number of idiosyncratic risk words; (5) the number of systematic risk words; and (6) the
number of legal risk words. As earlier discussed, these risk words are based on Campbell et al.
(2014).
For public debt, I used ordered probit regressions since RATING is a categorical variable
ranging from 1 to 22. Details of the variables are presented in Table 2 and the regression models
are presented below.
𝐴𝐼𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛼 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑇 + 𝛼 𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛼 𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛼 𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝑅𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛼 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛼 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 + 𝛼 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁
+ 𝛼 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑇𝐼𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛼 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (3)
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝛼 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛼 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛼 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 + 𝛼 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛼 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛼 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑇𝐼𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+ 𝛼 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (4)

25

The 70% accuracy in identifying the correct section is lower than Campbell et al.’s (2014) 98% accuracy, but the
accuracy of the risk word count, which is the variable of interest, is higher than Filzen’s (2015) reported correlation
of 0.97.
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For the private debt market, cost of debt is measured as All-in drawn spread (AIS) which is
the number of basis points above LIBOR (available in the DealScan database). Risk disclosure is
the log of one of the six measures of RFD: the total number of words in Item 1A (1A_TW); the
total number of risk words in Item 1A (1A_CRW); the number of financial risk words in Item 1A
(1A_CFRW); the number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item 1A (1A_CIRW); the number of
systematic risk words in Item 1A (1A_CSRW); and the number of legal risk words in Item 1A
(1A_CLRW). The control variables include loan and firm characteristics. The loan characteristics
are: FACAMT which is the sum of all borrowings in the year measured in $millions; MAT controls
for loan maturity and is measured in months; SEC is a dummy variable for whether the loan is
secured or not; RES is the control for loan purpose and is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 for restructure loans, which are loans designated as CP back up, corporate purposes, and
working capital, otherwise it takes a value of zero; and REV is the control for loan type and is also
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for revolving loans or zero otherwise. FILE_TW is
total words in the 10-K and controls for disclosure comprehensiveness. FILE_TW should be
positively associated with RFD as larger 10-K files should have longer Item 1A-RFD (Dyer, Lang,
& Stice-Lawrence, 2016). I expect loan maturity (MAT) and secured loan (SEC) to have a positive
association with cost of debt, while facility amount (FACAMT) should have a negative association
with cost of debt (Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; Sengupta, 1998). I do not predict a
direction for revolving loans and restructuring loans as the effect on cost of debt is not clear for
RFDs compared to corporate risk disclosures.
The controls for firm characteristics include LASSET measured as the natural log of total
asset, BTM as the book value of equity to market value of equity ratio, and ROA is return on asset.
Other controls include LOSS which takes a value of 1 if earnings before interest and taxes are
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negative, BIGN which takes a value of 1 for firms audited by large auditors, and oZ_SCORE is the
orthogonal value of Z_score based on Altman (1968) after removing the impact of SIZE, BTM,
ROA, LASSET, and LOSS. The control for firm liquidity is Times Interest Earned (TIE) measured
as the ratio of interest paid to earnings before interest. 26LASSET and BTM control for firm size and
growth opportunities respectively, ROA and LOSS both control for firm profitability, while TIE
controls for firm liquidity. BIGN is the control for audit quality and oZ_SCORE is the control for
bankruptcy risk. Previous findings have shown that these variables are associated with risk
disclosure. Khlif and Hussainey (2014) showed that risk reporting is positively associated with
size, leverage, profitability, and risk factor (Beta, probability of bankruptcy). Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) predicted that larger companies disclose more information and are more
susceptible to regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, I expect large firms, profit making firms, firms with
lower risk of bankruptcy, and firms audited by large auditors to have increased scrutiny over the
reporting process and have more transparent disclosure. On the other hand, loss making firms may
attempt to hide risk information to avoid further losses and are likely to have less transparent RFDs.
Thus, I expect all the control variables except LOSS to be positively associated with discretionary
reporting in RFDs.
I further control for industry effects based on Fama-French 12-industry classification and
time effects by including a dummy variable for each year. The t-statistics presented in the
regressions are calculated using standard errors that are clustered by firm to control for serial
correlation. I evaluate the effect of multicollinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF).
For the public debt market, the dependent variable is the credit rating based on Standard &
Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating of three months after the fiscal year end. RATING takes a

26

The objective of using the orthogonal value of Z_SCORE is to capture the potential effect of Z_SCORE after
excluding the effect of other predictors in the regression model that may be collinear with Z_SCORE.
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value from 1 to 22 ranging from best to worst. For example, a debt rating of AAA takes the value
of 1, AA+ takes the value of 2, and on the other end of the spectrum, an SD rating has a value of
22. This rating makes it easier to interpret the results as a direct relationship since a poorer
RATING value implies higher cost of debt. Control variables for public debt regression are the
same as those for private firms excluding the controls for loan characteristics. FILE_TW is also
included to control for disclosure comprehensiveness of the annual 10-K.
To test H2a and H2b, a two-stage regression was conducted. The first stage is the
regression of RFD on its determinants to derive the Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure Measure
(ARFD) and the second stage is the regression of cost of debt (AIS or RATING) on the absolute
value of the residual from the first stage (ARFD) after separating by the sign of the coefficient
(PARFD and NARFD). Separating into PARFD and NARFD enables us to observe the different
effects for disclosing more or less risk factors based on an expected risk level. For the private debt
sample in H2a, I use a lagged model to derive the measure of managerial discretion in risk factor
disclosure (PARFD or NARFD). Using the lagged variable is important to observe the reaction of
banks to transparency of RFDs as banks already have information on firm risk and use public
disclosure to confirm their information. The lagged model therefore tests whether the information
used in the RFD is correlated with the information used by banks. In line with the same reasoning,
the accounting variables in the second stage are also lagged to examine H2a. The cost of debt
measure for public debt (RATING) is measured three months after the fiscal year end, hence a
lagged model is used to test H2b as the RFD already precedes the cost of debt effect. This model
further ensures that the risk of endogeneity is minimized.
The regression for the second stage takes the form below for the private debt and the public
debt, respectively:
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𝐴𝐼𝑆 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷(𝑁𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷)
+ 𝛽 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊
+ 𝛽 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁

+ 𝛽 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑇 + 𝛽 𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽 𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽 𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽 𝑅𝐸𝑆

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇

+ 𝛽 𝐵𝑇𝑀

+ 𝛽 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝐼𝐸

+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆

+ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌

+ 𝜇 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … . (5)
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝛽 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷(𝑁𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷) + 𝛽 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐼𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜇 . . . . (6)
All variables are as described above. Similar to the private debt sample, the continuous
variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% to reduce the effect of outliers, standard errors are
clustered by firms, and VIFs are used to evaluate the influence of multicollinearity.

3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 3a and 3b present a general overview of the descriptive statistics for the private and public
debt sample, respectively. The average cost of debt (AIS) for the private debt sample in Table 3a is
roughly 181bps. The median is 160bps, while the lower and upper quartiles are 112bps and
225bps, respectively. The lower quartile facility amount (FACAMT) is $200m while the upper
quartile is $1.25b with a mean of $1.17b. The firms in this sample are large firms since RFDs are
only mandatory for firms with over $75m in assets. To appreciate the importance of loans, I
compute the ratio of average facility amount to average total firm asset (AT). The calculation
shows that, on average, loans represent almost 12% of total assets. 27 The average maturity (MAT)
of private loans is 51 months with a standard deviation of 17 months. Less than half of the loans

27

Average total assets is $10.145b.
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are secured (SEC), while restructuring loans (RES) constitute more than half of the loans. Most of
the firms are profitable (ROA), generally audited by large audit firms (BIGN), and have a low risk
of bankruptcy as indicated by the average Z_SCORE of 4.0.28 Compared to studies on debt
contracting, the statistics are similar to Bharath et al. (2008) and Kim, Song, and Zhang (2011),
whose results showed a mean AIS of 185.5 and 186.4 and mean loan maturity of 41 and 53
months, respectively. The mean facility amount of $1.17b, however, differs from Bharath et al.
(2008) and Kim et al. (2011) who found mean facility amounts of $246 m and $478m,
respectively. This difference can be attributed to the current study sample as it includes firms
disclosing risk factors, which is only mandatory for large firms.
In terms of the independent variables of interest, the average number of words in Item 1A
is 15,028 words, while the means of the number of risk words are 760, 115, 248, 292, and 80 for
total risk words, financial, systematic, idiosyncratic, and legal risk words, respectively. 29
Compared to Campbell et al. (2014), there is a significant difference between the results for the
average number of risk words in the current study. Campbell et al. reported the number of words in
Item 1A as 4,902 with averages of 293, 36, 101, 103, and 45 for the total risk words, financial,
systematic, idiosyncratic, and legal risk words, respectively. 30 The sample in my study is made up
of firms with debt while Campbell et al. examine the entire population of firms reporting RFDs.
Also, the average firm size (SIZE) measured as log of market value of equity in my sample is 7.77
compared to the average SIZE in Campbell et al.’s study of 6.46.

28

The orthogonal value of this measure is used in the regressions.
Compared to the other tables in the paper, the risk words in Tables 3a and 3b are the raw measures.
30
The software did not accurately identify some Item-1As due to the different formats of reporting the 10-K. Some
of the files included other sections as part of Item 1A. The test on 10 random files reveals 70% accuracy in section
extraction but 100% accuracy in the risk word count.
29
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Table 3b presents the descriptive statistics for the public debt sample. The average debt
rating for the public debt sample is 10.28, which is between a BBB- and BB+ rating and close to
the 50th percentile of 10 which is BBB-. Compared to the private firms, the public debt firms are
larger, as measured by SIZE of $8.29b, which is similar to previous findings by Dhaliwal et al.
(2011b) and Bharath et al. (2008), and more firms are audited by large audit firms (mean of 0.97).
Despite these differences, the statistics for the independent variables of interest are similar
to that of the private debt sample. The mean of aggregate, financial, systematic, idiosyncratic, and
legal risk words are 827, 123, 287, 301, and 87, respectively, while the mean of the total number
of words in Item 1A is 16,762 words.
3.5.2. Univariate analyses
Table 4a presents the correlation analysis for private firms. Consistent with H1a, AIS is positively
correlated with total number of risk words (1A_CRW) and financial risk words (IA_CFRW).
However, AIS is not significantly correlated with the other four RFD measures (1A_TW,
1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CIRW). The positive correlation between AIS and risk words
provides preliminary evidence that AIS contains risk information that is similar to the content of
RFDs. The negative correlation between earnings volatility (SD-EARN) and AIS is surprising as
firms with volatile earnings should have higher cost of debt to compensate for the level of risk. AIS
is positively correlated with macroeconomic risk proxy (CPIChange), leverage (LEV), secured
loans (SEC), revolving loans (REV), and negative earnings (LOSS) in line with the expectation
that non-profitable firms, and highly levered firms, attract higher cost of debt to compensate for
the additional risk. High-risk firms are also offered secured loans to mitigate risk of default.
Understandably, firms that are profitable (ROA) and large (SIZE & LASSET) attract lower cost of
debt. Similarly, firms with high facility amounts (FACAMT), those audited by large audit firms
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(BIGN), those with a higher interest coverage ratio (TIE), and those with low risk of bankruptcy
(oZ_SCORE) also attract lower cost of debt. Firms with longer maturity (MAT) attract higher cost
of debt because of their greater risk exposure. Revolving loans (REV) are positively correlated
with AIS while restructuring loans (RES) are negatively correlated with AIS. As expected, all the
measures of risk disclosure and the proxy for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are
positively correlated with one another and are significant at 5% or better.
Table 4b presents the correlation for public firms. The correlation between debt ratings and
the various measures of risk disclosure is positive and significant for all risk factor disclosure
measures except legal risk words (1A_CLRW) providing initial evidence in support of H1b.
RATING has a negative correlation with the total number of words in the annual 10-K (FILE_TW),
suggesting that there are capital market benefits from comprehensive disclosures. Also, larger
firms (SIZE and LASSET), more profitable firms (ROA), firms audited by large auditors (BIGN),
firms with low risk of bankruptcy (oZ_SCORE), and firms with high interest coverage ratio (TIE)
are correlated with lower cost of debt, while high leverage (LEV) and loss (LOSS) firms have
higher cost of debt, as expected. Control for earnings volatility (SD_EARN) is also negatively
correlated with RATING. All risk factor disclosure measures are positively correlated to one
another.
3.5.3. Multivariate analyses
Table 5 presents the results for the test of H1a on the association between RFDs and cost of debt
for the private debt market. The results reveal significant positive associations between cost of
debt (AIS) and two RFD measures: financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk words
(1A_CLRW). This result confirms H1a that RFDs are associated with banks’ access to private
information. The results are also consistent with the findings of a positive association between
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changes in the spread of credit default swaps and changes in the number of RFDs by Chiu et al.
(2017). For financial and legal risk words that are significant, the economic implication is quite
limited as disclosing an additional 1.1 financial or 0.8 legal risk words, on average, increases cost
of debt by 0.04 bps.31 In addition to confirming that the risk profile of firms is associated with their
cost of debt, the significant results also support the argument presented in previous studies that
RFDs are informative. Current literature on corporate disclosure and cost of debt has mostly
reported negative associations between disclosure and cost of debt (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005;
Sengupta, 1998). However, these studies focus on general corporate disclosures which are
considerably different from RFDs, not only because RFDs are mandatory, but also because they
are negative in nature and can have adverse effects on the firm.
The results for the control variables show that AIS increases with maturity (MAT), secured
loans (SEC), and disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW), as expected. Revolving loans (REV)
are negatively associated with AIS, while restructuring loans (RES) have a positive association
with AIS. Since banks can employ other non-price factors, loans requiring collateral (SEC) likely
incur higher cost of debt since such firms may have higher probability of default. In the case of
restructuring loans (RES), firms may incur lower cost of debt because such loans are massive and
often supported by a range of banks or investment firms. For example, some of the comments in
the data for restructuring loans discuss lead banks, joint lead arrangers, and the possibility of
increasing loan amount based on specific criteria. The positive association between AIS and
FILE_TW suggests some large files actually contain relevant information. Contrary to what was
expected, the proxy for size (LASSET), growth firms (BTM), and bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE) are
negatively associated with AIS. This may be because large firms are better able to negotiate deals
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Since RFD is a log measure, an additional 1% of RFD is calculated as 1% of average number of financial risk
words (115) and legal risk words (79) which are 1.1 and 0.8 risk words, respectively.
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with the banks as they likely have other options of obtaining finance due to their size. Firms may
also choose to disclose less risk information to avoid revealing sensitive, negative information
publicly. Surprisingly, the control for profitability (ROA), loss firms (LOSS), and liquidity risk
(TIE) are not significantly associated with cost of debt. The average R 2 for the test of H1a in this
study is 0.53 which is similar to the adjusted R2 range of 0.50 to 0.66 reported in similar studies on
disclosure and cost of debt (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005; Sengupta, 1998).
For the public debt market, the results for H1b assessing the association between RFDs and
cost of debt are presented in Table 6. All risk disclosure measures have a strong positive
association with RATING at 1% significance. This provides evidence for H1b that RFDs are
important in the public debt market. Economically, the results show that, on average, firms that
disclose an additional 1% RFDs have significantly less favourable debt rating and, consequently,
significantly higher cost of debt. Although this deterioration in RATING is not large enough to
move firms from one bond rating category to another, the results show more significant
associations between RFDs and cost of debt as compared to the private debt market. The direction
of the effects for some of the control variables are the same as that of the private debt market.
Specifically, the control for firm size (LASSET) and risk of bankruptcy (oZ-SCORE) have negative
associations with RATING, while audit quality control (BIGN) and control for firm liquidity (TIE)
are not significant. Contrary to the private debt sample, however, disclosure comprehensiveness
(FILE_TW) is not significant in the public debt sample, while the control for profitability (ROA)
and LOSS are significant for public debt although not in the expected direction. The control for
growth firms (BTM) is significantly positive as expected. In the case of disclosure
comprehensiveness, the result is contrary to expectation as borrowers in the public debt market are
assumed to have better disclosure quality. Ruling out the possibility of the irrelevance of the
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information in the annual 10-K,32 the other explanation for this result is that most of the
information in theses firms’ annual 10-K focuses on other issues not important to the debt market.
The McFadden’s Pseudo R2 is around 0.15, and this value is comparable to that obtained from
studies that have used bond ratings as a measure of cost of debt. For example, Bharath et al. (2008)
reported Pseudo R2 between 0.05 and 0.33, while Jiang (2008) reported generalized R 2 of 0.11 to
0.18 in some regressions.33 In summary, the results fully support H1b that RFDs are useful to
bondholders. This is in line with the assumption that bondholders do not have access to private
information and will rely on public disclosures. The results also suggest RFDs reflect the risk
profile of firms thereby supporting the findings in other papers that RFDs are informative and not
boilerplate (Campbell et al., 2014; Chiu et al., 2017; Hope et al., 2016)
The results to test H2a for the private debt market are presented in Tables 7a to 7c. Table
7a reports the results of the first stage regression of RFDs on the determinants for the private debt
sample. The residual from this regression forms the dependent variable for the second stage
regression which is the main test of H2a. Table 7a shows regressions of the six determinants of
RFDs. I expect a positive association between these determinants and RFDs since these variables
determine the content of RFDs. The results show that the proxy for financial risk (LEV) is positive
and significant for financial risk words (1A_CFRW), further highlighting the importance of
financial risk in debt contracts (Chiu et al., 2017). SIZE and SD_EARN, the proxies for regulatory
and idiosyncratic risks, respectively, have negative associations which are contrary to expectation.
Specifically, SIZE is negatively associated with financial risk words (1A_CFRW), while SD_EARN
is negatively associated with all risk words except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). The litigation
risk proxy (LIT) is not significant for any of the measures. A possible explanation for the lack of
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Research using various types of information in the 10-K is vast and not limited to only Item 1A-RFDs.
Although, the variables of interest differ from those in my study, the information is provided for comparison.
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significant results for these measures is that they capture many dimensions of firm risk which may
not be directly reflected in the cost of debt. The R 2 for the regressions vary between 0.09 and 0.20
which is comparable to similar literature on determinants of textual data with R 2 ranging from
4.41% in Huang et al. (2014) to 36% in Cahan et al. (2015).
Table 7b presents the results of the regression of AIS against the positive residuals from the
stage 1 regression (PARFD) and the control variables. Consistent with H2a, the results show that
PARFD is negatively associated with AIS for total number of risk words (1A_CRW) and financial
risk words (1A_CFRW). Specifically, PARFD firms have on average lower cost of debt by 0.07
bps. Based on the cost of information hypothesis, a possible reason for this result is that public
disclosure can save banks the cost of information acquisition (Mazumdar & Sengupta, 2005). The
results suggest that banks recognize the firms as honest and reward them for being transparent
since the disclosure can reduce the bank’s risk and monitoring costs. The results for the control
variables are similar to that obtained in H1a. Loan maturity (MAT), secured loans (SEC), revolving
loans (REV), facility amount (FACAMT), control for loss firms (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN), and
disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are positively associated with AIS, while restructuring
loans (RES), large firms(LASSET), control for profitability(ROA), and bankruptcy risk
(oZ_SCORE) are negatively associated with AIS. The control for growth firms (BTM) and liquidity
risk (TIE) are not significantly associated with AIS for positive residual (PARFD) firms. Since
PARFD firms disclose more risks than expected, banks may impose tighter loan covenants such as
the need to provide collateral. The average R 2 is around 0.59 and is consistent with the R 2 of
similar papers in the range of 13% to 54% (Cahan et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2014).
Table 7c presents the results of the regression of AIS against the negative residuals
(NARFD) and the control variables from the stage 1 regression. Contrary to the prediction in H2a,
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the results show negative associations between AIS and NARFD for all the risk word measures.
Specifically, NARFD firms have on average lower cost of debt of 0.11bps. Since NARFD firms
under report risk factors, it is possible that banks disregard the lack of transparency knowing that
these firms are less risky and hence have no further need to adjust cost of debt. The negative
relationship with AIS, therefore, reflects the lower levels of risk exposure. The association between
the control variables and AIS are in similar directions to PARFD firms with the exception of the
proxies for losses (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN), and disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW)
that are not significant for NARFD but significant for PARFD. The R2 is around 0.49 and is
comparable to the R2 in the literature discussed above.
Tables 8a to 8c present the results for the test of H2b.The results for the first stage
regressions are presented in Table 8a. Similar to the private debt sample, and contrary to
expectation, the regulatory risk proxy (SIZE) is negatively associated with RFDs. This negative
correlation can be the effect of proprietary cost of information. It is possible these firms disclose
just enough information to comply with regulations and avoid regulatory scrutiny. The financial
risk proxy (LEV) is significant for financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk words
(1A_CLRW). This result also underscores the importance of financial risks in debt contracts. Tax
risk proxy (ETR) is negative for all RFDs except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). This result is
not surprising as RFDs rarely focus on tax issues except in uncommon cases of changes in tax law
and regulations that may affect their businesses. Litigation risk proxy (LIT) and macroeconomic
risk proxy (CPIChange) are not significant. Operational risk proxy (SD_EARN) is negatively
associated with RFDs which is contrary to the expectation that firms with high volatility in
earnings will be riskier and hence have more RFDs. Similar to the R 2 of the private debt market,
the R2 for the public debt market is also between 0.08 and 0.19.
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Tables 8b and 8c present the results for PARFD and NARFD firms respectively for the
public debt sample. In Table 8b for PARFD, legal risk words (1A_CLRW) have a significantly
positive association with RATING, in support of H2b. This result is consistent with the expectation
that more disclosure implies higher risk especially since lenders in the public market may not be
sophisticated enough to see through this disclosure. As expected, loss firms (LOSS) have higher
cost of debt. Large (LASSET), profitable (ROA), and low bankruptcy risk firms (oZ_SCORE) have
lower cost of debt as they are considered less risky. Table 8c presents the results for the negative
residual firms (NARFD). In line with H2b, the results reveal significant negative associations
between RATING and NARFD for all RFDs. This supports the argument that for public debt
lenders, less risk disclosure is interpreted as lower actual risk by bondholders. In line with
expectations and similar to the results for PARFD firms, LOSS and FILE_TW have positive
associations with RATING, while LASSET, ROA, and oZ_SCORE are negatively associated with
RATING.
Overall, the results for the private debt market partly support H2a that PARFD is
negatively associated with the cost of debt as a reward for transparency. However, NARFD is
negatively associated with AIS which contradicts the expectation of a higher cost of debt as penalty
for the lack of transparency. In the case of NARFD firms, banks already know these firms are less
risky, so there is no need to increase the cost of debt. The public debt market results support H2b
as firms with more risk disclosure (PARFD) have higher cost of debt, while firms with less risk
disclosure (NARFD) have lower cost of debt. These results suggest bondholders take RFDs as
representative of the actual firm risk and react accordingly.
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3.6. Robustness test
3.6.1 Risk Words in Item 7-MD&A
In the annual 10-K report, Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) also contains
comments on several issues affecting businesses including the firms’ exposure to risk. In this
section, I examine the research questions by applying the same set of risk words discussed above
to Item 7-MD&A. The objective of this test is to understand whether other disclosures in the
annual 10-K can substitute for Item 1A-RFDs.
Untabulated results support H1a by showing a positive association between cost of debt
(AIS) and RFDs for financial risk words (1A_CFRW), while other risk words are not significant.
Similar to the result for Item 1A, H1b is also supported for Item 7-MD&A for public debt. All risk
factor disclosure measures have a significantly positive association with RATING. These results
imply that the information in Item7also includes risk disclosures that are informative to the debt
market.
The results for H2a for the private debt market show negative associations for both PARFD
and NARFD firms. This is the same as the findings for Item 1A-RFDs but contrary to the
expectation of a positive association for NARFD firms. Therefore, the hypothesis that banks will
penalize NARFD firms with higher cost of debt (H2a) is only partly supported. The results for the
public debt market, however, support H2b. For the PARFD sample, all RFD measures are positive
and significant. Similarly, NARFD results show significant negative associations between cost of
debt (RATING) and RFDs for risk all risk factor measures.
Overall, the results support H1a, H1b, H2b, and partly support H2a, and suggest that
similar to Item 1A, Item 7-MD&A also contains useful information about firm risk.
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A question that comes to mind is that if more risk disclosure attracts higher cost of debt,
what is the incentive for honesty in disclosure? A possible answer to this question is the potential
reward for disclosure transparency in the private debt market. Since most firms have both private
and public debt, the expectation of reward in the private debt market creates an incentive for
increased transparency in disclosure at the expense of punishment in the public debt market. 34
These firms may be hopeful that the capital market benefits of disclosure transparency will exceed
the adverse outcome of higher risk. Furthermore, the reward for transparency extends beyond the
debt market. Firms can also be rewarded for disclosure transparency in the equity market and in
the level of accuracy of analyst forecasts (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).

3.7. Conclusion
This chapter examines the informativeness and usefulness of risk factor disclosures in the annual
10-K report. The first test examines the direct association between RFDs and cost of debt in the
private and public debt market, while the second test examines the effect of managerial discretion
in reporting more or less risk information on cost of debt in the two debt markets. In the private
debt market, the results show that higher risk disclosures are associated with higher cost of debt in
support of H1a. The results partly support H2a that banks will reward transparency with lower cost
of debt and penalize firms that lack transparency. As expected, the results show that firms
disclosing more risk (PARFD) have lower cost of debt. However, contrary to expectation, firms
disclosing less risk (NARFD) also have lower cost of debt.
The public debt market results also show a positive association between RFDs and cost of
debt in support of H1b. The findings further support H2b that public debt lenders rely on public

34

I test H2a and H2b using a sub-sample of firms with both private and public debts. The result did not show any
significant result for PARFD in the public debt markets. Thus, these firms can disclose more as they will be
rewarded with lower cost of debts in the private debt markets.
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disclosures. The results show that disclosing more risk (PARFD) than the expected level results in
higher cost of debt. Similarly, RFDs below the expected level (NARFD) result in lower cost of
debt. The results for the public debt market suggest bondholders take RFDs as representative of
firm risk.
In addition to confirming the informativeness of RFDs, the results reveal two important
observations. First, institutional differences in the two debt markets matter when considering the
usefulness of RFDs. Second, financial risk has more effect on cost of debt than other risk factor
categories. The role of financial risk in debt contracting is supported by the findings in Chiu et al.
(2017) on the importance of financial risk to creditors. Furthermore, when the risk words are
applied to Item 7-MD&A, the findings are consistent for H1a and H1b suggesting that this section
of the 10-K is also informative about firm risk.
A limitation in this study is the loss of data from the data extraction software due to the
format of the 10-K files. This data loss significantly reduced the sample size of this study.
Improving the data extraction software can increase the sample size which can improve the ability
to generalize the results of this study.
This study contributes to the literature on informativeness of RFDs and to the literature on
textual disclosures and debt contracting. It is not only the first study to examine the association
between RFDs and cost of debt, but also the first study on the determinants of RFDs. Future
studies can examine RFDs and other compensating or debt contracts. The analysis can also be
extended to understanding the role of corporate governance in the relationship between RFDs and
cost of debt. The results discussed herein provide some valuable insights to debt providers and
regulators on the usefulness of RFDs.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Risk words list
Financial

Other Idiosyncratic

Anti-takeover
provision

Acquisition

Bank debt

Adequate staffing

Legal and
Regulatory
Adverse
judgement

Other systematic

Tax

Capital lease

Asset impairment(s)* Charged

chapter 11

Class action

chapter 7

Asset
securitization(s)*
Assimilation

Economic
Uncertain tax
uncertainties*(exclu position
ded)
Economy
VAT*(exclude
d)
Electricity
Value Added
Tax
Energy
Aggressive tax
position(s)*
EU*(excluded)
Back taxes

Compliance

E.U*(excluded)

chapter 9

Backlog

Comply

Euro

collateral

Brand

European Union

concentrated
ownership
covenant

Brand recognition

Conflict of
interest(s)*
Contamination

Deferred tax
asset
Deferred tax
liability
Excise tax

Exchange rate(s)

FIN 48

Financial Crisis

credit facility
credit rating

Certification
Clinical trial(s)*

Credit risk

Commercialize

Debt burden

Concentration

Decline in stock
price
Default

Consolidation

Deregulation
Fiscal Policy
Effects of
Foreign currency
implementing
new standard(s)*
Effects of
Afghanistan
implementing
new method(s)*
IFRS*Internationa Aggregate demand
l Financial
Reporting
Standard
Infringe
Asian crisis

Internal
Revenue Service
IRS*(excluded)
I.R.S*(excluded
)

Construction

Injury

Defined benefit

Contract(s)*

Inquir(ies)*

Capital expenditure Advertising

Anti-trust
Casualty

California power crisis Defendant

Business
condition(s)*
Call*(deleted)

IRS audit
IRS judgment

Loss carryback
Loss
carryforward
Property
tax(es)*
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Financial

Other Idiosyncratic

Dilution

Copyright(s)*

Dividend(s)*

Corporate culture

Downgrade

Cost control

Family

Customer
concentration

Legal and
Regulatory
Inquir(y)*

Other systematic

Tax

Capacity

Provision for
income tax
State tax

Intellectual
property
Investigation

Forward(s)*

Legislation

Fuel

Financial condition Customer service

Litigation

Future

Financing cost(s)* Delivery

Pay damages

Gas

Funded status
Illiquid market

Distribution(s)*
Distributor(s)*

Improvement(s)*
Indebtedness

Downsizing
Economies of scale

Penalt(*)
Enforceability of
judgement(s)*
Enforcement
Environment

Insider sale(s)*
Reserves

Embargo
Enron

FDA approval
Federal

Gasoline
GDP*(Gross
Domestic Product)
G.D.P*(excluded)
GNP*(Gross
National Product)
G.N.P*(excluded)
General business
risk(s)*
General condition(s)*
General economic
conditions*(excluded
)
Gold

Revolver
Expand(s)*
Sale of productive Expand(ing)*
asset(s)*
Stock market
listing
Stock price drop
Stock price
volatility
Underfunded
pension(s)*
Underwriting

Fines
Fraud

Expansion

Government
investigation
Export(s)*
Government
policy
Facilities*Facility/Faci Government
lities
approval
Franchise
Hazardous
Franchis(ee)*

Pending
lawsuit(*)
Goodwill*(excluded) Plaintiff

Volatility of
operating result(s)*
Volatility of
Goodwill impairment Possibility of
revenue(s)*
restatement(s)*

Foreign exchange

Tax
audit*(excluded
)
Tax
authorit*(exclud
ed)
Tax
liability*(exclud
ed)
Tax
penalt*(exclude
d)
Taxable
Taxes

Growth rate(s)*
Hedg(e)*
Hedg(ing)*
Housing
Housing starts
Industry
condition(s)*
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Financial

Other Idiosyncratic

Legal and
Regulatory
Impairment*(excluded Potential
)
lawsuit(*)
Intangible
Product liability
Integrat(e)*
Regulation(s)*

Volatility of
sale(s)*
Working capital
Investment in
equipment
Investment in plant Integrat(ing)*
lease*(excluded) Integrat(ion)*
leasing

Intellectual

Lease commitment Internal control(s)
Leverage

Internet

Leveraged
lease(s)*
Limited trading

Investment in
subsidiary(y/ies)
IT* (Information
technology)
Liquidity
I.T.*(excluded)
Loan
Joint venture
Locked-in lease(s)* keep and retain top
management
Mandatory
key personnel
contribution
Maturity
Negative operating
cash flow
New financing
Obligations
OPEB *(Excluded)

Other systematic
Industry environment
Inflation
Iraq

Regulatory
Regulatory
approval
Regulatory
change
Regulatory
compliance
Regulatory
environment
Related
part(y)/part(ies)
Remediation

Coal
Commodit(y/ies)*

Consumer confidence

Restatement(s)
Safety
Superfund

Consumer spending
Consumption
Currency collapse

Uncertainties
regarding
accounting
estimates

Currency
fluctuation(s)*

Competition
Competitor(s)*
Complement
Concentration

Labor cost(s)*
Labor relations

Cyclical
Demand

Labor union(s)*
license(es)*
Limited operating
history
Maintenance

Derivative(s)*
Discounting
Economic

O.P.E.B*(Other
post employment
benefit)
Operating loss(es)* Management retention
Penny stock

Market acceptance

Postretirement
Rating*(Debt
rating)

Marketing
Information
technology

Tax

Economic
condition*(excluded)
Economic
downturn*(excluded)
Economic growth*
(excluded)
Petroleum
Political climate
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Financial

Other Idiosyncratic

Refinance*(refinan
ce)
Refinancing*(refin
ance)
Reinsurance
Renegotiation
Reorganization

Innovation

Political instability

Insurance coverage

Pound

Secret(s)*
Security
Shortages
Single customer
single supplier
software
sole supplier(s)*
SPE*(excluded)
S.P.E*(excluded)
Special purpose entity
strike
supplier
supply chain
synergy(ies)*
systems

Market(s)*
Market demand
Market supply
Marketplace
Materials
Metal(s)*
Middle East
mineral
Mining
Monetary policy
Mortgage
Natural gas
Obsolescence
Oil
Operating
environment
Option
Ore*(excluded)

tariff(s)*
technological
obsolescence
technologies
technology
trade
Material
weakness(es)*
MBS*(excluded)
M.B.S*(excluded)
Merger
Mortgage backed
securities
Mortgage servicing
rights
MSR*(excluded)
M.S.R*(excluded)
Natural disasters
New construction
New product
acceptance

Legal and
Regulatory

Other systematic

Tax

Overstocked
Peso
Price pressure
Prices
Pricing Power
Raw material(s)*
Real*(excluded)
Real estate
investment trust
Recession
REIT*(excluded)
R.E.I.T*(excluded)
Renmenbi
RMB*(excluded)
Ruble
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Financial

Other Idiosyncratic
New product
development
No current operation
Online
Orders
Patent
Personnel
Preclinical
Product(s)*
Product development
Product mix
Product performance
Production
Trademark(s)*
Training
Union election
Variable interest
entity
Vendor
VIE*(excluded)
V.I.E*(excluded)
Weather
Web security
website(s)*
Proprietary
Publicity
Redundancy
Reliance on key
customer(s)*
Reliance on key
supplier(s)*
Reporting controls
Research and
development
Restructuring
Restructuring
implementation
Sarbanes-Oxley
SARS*(Suspicious
Activity Report)

Legal and
Regulatory

Other systematic

Tax

Rupee
saving
seasonal
September 11
Short*(excluded)
Silver
Steel
Substitute
swap
Terrorism
U.S. dollar
Underlying
Unsalable Inventory
war*(excluded)
Yen
Yuan
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Appendix 2: Software description
Requirements

Obtain a list of public companies from Edgar's Form Z (available online at
www.sec.gov/edgar).

Generate a short list of qualified companies (criteria: Firms with private and public
debt)

Use the CIK numbers for the qualified companies to generate a comprehensive 10K filing listing with the following header:
◦ Form Type
◦ Company Name
◦ CIK
◦ Date Filed
◦ File Name

Download all qualified 10-K filing data from Edgar

Create a software module to perform “HTML tag removal” on the downloaded
Edgar 10-K files. This is necessary for reliable word counts.

Create a software module to extract item sections named:
◦ “Item 1A” (Risk Factors)
◦ “Item 7” (Market Risk)
◦ “Item 7A” (Management Discussion & Analysis)

For each qualified company, generate the following result:
◦ Total Words
◦ Risk Words
◦ 1A Total Words
◦ 1A Risk Words
◦ 7 Total Words
◦ 7 Risk Words
◦ 7A Total Words
◦ 7A Risk Words

Repeat the process for years 2005 – 2015
Sample Report:
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User Interface:

Start
Generate qualified list of Edgar
companies from form Z
Download
Edgar

Perform HTML
Removal

Extract sections 1A, 7
and 7A from Edgar files

Generate Risk word counts

Risk Word
Count
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End

Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection
Private Debt
All facilities from 2005 to 2015/ All S&P ratings data from 2005 106,183

Public Debt
205,191

to 2015
Loan-year observations after forming panel data

8,543

15,187

No EDGAR data

(2,064)

(3,504)

Exclude data with less than 30 words in Item 1A

(2,085)

(3,921)

Exclude firms with incomplete data

(3,068)

(4,755)

Final data

1,326

3,007
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Table 2: Description of Variables
Variable

Proxies

1

AIS

Log of weighted average of AIS: All-In-Drawn spread

2

RATING

3

1A_TW

4

1A_CRW

S&P debt issuer rating. RATING takes values from 1 to 22 from the best to the
worst: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA- =4, A+=5, A=6, A- =7, BBB+=8,
BBB=9, BBB- =10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB- =13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16,
CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, D=21, SD=22.
Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure item IA
+1
Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure item
IA + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014)

5

1A_CFRW

Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014)

6

1A_CIRW

7

1A_CSRW

8

1A_CLRW

9

PARFD

11 FILE_TW

Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014)
Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014)
Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure
item 1A + 1 based on Campbell et al. (2014)
Equals raw value of positive residual from the regression of risk disclosure on
its determinants if residual is greater than zero
Equals raw value of negative residual from the regression of risk disclosure on
its determinants if residual is less than zero
Log of total number of words in 10-K

12 LEV

Book value of debt divided by total assets

13 LIT
14 SIZE

Litigation =1 for firms within SIC code 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3676,
5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734
Market value of equity

15 ETR

Total tax expense divided by pre-tax income

16 CPIChange

Change in CPI (Inflation) from CRSP Treasury and Inflation Index

17 MAT

Natural log of loan maturity in months

18 FACAMT

Sum of all borrowings for the year per firm in $m

19 SEC

Dummy variable = 1 for secured loans

10 NARFD
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Variable

Proxies

20 BTM

Book value of equity divided by market value of equity

21 REV

Dummy variable= 1 for revolving loans

22 RES

27 LASSET

Dummy variable =1 for loans classified as CP back up, corporate purposes, and
working capital purpose
Dummy variable=1 for BIGN auditor. AU data in Compustat of auditor code.
Auditors coded 1-8 are classified as BIGN
Dummy variable=1 if firm has negative earnings, i.e. earnings before interest
and tax is less than zero
Orthogonized Z-score= 1.2 * (working capital/total assets) +1.4*(Retained
earnings) +3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/total assets) +0.6*(market value
of equity/total liability) +0.999*(Sales/total asset)
Standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past three years starting from
the current quarter
Log of total assets

28 TIE

Times Interest earned = tax expense divided by income before taxes

29 ROA

Return in asset measured as net income divided by total assets

30 INDUSTRY

Fama-French 12-industry classification

31 YEAR

Control for year effects

23 BIGN
24 LOSS
25 oZ_SCORE
(Altman)
26 SD_EARN
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Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics for Private Debt Sample
(N=1,326)

AIS
1A_TW
1A_CRW
1A_CFRW
1A_CSRW
1A_CIRW
1A_CLRW
FILE_TW
SD_EARN
CPIChange
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
FACAMT
MAT
SEC
RES
REV
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

Mean
Median
181.37
160.00
15,028.06
6,779.00
759.90
461.50
114.70
54.00
247.63
133.00
292.27
186.00
79.85
60.00
266,684.20 244,119.50
107.09
20.85
0.00
0.00
0.49
0.31
0.26
0.25
7.77
7.78
0.21
0.00
1,172.16
500.00
51.30
60.00
0.40
0.00
0.66
1.00
0.21
0.00
7.96
7.92
0.48
0.45
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.00
0.91
1.00
4.52
4.01
11.09
4.70

Standard Lower
Upper
Deviation Quartile Quartile
109.96
112.50
225.00
20,160.71 3,765.00 20,809.00
905.18
274.00
980.00
355.26
24.00
155.00
333.67
77.00
303.00
287.29
102.00
395.00
69.58
35.00
106.00
242,741.40 67,650.00 400,588.00
407.91
7.00
72.89
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.97
0.19
0.37
0.17
0.15
0.35
1.78
6.73
8.96
0.41
0.00
0.00
2,382.93
200.00
1,250.00
16.50
41.00
60.00
0.49
0.00
1.00
0.48
0.00
1.00
0.41
0.00
0.00
1.60
6.87
9.01
2.21
0.27
0.71
0.14
0.02
0.08
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.28
1.00
1.00
2.90
2.62
5.75
45.37
2.07
10.23
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Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics for Public Debt Sample
(N=3,007)
Standard
Lower
Upper
Mean
Median
Deviation
Quartile
Quartile
RATING
10.28
10.00
3.31
8.00
13.00
FILE_TW
244,019.20 161,115.00 228,195.10 67,479.00
385,213.00
1A-TW
16,762.64 6,737.00
21,306.10
3,783.00
26,033.00
1A_CRW
827.54
466.00
923.87
263.00
1,132.00
1A-CFRW
123.25
58.00
267.97
24.00
177.00
1A_CSRW
286.80
137.00
389.15
77.00
348.00
1A_CIRW
301.25
181.00
304.55
92.00
420.00
1A_CLRW 86.98
62.00
83.59
35.00
111.00
SD_EARN
162.18
40.94
562.68
15.13
114.58
CPIChange 0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
ETR
0.41
0.32
7.93
0.20
0.37
LEV
0.30
0.27
0.18
0.19
0.38
SIZE
8.29
8.25
1.65
7.21
9.35
LIT
0.20
0.00
0.40
0.00
0.00
LASSET
8.58
8.45
1.33
7.65
9.45
BTM
39.88
0.44
1,614.16
0.26
0.68
ROA
0.04
0.05
0.10
0.02
0.08
LOSS
0.05
0.00
0.23
0.00
0.00
BIGN
0.97
1.00
0.18
1.00
1.00
Z_SCORE
3.96
3.61
2.31
2.30
4.97
TIE
10.42
3.86
65.72
1.83
7.93
Tables 3a and 3b report descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses. Statistics presented include the
number of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation, lower quartile and upper quartile. All the variables are
defined in table 2 AIS is the weighted average All-in-Drawn. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer
rating. 1A_TW is the total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is total number of risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CFRW is total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is total number of idiosyncratic risk words in
Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is total number of legal risk
words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of
quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm
leverage. SIZE is log of market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in
$’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring
loans. REV is the proxy for revolving loans. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market
value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for
large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Table 4a: Correlation for Private Debt Sample

AIS
1A_TW
1A_CRW
1A_CFRW
1A_CIRW
1A_CSRW
1A_CLRW
FILE_TW
SD_EARN
CPIChange
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
FACAMT
MAT
SEC
RES
REV
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

AIS
1
0.05
0.06
0.19
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.01
-0.10
0.06
0.00
0.21
-0.48
0.01
-0.13
0.09
0.46
-0.12
0.12
-0.35
-0.03
-0.20
0.21
-0.19
-0.14
-0.10

1A_TW

CRW

CFRW

CIRW

CSRW

CLRW

FILE_TW

SD

CPI

ETR

LEV

SIZE

1
0.96
0.89
0.92
0.86
0.74
0.15
-0.05
0.01
-0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.05
0.01
0.04
0.10
-0.04
0.02
0.02
-0.04
-0.02
0.03
0.04
-0.04
0.00

1
0.89
0.93
0.93
0.8
0.2
-0.04
-0.02
-0.04
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.08
-0.03
0.01
0.07
-0.05
-0.03
0.05
0.06
-0.09
-0.01

1
0.77
0.82
0.66
0.14
-0.06
0.00
-0.03
0.11
-0.09
-0.02
-0.03
0.07
0.16
-0.04
0.05
-0.01
-0.04
-0.06
0.06
-0.01
-0.13
-0.05

1
0.76
0.71
0.19
-0.07
0.02
-0.03
-0.04
0.04
0.13
0.01
0.05
0.07
-0.04
0.02
0.01
-0.05
-0.02
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.02

1
0.7
0.17
-0.02
-0.05
-0.03
0.03
0.05
-0.09
0.01
0.01
0.05
-0.02
-0.02
0.10
-0.03
-0.03
0.07
0.06
-0.15
-0.02

1
0.29
0.00
-0.09
-0.03
0.05
0.16
-0.02
0.08
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.19
-0.06
0.01
0.00
0.12
-0.13
-0.02

1
0.15
-0.07
0.02
0.13
0.41
0.01
0.21
0.13
-0.18
0.14
-0.05
0.42
-0.09
0.08
-0.10
0.21
-0.13
0.02

1
-0.02
-0.01
0.03
0.31
0.04
0.38
-0.02
-0.09
0.08
0.02
0.37
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
0.08
-0.09
-0.02

1
0.00
-0.09
-0.08
0.15
-0.08
0.00
0.10
0.02
-0.05
-0.11
0.02
0.04
0.00
-0.05
0.12
-0.01

1
0.02
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.01
0.02
-0.04
-0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.01
-0.03
0.00

1
0.02
-0.07
0.13
0.11
0.10
0.01
0.20
0.16
-0.11
-0.13
0.04
0.07
-0.44
-0.21

1
0.08
0.48
0.00
-0.47
0.13
-0.03
0.89
-0.04
0.32
-0.30
0.41
-0.03
0.12
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Panel B: Table 4a (Continued)

LIT
FACAMT
MAT
SEC
RES
REV
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

LIT
1
0.05
-0.02
0.03
0.01
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.22
0.06

FAC

MAT

SEC

RES

REV

LASSET

BTM

ROA

LOSS

BIGN

Z_SCORE

TIE

1
-0.14
-0.16
-0.02
0.09
0.53
-0.02
0.03
-0.08
0.13
-0.14
-0.03

1
0.11
0.10
-0.06
-0.02
0.03
0.07
-0.16
0.11
0.02
0.04

1
-0.17
0.13
-0.40
-0.01
-0.20
0.21
-0.23
0.01
-0.11

1
-0.11
0.13
0.02
0.05
-0.03
0.09
-0.01
0.05

1
0.03
0.01
-0.07
-0.01
0.00
-0.10
-0.07

1
-0.05
0.17
-0.22
0.42
-0.26
-0.02

1
0.01
-0.02
-0.06
-0.01
-0.04

1
-0.47
0.11
0.23
0.31

1
-0.11
-0.13
-0.21

1
-0.07
-0.02

1
0.37

1
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Table 4b: Correlation for Public Debt Sample

RATING
1A_TW
1A_CRW
1A_CFRW
1A_CIRW
1A_CSRW
1A_CLRW
FILE_TW
SD_EARN
CPIChange
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

RATING 1A_TW 1A_CRW
1
0.08
1
0.09
0.96
1
0.25
0.9
0.89
0.05
0.92
0.93
0.07
0.87
0.94
0.03
0.79
0.84
-0.11
0.10
0.15
-0.12
-0.07
-0.06
-0.01
0.00
-0.03
-0.01
-0.03
-0.03
0.44
0.04
0.04
-0.72
-0.06
-0.04
-0.07
-0.01
-0.05
-0.55
-0.05
-0.03
0.03
-0.02
-0.02
-0.38
-0.03
-0.05
0.31
0.00
0.02
-0.14
0.00
-0.01
-0.18
-0.06
-0.11
-0.11
-0.03
-0.03

1A_CFRW

1A_CIRW

1A_CSRW

1A_CLRW

FILE_TW

SD_EARN

CPI

1
0.79
0.83
0.7
0.10
-0.07
-0.03
-0.02
0.15
-0.20
-0.09
-0.14
-0.04
-0.11
0.05
-0.05
-0.16
-0.06

1
0.78
0.75
0.14
-0.06
0.02
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.07
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.01
-0.01

1
0.75
0.14
-0.03
-0.06
-0.02
0.03
-0.03
-0.14
0.00
-0.02
-0.06
0.05
0.00
-0.18
-0.04

1
0.22
-0.06
-0.07
-0.03
0.07
0.01
-0.11
0.03
0.00
-0.04
-0.01
0.04
-0.16
-0.05

1
0.09
-0.07
0.00
0.03
0.26
-0.03
0.29
-0.02
0.02
-0.05
0.01
-0.12
-0.01

1
-0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.26
0.04
0.36
-0.01
0.04
0.06
0.04
-0.05
0.02

1
-0.03
-0.09
0.04
0.23
-0.04
0.01
0.09
-0.02
0.03
0.18
0.05

126

Panel B: Table 4b (Continued)

ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

ETR
1
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00

LEV

SIZE

LIT

LASSET

BTM

ROA

LOSS

BIGN

Z_SCORE

TIE

1
-0.34
-0.12
-0.19
0.03
-0.23
0.10
-0.08
-0.35
-0.16

1
0.16
0.85
-0.18
0.34
-0.20
0.20
0.17
0.11

1
0.11
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.03
0.30
0.12

1
0.00
0.13
-0.11
0.21
-0.07
0.04

1
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.03
0.00

1
-0.37
0.10
0.33
0.14

1
-0.03
-0.18
-0.05

1
0.06
0.02

1
0.21

1

Tables 4a and 4b present Pearson correlation matrix for private debt. Variables significant at 5% and below are in bold. All the variables are defined in table 2.
AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A.
1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total
number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of
legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3
years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation
risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans.
REV is the proxy for revolving loans. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the
dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest
earned ratio.
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Table 5: H1a for Private Debt Market
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
Dependent Variable
AIS
Risk Disclosure
0.01
0.03
0.05***
0.02
0.01
0.04*
+
(0.91)
(1.36)
(3.39)
(1.00)
(0.74)
(1.73)
FACAMT
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(1.44)
(1.46)
(1.50)
(1.45)
(1.44)
(1.49)
MAT
+
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.23)
(2.30)
(2.30)
(2.26)
SEC
+
0.40*** 0.40***
0.38***
0.40***
0.40***
0.39***
(12.25)
(12.22)
(11.85)
(12.23)
(12.34)
(12.17)
REV
?
0.17*** 0.17***
0.16***
0.17***
0.17***
0.17***
(3.20)
(3.19)
(3.13)
(3.20)
(3.20)
(3.20)
RES
?
-0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12***
-0.12*** -0.12***
-0.12***
(-3.85)
(-3.83)
(-3.82)
(-3.83)
(-3.85)
(-3.82)
FILE_TW
+
0.05*
0.05*
0.04
0.05*
0.05*
0.05*
(1.93)
(1.86)
(1.61)
(1.93)
(1.92)
(1.86)
LASSET
+
-0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13***
-0.13*** -0.13***
-0.13***
(-6.09)
(-6.12)
(-6.06)
(-6.07)
(-6.15)
(-6.26)
BTM
+
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
-0.01*** -0.01***
-0.01***
(-4.34)
(-4.32)
(-4.24)
(-4.34)
(-4.34)
(-4.21)
ROA
+
-0.26
-0.26
-0.26
-0.26
-0.26
-0.26
(-1.49)
(-1.48)
(-1.49)
(-1.47)
(-1.49)
(-1.46)
LOSS
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
(1.16)
(1.14)
(1.17)
(1.16)
(1.15)
(1.14)
BIGN
+
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
(-0.54)
(-0.57)
(-0.55)
(-0.57)
(-0.55)
(-0.59)
oZ_SCORE
+
-0.70*** -0.70*** -0.67***
-0.70*** -0.70***
-0.71***
(-3.23)
(-3.25)
(-3.25)
(-3.22)
(-3.27)
(-3.32)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(-0.33)
(-0.33)
(-0.30)
(-0.34)
(-0.32)
(-0.28)
Constant
4.32*** 4.30***
4.34***
4.35***
4.38***
4.35***
(14.11)
(14.21)
(14.22)
(14.45)
(14.56)
(14.05)
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Industry FE

1,326
0.52
Yes
Yes

1,326
0.52
Yes
Yes

1,326
0.53
Yes
Yes

1,326
0.52
Yes
Yes

1,326
0.52
Yes
Yes

1,326
0.52
Yes
Yes

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
This table presents coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on risk disclosure measures and the control variables. tstatistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are
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winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. Risk
disclosure is one of 1A_TW, 1A_CRW, 1A_CFRW, 1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CLRW. 1A_TW is the log of total
number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number
of financial risk words in Item -1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is
the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item1A. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. REV is
the proxy for revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual
10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. BTM is book
value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is firm leverage. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with
negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is
times interest earned ratio.
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Table 6: H1b for Public Debt
1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
RATING
Dependent Variable Sign
Risk Disclosure
0.08*** 0.13***
0.18***
0.08***
0.12***
0.13***
+
(5.04)
(6.49)
(12.09)
(4.04)
(6.50)
(6.10)
FILE_TW
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
+
(0.81)
(0.62)
(0.22)
(0.91)
(0.64)
(0.67)
LASSET
-0.61*** -0.61*** -0.59***
-0.61*** -0.61***
-0.61***
+
(-33.70) (-33.79)
(-32.82)
(-33.80)
(-34.05)
(-34.02)
BTM
0.00**
0.00**
0.00***
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
+
(2.19)
(2.20)
(2.62)
(2.15)
(2.17)
(2.10)
ROA
-2.75*** -2.74*** -2.72***
-2.74*** -2.75***
-2.74***
+
(-12.82) (-12.78)
(-12.67)
(-12.77)
(-12.80)
(-12.73)
LOSS
0.75*** 0.74***
0.75***
0.75***
0.73***
0.75***
(8.10)
(8.07)
(8.19)
(8.11)
(7.97)
(8.10)
BIGN
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.16
0.15
0.13
+
(1.43)
(1.42)
(1.54)
(1.49)
(1.37)
(1.19)
oZ_SCORE
-0.38*** -0.38*** -0.37***
-0.38*** -0.38***
-0.38***
+
(-15.07) (-15.09)
(-14.60)
(-15.13)
(-15.00)
(-14.97)
TIE
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
+
(-0.66)
(-0.62)
(-0.40)
(-0.68)
(-0.68)
(-0.58)
Observations
Year FE
Industry FE
Pseudo R2

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.15

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.15

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.16

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.15

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.15

3,007
Yes
Yes
0.15

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
This table presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on risk disclosure measures and the control variables.
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are
winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating.
Risk disclosure is one of 1A_TW, 1A_CRW, 1A_CFRW, 1A_CIRW, 1A_CSRW, and 1A_CLRW. 1A_TW is the log of total
number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number
of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is
the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. SD_EARN is
standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is firm
leverage. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors.
oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Table 7a: Stage 1 H2 for Private Debt
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
SIZE
+
-0.05*
-0.03
-0.13***
-0.03
-0.01
0.02
(-1.92)
(-1.31)
(-4.34)
(-1.32)
(-0.34)
(0.90)
FILE_TW
+
0.28*** 0.25***
0.34***
0.25***
0.25***
0.22***
(4.82)
(4.82)
(5.18)
(4.47)
(4.71)
(4.52)
LEV
+
-0.11
-0.02
0.76***
-0.24
-0.03
0.01
(-0.49)
(-0.11)
(2.90)
(-1.24)
(-0.17)
(0.05)
ETR
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00***
(0.42)
(-0.15)
(0.55)
(0.58)
(-0.34)
(-3.39)
LIT
+
0.04
-0.02
-0.06
0.06
-0.06
-0.13
(0.28)
(-0.16)
(-0.39)
(0.59)
(-0.55)
(-1.38)
CPIChange
+
-10.98
-8.06
-22.84*
-5.75
-5.15
-10.13
(-0.98)
(-0.86)
(-1.77)
(-0.61)
(-0.53)
(-1.02)
SD_EARN
+
-0.00** -0.00**
0.00
-0.00**
-0.00**
-0.00**
(-2.14)
(-2.30)
(-1.43)
(-2.53)
(-1.97)
(-2.51)
Constant
6.31*** 3.75***
0.97
3.07***
2.29***
1.40**
(8.51)
(5.67)
(1.19)
(4.30)
(3.44)
(2.31)
Observations
1,326
1,326
1,326
1,326
1,326
1,326
R-squared
0.09
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.17
0.20
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 7a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the private debt sample. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are lagged and
winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A.
1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of
systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for
regulatory risk and measured as the market value of equity. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report.
LEV is firm leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic
risk. SD_EARN is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years.
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Table 7b: Stage 2 H2 for Positive Residuals Private Debt
AIS
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
PARFD
-0.05
-0.07*
-0.07**
-0.05
-0.04
0.01
(-1.36)
(-1.96)
(-2.26)
(-1.29)
(-1.10)
(0.25)
FACAMT
0.00
0.00
0.00*
0.00
0.00*
0.00
+
(1.21)
(1.55)
(1.84)
(1.59)
(1.72)
(0.98)
MAT
0.00*
0.00
0.00*
0.00**
0.00***
0.00*
+
(1.93)
(1.62)
(1.80)
(2.12)
(2.82)
(1.81)
SEC
0.40*** 0.40***
0.37***
0.39***
0.40***
0.37***
+
(8.32)
(8.80)
(8.67)
(8.61)
(8.99)
(9.09)
REV
0.20*** 0.21***
0.24***
0.19***
0.20***
0.16***
?
(3.82)
(4.35)
(5.17)
(4.01)
(4.08)
(3.52)
RES
-0.11*** -0.11**
-0.11***
-0.12*** -0.14***
-0.12***
?
(-2.59)
(-2.57)
(-2.73)
(-2.90)
(-3.48)
(-3.09)
FILE_TW
0.09*** 0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.11***
0.09***
+
(2.89)
(3.20)
(3.38)
(3.25)
(3.76)
(2.96)
LASSET
-0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13***
-0.16*** -0.16***
-0.14***
(-7.42)
(-7.68)
(-6.88)
(-8.34)
(-8.08)
(-7.95)
BTM
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
(-0.55)
(-0.26)
(-0.52)
(-0.61)
(-0.71)
(-0.84)
ROA
-0.71***
-0.14
-0.75***
-0.80***
-0.16
-0.15
(-2.60)
(-0.80)
(-2.78)
(-3.17)
(-0.96)
(-0.91)
LOSS
0.16*
0.23***
0.09
0.15*
0.25***
0.25***
+
(1.75)
(2.72)
(1.01)
(1.67)
(3.00)
(3.08)
BIGN
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.12*
(0.61)
(0.41)
(0.27)
(0.69)
(0.21)
(1.68)
oZ_SCORE
-0.44*** -0.47*** -0.50***
-0.43*** -0.35***
-0.54***
(-2.99)
(-3.38)
(-3.47)
(-3.35)
(-2.82)
(-4.16)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(-0.29)
(0.01)
(-0.01)
(0.12)
(-0.37)
(0.68)
Constant
4.03*** 4.03***
3.93***
4.07***
3.70***
4.00***
(9.91)
(10.21)
(10.05)
(10.20)
(9.40)
(10.28)
Observations
554
616
636
649
614
708
R-squared
0.61
0.59
0.58
0.60
0.59
0.56
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 7b present coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on the positive residuals from Table 7a including the control
variables for the private debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. PARFD is the positive
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residuals from stage 1 regression AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk
words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total
number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FACAMT is
the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. REV is the proxy for
revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report.
LASSET is the lag of log of total assets. BTM is the lagged book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is lagged return
on assets. LOSS is the lag value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the lagged dummy for large auditors.
oZ_SCORE is lagged bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is lagged times interest earned ratio.
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Table 7c: Stage 2 H2 for Negative Residuals Private Debt
AIS
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
NARFD
-0.14*** -0.12*** -0.17***
-0.07**
-0.10***
-0.08**
+
(4.03)
(3.23)
(6.44)
(2.18)
(2.94)
(2.35)
FACAMT
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00*
0.00**
0.00**
+
(2.57)
(2.29)
(2.45)
(1.91)
(2.07)
(2.18)
MAT
0.00*** 0.00***
0.00**
0.00***
0.00*
0.00***
+
(2.70)
(2.84)
(2.24)
(2.69)
(1.91)
(2.73)
SEC
0.34*** 0.34***
0.36***
0.36***
0.35***
0.35***
+
(7.91)
(7.54)
(7.73)
(7.70)
(7.73)
(6.81)
REV
0.14*** 0.13***
0.09*
0.14***
0.13***
0.17***
?
(3.22)
(2.77)
(1.88)
(3.00)
(2.92)
(3.39)
RES
-0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12***
-0.12***
-0.10**
-0.12***
?
(-3.07)
(-3.27)
(-2.81)
(-2.79)
(-2.54)
(-2.77)
FILE_TW
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.03
+
(1.55)
(1.10)
(0.89)
(0.97)
(0.15)
(0.99)
LASSET
-0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16***
-0.13*** -0.14***
-0.14***
(-8.67)
(-7.84)
(-9.27)
(-7.38)
(-7.88)
(-7.25)
BTM
0.04
-0.01
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.05
(0.97)
(-0.13)
(0.58)
(1.12)
(0.42)
(1.13)
ROA
-0.31* -1.39***
-0.26
-0.26
-1.29***
-1.55***
(-1.67)
(-4.07)
(-1.40)
(-1.31)
(-3.77)
(-3.88)
LOSS
0.04
-0.08
0.09
0.05
-0.12
-0.14
+
(0.44)
(-0.87)
(0.97)
(0.52)
(-1.24)
(-1.32)
BIGN
-0.05
-0.05
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.10
(-0.68)
(-0.64)
(-0.33)
(-0.26)
(-0.26)
(-1.25)
oZ_SCORE
-0.67*** -0.66*** -0.57***
-0.77*** -0.88***
-0.59***
(-5.08)
(-4.68)
(-4.40)
(-4.93)
(-5.43)
(-3.85)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00*
0.00
(1.14)
(1.28)
(1.06)
(1.15)
(1.82)
(1.18)
Constant
4.76*** 4.90***
5.13***
4.65***
5.38***
4.94***
(11.30)
(11.15)
(11.88)
(10.65)
(12.27)
(10.74)
Observations
772
710
690
677
712
618
R-squared
0.48
0.49
0.52
0.46
0.50
0.51
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 6c present coefficient estimates from the regression of AIS on the negative residuals from Table 7a including the control
variables for the private debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. NARFD is the negative
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residuals from stage 1 regression AIS is log of weighted average All-in-Drawn. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk
words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total
number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FACAMT is
the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. REV is the proxy for
revolving loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report.
LASSET is the lag of log of total assets. BTM is the lagged book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is lagged return
on assets. LOSS is the lag value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the lagged dummy for large auditors.
oZ_SCORE is lagged bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is lagged times interest earned ratio.
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SIZE

Sign
+

FILE_TW

+

LEV

+

ETR

+

LIT

+

CPIChange

+

SD_EARN

+

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Industry FE

Table 8a: Stage 1 H2 for Public Debt
1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
-0.06**
-0.03
-0.15***
-0.03
-0.01
0.00
(-2.24)
(-1.57)
(-4.89)
(-1.50)
(-0.48)
(-0.05)
0.21***
0.19***
0.22***
0.19***
0.20***
0.19***
(4.32)
(4.37)
(4.22)
(4.06)
(4.40)
(4.32)
0.06
0.17
0.63***
-0.01
0.18
0.30*
(0.29)
(0.96)
(2.79)
(-0.08)
(0.89)
(1.81)
-0.00*** -0.00***
0.00*
-0.00*** -0.00***
-0.00***
(-3.57)
(-4.01)
(-1.41)
(-3.26)
(-3.79)
(-4.30)
0.11
0.05
-0.07
0.11
0.04
-0.16
(0.96)
(0.48)
(-0.45)
(1.10)
(0.37)
(-1.64)
10.30
9.63
3.57
11.07
10.72
6.54
(1.15)
(1.24)
(0.34)
(1.31)
(1.28)
(0.92)
-0.00**
-0.00**
0.00
-0.00**
-0.00*
-0.00**
(-2.22)
(-2.13)
(-1.31)
(-2.40)
(-1.67)
(-2.26)
7.35***
4.58***
2.63***
3.95***
2.96***
1.91***
(11.43)
(8.00)
(3.93)
(6.54)
(5.01)
(3.32)
3,007
3,007
3,007
3,007
3,007
3,007
0.08
0.10
0.14
0.10
0.19
0.16
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 8a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the public debt sample. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at
2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log
of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is
the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in
Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for regulatory risk and
measured as the market value of equity. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LEV is firm
leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk.
SD_EARN is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years.
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Table 8b: Stage 2 H2 for Positive Residuals Public Debt
RATING
Sign
1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW
PARFD
+
0.01
0.08
-0.06
0.06
0.01
(0.16)
(1.53)
(-1.31)
(1.23)
(0.11)
FILE_TW
+
0.09*
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.00
(1.81)
(0.81)
(0.75)
(1.38)
(0.37)
LASSET
-0.63*** -0.66***
-0.56***
-0.68***
-0.61***
(-22.79)
(-24.23)
(-21.25)
(-25.35)
(-22.34)
BTM
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(1.14)
(1.25)
(0.96)
(1.35)
(1.3)
ROA
-3.10*** -3.25***
-2.52***
-3.56***
-1.98***
(-9.24)
(-9.71)
(-8.27)
(-10.89)
(-7.32)
LOSS
+
0.51***
0.47***
0.53***
0.53***
0.69***
(3.74)
(3.52)
(4.23)
(3.90)
(5.52)
BIGN
0.11
-0.01
0.11
0.08
-0.22
(0.70)
(-0.09)
(0.69)
(0.55)
(-1.37)
oZ_SCORE
-0.33*** -0.34***
-0.36***
-0.33***
-0.33***
(-9.05)
(-9.44)
(-10.02)
(-9.48)
(-9.07)
TIE
+
-0.00*** -0.00***
-0.00***
-0.00**
-0.00***
(-3.19)
(-3.21)
(-3.22)
(-2.05)
(-3.37)
Observations
1,284
1,360
1,435
1,447
986
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.16
0.13
0.17
0.15

1A_CLRW
0.12**
(2.18)
0.08**
(1.69)
-0.66***
(-25.74)
0.00
(1.33)
-3.39***
(-10.46)
0.52***
(4.17)
-0.19
(-1.15)
-0.33***
(-9.48)
-0.00***
(-2.77)
1,565
Yes
Yes
0.16

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 8b present coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals (PARFD) from Table 8a
including the control variables for the public debt sample. z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust
standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in
Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the
log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. LOSS is the dummy for firms with negative earnings. LASSET is the log of
total assets. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. ROA is return on assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of
equity. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio. FILE_TW is the log of total
number of words in annual 10-K report.
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Table 8c: Stage 2 H2 for Negative Residuals Public Debt
RATING
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
NARFD
-0.45*** -0.37*** -0.42***
-0.19*** -0.32***
-0.15***
(9.07)
(7.63)
(11.36)
(4.34)
(7.40)
(3.75)
FILE_TW
0.05
0.08*
0.09*
0.04
0.12**
0.03
+
(0.99)
(1.65)
(1.77)
(0.87)
(2.49)
(0.61)
LASSET
-0.63*** -0.60*** -0.70***
-0.57*** -0.63***
-0.59***
(-25.84) (-24.12)
(-27.03)
(-22.76)
(-25.30)
(-22.66)
BTM
0.00**
0.00**
0.00***
0.00*
0.00*
0.00
(2.44)
(2.00)
(3.72)
(1.79)
(1.83)
(1.36)
ROA
-2.47*** -2.31*** -2.78***
-2.16*** -4.30***
-2.12***
(-8.65)
(-8.09)
(-8.95)
(-7.43)
(-11.63)
(-7.24)
LOSS
0.91*** 0.95***
0.93***
0.90***
0.79***
0.96***
+
(7.24)
(7.40)
(6.76)
(7.10)
(5.75)
(6.91)
BIGN
0.22
0.34**
0.31**
0.26
0.49***
0.36**
(1.42)
(2.21)
(1.98)
(1.61)
(3.21)
(2.39)
oZ_SCORE
-0.45*** -0.44*** -0.39***
-0.46*** -0.42***
-0.46***
(-12.55) (-12.11)
(-10.58)
(-12.16)
(-11.65)
(-12.10)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.54)
(0.46)
(0.37)
(0.30)
(0.66)
(0.56)
Observations
1,723
1,647
1,572
1,560
1,639
1,442
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.15
0.16
0.15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 8c present coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the negative residuals (NARFD) from Table 8a
including the control variables for the public debt sample. z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust
standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2.
RATING is the numerical value of S&P debt issuer rating. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is
log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic
risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. LOSS is the dummy for firms with
negative earnings. LASSET is the log of total assets. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. ROA is return on assets. BTM is
book value of equity to market value of equity. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest
earned ratio. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report.
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Chapter 4: Essay Three

Risk Factor Disclosures, Debt, and Corporate Governance
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Abstract
This chapter examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in reporting
Risk Factor Disclosures (RFDs) and the subsequent effect on cost of debt in the public debt market.
Managerial discretion in reporting RFD, which I call Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD),
is measured as the residual from the regression of RFDs on its determinants. In the previous
chapter, I find that for public debt, cost of debt is positively associated with Positive Abnormal
Risk Factor Disclosure (PARFD) and negatively associated with Negative Abnormal Risk Factor
Disclosure (NARFD). To examine the effect of strong versus weak corporate governance on cost
of debt, I focus on those firms that pay a price for perceived higher risk, i.e., the PARFD firms. I
expect the presence of strong corporate governance will mitigate the expected higher cost of debt
for these firms. Cost of debt is measured using S&P debt issuer rating (RATING) while corporate
governance (GOV) is measured as the composite score of three corporate governance measures
(Independent Directors – IND, Expert Directors – EXPERT, and Board Maturity – BMAT). The
results reveal positive associations between GOV and ARFD which is consistent with the
expectation that corporate governance will promote more transparent reporting. However, there is
no cost of debt mitigating effect for riskier firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance. As
expected, PARFD firms with weak corporate governance have higher cost of debt. The findings
are useful to regulators in setting mandatory disclosure requirements and to management in
implementing corporate governance structures in the organization.
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4. Introduction
Corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce information
asymmetry between stakeholders and managers (Jensen, 1993). Strong corporate governance can
serve as a means of managing opportunist and self-seeking behaviour by managers, thereby
reducing the variability in cash flow and subsequently reducing default risk (Sengupta, 1998).
Extant literature has established a positive association between some corporate governance
characteristics and corporate risk disclosure (Beasley, Clune, & Hermason, 2005; Lajili, 2009).
However, there are currently no studies on the direct or indirect effect of corporate governance on
the mandatory Item 1A-Risk Factor Disclosure by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Compared to similar studies that have focused on levels of disclosure, this study explores
managerial discretion in disclosure by first examining whether corporate governance promotes
transparency in reporting RFDs and then assessing whether strong corporate governance mitigates
cost of debt for firms that are considered risky (Positive Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure –
PARFD) in the public debt market. In the previous chapter, I find that PARFD is positively
associated with cost of debt while Negative Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (NARFD) is
negatively associated with cost of debt. This suggests that PARFD firms suffer a penalty for
perceived higher risk although it appears that NARFD firms are rewarded for less risk. If strong
corporate governance has a risk mitigation effect, then I expect risky firms (PARFD) with strong
corporate governance have lower cost of debt.
In this chapter, I examine whether strong corporate governance mitigates the negative
effect on the cost of debt when firms are perceived as risky. Addressing these objectives will
provide insights into the following research questions:
RQ 1) Does corporate governance affect managerial discretion in risk factor disclosures?
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RQ 2) Does strong corporate governance have a mitigating effect on cost of debt?
Similar to Chapter 3 of this dissertation, managerial discretion in reporting RFDs,
Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure (ARFD), is measured as the residual from the regression of RFD
on its determinants. These determinants are discussed in the previous chapter and based on the
literature examining the contents of RFDs (financial risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk,
macroeconomic risk, tax risk, and legal risk). Corporate governance (GOV) is assessed using the
composite score of three corporate governance mechanisms: the proportion of independent
directors (IND); the number of expert directors on the board (EXPERT); and the average age of
directors, or board maturity (BMAT). Cost of debt is measured as the categorical value of S&P
issuer debt rating (RATING).
The results of the first part of the study examining the effect of corporate governance on
managerial discretion in RFDs indicate that there is a positive association between corporate
governance (GOV) and discretionary reporting of RFDs (ARFD). This result suggests corporate
governance improves transparency in reporting RFDs. However, the results of the second part of
the study assessing the mitigating effect of strong corporate governance on cost of debt for risky
firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance did not show a mitigating effect on cost of debt.
Meanwhile, as expected, PARFD firms with weak corporate governance have a high cost of debt.
This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. It is the first study to
examine the effect of corporate governance on Item 1A-Risk factor disclosure. While previous
studies have examined the role of corporate governance on corporate risk disclosures, there is no
known study on corporate governance and RFDs. Compared to corporate risk disclosures, RFDs
are unique because they are a mandatory requirement to disclose sensitive, negative information.
This study also contributes to the literature on capital market implications of disclosure and
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corporate governance by examining the effect of corporate governance on cost of debt when
managers exercise discretion in reporting risk information. Therefore, this study provides new
evidence on the importance of RFDs in the debt market and the impact of strong corporate
governance on the credibility of disclosures. Finally, my research contributes to the literature on
mandatory disclosure policies, including the implications and usefulness of such disclosures.
Examining RFDs within the context of corporate governance provides insight into the usefulness
of RFDs when corporate governance is considered strong or weak.
The findings from this study are useful to organizations implementing corporate
governance structures and to regulators setting mandatory disclosure requirements. The remainder
of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the background literature relating
to corporate governance, RFDs, and cost of debt. The following sections present the theories and
hypotheses, a discussion of the research design, the results, the robustness tests, and a final
conclusion.

4.1. Background Literature
4.1.1 Corporate Governance
Broadly defined, corporate governance encompasses the rules, practices, and processes by which
a company is governed and directed, and responsibility for corporate governance in an organization
rests mainly with the board of directors. Corporate governance is multidimensional and has been
widely studied within and outside the field of management. It is important in all organizations and
has been identified as one of the key channels through which accounting information affects
economic performance (Bushman & Smith, 2003). Mechanisms of corporate governance are both
external and internal; external mechanisms include the external auditor, the market for control, the
role of regulators, and the role of the media, while internal mechanisms include board
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characteristics, such as board size, percentage of independent directors, CEO role duality, and
board busyness (Brown & Caylor, 2004; McNulty, Florackis,& Ormrod, 2012). Some studies have
also classified corporate governance based on board structure, which can be further categorized as
board structural characteristics, director-specific characteristics, and board processes (McNulty et
al., 2012; McNulty, Florackis & Ormrod, 2013). This study focuses on internal mechanisms related
to three corporate governance characteristics: board independence (IND), board expertise
(EXPERT), and board maturity (BMAT).
Corporate governance studies have relied mostly on agency theory which predicts that
managers are likely to shirk their duties and divert the firms’ resources to enjoy perquisites (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). This theory suggests that managers are likely to take risks that are not
beneficial to the stakeholders. To prevent agency conflicts between shareholders and management,
corporate governance measures are used to align the goals of the shareholders and managers. These
measures include having more independent directors on the board, avoiding CEO duality, tying
managerial incentives to future firm performance, and ensuring board diversity in terms of
ethnicity and gender.
While the literature on corporate governance and firm attributes or characteristics is vast,
very little has been done on corporate governance and risk disclosures, especially in North
America. The next sub-section discusses the current state of research relating to corporate
governance and risk disclosure.
4.1.2 Risk Disclosures and Corporate Governance
Extant literature has established a relationship between corporate governance and risk. Abraham
and Cox (2007), for example, show that risk information has only partial association with a nonexecutive board. Lajili (2009) examined the relationship between corporate governance
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mechanisms and risk disclosure in Canadian firms and found that board size and percentage of
non-executive directors are positively associated with risk disclosure. Lajili also found that a
fraction of the controlling vote is negatively associated with risk disclosure, while CEO incentive
compensation did not present a consistent result. Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) examined the
relationship between corporate risk disclosure and both firm characteristics and corporate
governance measures. The corporate governance measures they examined include institutional
ownership, board size, role duality, board independence, and presence of audit committee.
Surprisingly, their results did not show any relationship between these characteristics and risk
disclosure.
In an international setting, Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) examined the relationship
between the quality and extent of corporate risk disclosure for firms in South Africa. The corporate
governance mechanisms were split into corporate ownership mechanisms (government ownership,
block ownership, and institutional ownership) and corporate board characteristics (board diversity,
board size, independent non-executive directors, and dual board leadership). The results showed a
negative association between the extent of corporate risk disclosure and both block and
institutional ownership and a positive association for board diversity, board size, and independent
non-executive directors. Similarly, investigating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
on the level of risk disclosure in Kuwait, Al-Shammari (2014) found that corporate risk disclosure
has a positive association with board size, a negative association with role duality, and no
association with the proportion of non-executive directors, directors on audit committee, or having
family members on the board. Contrary to the negative association between risk disclosure and
non-executive directors reported in Ntim et al. (2013), Beasley et al. (2005) provide evidence of a
positive association between risk disclosure and both non-executive directors and role duality. The
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different results in these papers may be because Beasley et al. (2005) focused on the
implementation of enterprise risk management system while Ntim et al. (2013) studied corporate
risk disclosure.
Empirical evidence has also shown that corporate governance has a mitigating effect on
risk. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) demonstrated that the presence of large diverse boards
with more independent directors, higher amounts of board busyness, greater numbers of busy and
experienced directors, and lower directorship ownership results in lower costs of loans and less
intense covenants. The results from Francis, Hasan, and Koetter (2012) also provide supporting
evidence that board monitoring mitigates information risk ex ante and controls agency risk ex post.
The findings are further reinforced by McNulty et al. (2012) who find that financial risk is lower
in boards that are smaller, with fewer than eight directors, while corporate risk is lower when tenure
and remuneration of the executive director is greater than that of the non-executive director.
In summary, there is evidence of a positive association between risk disclosure and board
size, board duality, and percentage of non-executive directors and a negative association with
institutional ownership. Yet the relationship between risk disclosure and role duality is unclear.
There is also evidence that corporate governance mitigates risk; however, whether this effect
extends to managerial discretion in reporting RFDs is an empirical question.
4.1.3. Debt Contracting and Corporate Governance
Greater levels of corporate governance can mitigate agency conflict among managers and other
stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Studies have shown that strong corporate governance has
a mitigating effect on cost of debt by reducing information risk which subsequently reduces the
cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & La Fond, 2006; Sengupta, 1998). Strong corporate
governance, therefore, provides a platform for adequate supervision of actions and decisions taken
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by management that can increase the default risk if not controlled. Armstrong, Guay, and Weber
(2010) reviewed the literature on the role of information and financial reporting in corporate
governance and debt contracting and also discussed how governance mechanisms are used by
creditors to reduce agency cost and the associated cost of default.
In addition to default risk, information risk is another determinant of cost of debt that can
be influenced by the quality of corporate governance. This influence can be through the quality of
accounting information provided (Bushman & Smith, 2003) or through the timely disclosure of
information (Sengupta, 1998). Studies on corporate boards have examined the role of boards in
bank loan contracts (Francis et al., 2012), the effect of internal control weaknesses (Kim, Song, &
Zhang, 2011), corporate misreporting (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008), Sarbanes Oxley Act (Pae, 2010),
and board characteristics (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) found that
institutional ownership and greater outside control are associated with a higher bond rating and
lower spread. Anderson et al. (2004) argued that board independence and audit committee size are
negatively associated with cost of debt in the public debt market, while Francis et al. (2012) found
that higher quality boards have lower interest rates, more favourable loan terms, and more lenders
participating in syndicated loans. Furthermore, the board can influence bank contracting terms
through the monitoring of management activity and ensuring that proper internal controls are in
place. Pae (2010) demonstrated evidence of a reduction in private cost of debt following the
implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), while Kim et al. (2011) showed that loan spread
is higher for firms with Internal Control Weaknesses. These results align with the findings of
Graham et al. (2008) who argued that companies initiating loans after a restatement have higher
spreads.
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The above research findings suggest that strong corporate governance can reduce
information and default risk and that the benefits of strong corporate governance are recognized in
the debt markets through more favourable loan terms.

4.2. Theories and Hypotheses
4.2.1 Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure and Corporate Governance
While most studies on corporate governance are based on agency theory, some studies also rely on
signalling theory to explain the role of strong corporate governance in disclosure quality and
quantity. While agency theory predicts that providing reliable information about risk decreases
information asymmetry between investors and debt holders, signalling theory predicts that
disclosure of adequate information in the financial reports can be a sign of management quality.
Both theories, however, suggest that providing reliable information is beneficial to investors,
creditors, and management.
Another benefit of strong corporate governance is that it enhances the financial reporting
process by influencing management to make more accurate disclosure. Since a primary duty of
boards of directors is monitoring the financial reporting process, the board structure is important
in ensuring that financial statements are credible and relevant, and the credibility of financial
information is critical in evaluating the default risk of debts. Furthermore, corporate governance
can minimize opportunistic disclosure as an outcome of the discretion allowed in financial
reporting. Corporate governance mechanisms that limit opportunistic management behaviour will,
therefore, benefit all stakeholders. Prior studies have discussed an association between corporate
governance and risk disclosure. For example, there is evidence of a positive association between
risk disclosure and dual listing (Abraham & Cox, 2007), board size and percentage of nonexecutive directors (Lajili, 2009), and board diversity and board size (Ntim et al., 2013).
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Furthermore, agency theory suggests that corporate governance mechanisms, such as outside
directors, play a significant role in aligning the interests of managers and owners (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). This is because firms with strong corporate governance are better able to monitor
management and prevent managerial self-interest behaviour which reduces information asymmetry
between management and owners. Therefore, governance mechanisms that mitigate self-interest
behaviour will improve risk disclosure transparency and subsequently mitigate information
asymmetry in firms.
Based on the above discussion, I expect corporate governance will have a direct impact on
managerial discretion in reporting RFDs by promoting transparency in disclosures and signalling
the credibility of disclosures. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive association between discretions in reporting RFDs (ARFD) and
corporate governance.
4.2.2 Cost of Debt, Corporate Governance, and Abnormal Risk Factor Disclosure
Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides empirical evidence that RFDs reflect actual firm risk and
that managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD) affects the cost of debt. The results from the previous
chapter also reveal higher cost of debt for firms that are perceived as riskier (PARFD) in the public
debt market. The higher cost of debt effect suggests public debt lenders take disclosed RFDs as
representative of firm risk. Furthermore, the results show that firms with RFDs below the expected
level (NARFD) attract lower cost of debt possibly as a reward for lower risk. Research findings
also reveal capital market benefits of strong corporate governance. There is evidence that corporate
governance can reduce the cost of debt through the effect on default and information risk
(Sengupta, 1998) and that the quality of corporate governance can influence information risk
through the quality of accounting information (Bushman &Smith, 2003). Prior research has also
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established an association between corporate governance and cost of debt (Anderson et al. 2004;
Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003) and also between corporate governance and risk disclosure (Lajili,
2009; Ntim et al. 2013). These findings suggest that corporate governance plays a role in the
relationship between risk disclosure and cost of debt.
I evaluate the influence of strong corporate governance on discretionary reporting of RFDs
for firms that that are perceived as risky (PARFD). Focusing only on PARFD firms makes it
possible to examine the effect of corporate governance in mitigating the higher cost of debt effect
observed for PARFD firms in Chapter 3. Since strong corporate governance adds credibility to
disclosures, I expect PARFD firms with strong corporate governance to have a lower cost of debt
based on the predictions from theory and evidence from the current literature. Similarly, risky firms
(PARFD) with weak corporate governance should have a higher cost of debt because the weak
governance structure in these firms further underscores the riskiness of the firms.
Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypotheses.
H2a: The association between cost of debt and positive abnormal risk factor disclosure
(PARFD) is negative when corporate governance is strong.
H2b: The association between cost of debt and positive abnormal risk factor disclosure
(PARFD) is positive when corporate governance is weak.

4.3. Research Design
4.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample consists of public debt firms as outlined in Chapter 3 with complete data for the
corporate governance variables. The final sample is 2,149 loan-year observations after excluding
firms with incomplete data and those with RFDs of less than 30 words. The data is summarized in
Table 1.
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4.3.2 Method
The first stage regression to derive the measure of managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD) is
presented below.
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 𝑅𝐹𝐷 −

∝ +∝ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +∝ 𝐿𝐸𝑉 +∝ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 +∝ 𝐿𝐼𝑇 +∝ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
…. (1)
+∝ 𝑆𝐷_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 +∝ 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊

ARFD is derived as the residual from the regression of RFDs on the determinants. As explained in
Chapter 3, these determinants are based on previous studies that have examined the topics
disclosed in RFDs (Bao & Datta, 2012; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Huang &
Li, 2011). From these, I identified six major categories of risk, as follows: financial risk,
idiosyncratic or operational risk, litigation risk, regulatory or legal risk, tax risk, and
macroeconomic risk. Similar to Chapter 3, LEV is firm leverage measured as the book value of
debt divided by total assets and is a proxy for financial risk. SD_EARN is the standard deviation of
quarterly firm earnings over the previous three years and is the proxy for idiosyncratic risk. LIT is
the proxy for litigation risk and is a dummy that equals one for firms with SIC codes 2833-2836,
3570-3577, 3600-3676, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734, or zero otherwise. SIZE is
measured as log value of market equity value and is the proxy for regulatory risk. ETR is expected
tax rate measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax income and is the proxy for tax risk.
CPIChange is the monthly rate of change in Consumer Price and is the proxy for macroeconomic
risk. I expect all determinants are positively associated with RFDs.
The regression to test H1 on the association between managerial discretion in RFDs
(ARFD) and corporate governance is presented below.
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐼𝐸 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀 .. (2)
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ARFD is measured as the absolute value of the residual from the regression of RFD on its
determinants, where RFD is measured as the total number of words in Item 1A-RFD and the risk
word categories from Item 1A-RFD, based on Campbell et al. (2014). GOV is the composite score
of three corporate governance mechanisms (IND, EXPERT, and BMAT). The coefficient of interest
is β1 which captures the relationship between corporate governance and discretion in reporting
RFDs (ARFD). I expect β1 to be positive in support of transparency and credibility effect of
corporate governance.
The first stage regression to examine H2 is the same as equation (1). The regression
equation for the second stage is presented below. As explained earlier, this regression is conducted
only for PARFD firms to examine the effect of strong corporate governance on the relationship
between positive managerial discretions in RFDs (PARFD) and cost of debt (RATING). This
regression is conditioned on a dummy variable of corporate governance (CGOV) which takes the
value of 1 for firms with strong corporate governance and zero otherwise. This variable is further
explained in the next subsection.
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐷 +𝛽 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽 𝑜𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐼𝐸 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐸_𝑇𝑊 + 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +
𝜀 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 1 (0)….…………………………………………………………………… (3)
The coefficient of interest is β1. I expect β1 to have a negative sign for strong governance firms
and a positive sign for weak governance firms. This follows from the argument that strong
corporate governance has a risk mitigating effect on cost of debt. PARFD firms with strong
corporate governance should be rewarded with lower cost of debt, while PARFD firms with weak
governance should be penalized with higher cost of debt.
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4.3.3 Description of variables
Cost of debt is the categorical score of S&P debt issuer rating (RATING). Corporate governance
(GOV) is the composite measure of: (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board (IND);
(2) the log of the number of directors employed in the fields of academia, accounting, law,
consulting, financial services, investing, and medicine (EXPERT);35 and (3) the log of average age
of directors (BMAT). The evidence in the literature linking these variables to corporate governance
are discussed below.
Armstrong et al. (2010) explains that a board consisting of only internal directors may not
be effective because of managerial entrenchment. On the other hand, boards consisting of only
external directors may not be effective because of limited experience. Research, however, supports
the view that a greater number of non-executive directors should improve the control and strategic
function of the company and reduce excessive risk-taking by executives (Coles, McWilliams, &
Sen, 2001). Elhazer and Hussainey (2012) find that the proportion of non-executive directors
explains most of the variation in corporate risk disclosures. Furthermore, based on agency theory,
having a larger number of independent directors can mitigate agency problems as independent
directors can monitor opportunistic behaviour by executives. Independent directors are therefore
able to monitor, discipline, and influence management. As such, the presence of more independent
board members (IND) suggests stronger corporate governance.
Financial literacy is essential in any board (Jensen, 1993). I expect that boards with expert
directors will make decisions that are beneficial to the firm as they understand the financial
implications of their actions. Armstrong et al. (2010) also support the view that financial expert
directors will be better at monitoring and advising on financial reporting and disclosure issues

35

This classification builds on Defond, Hann, and Hu’s (2005) classification of director’s expertise based on
financial and non-financial education and experience.
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compared to non-financial expert directors. Therefore, a larger number of EXPERT directors
implies stronger corporate governance. Board maturity (BMAT) measures the average age of
directors and is synonymous with more business experience which is a positive attribute. Similar
to EXPERT, higher values of BMAT indicate stronger corporate governance.
To derive this composite score, I create a dummy variable for each governance mechanism
(IND, EXPERT, and BMAT) based on the sample median. Observations with values greater than
the sample median are assigned a score of 1 or zero otherwise. Thus, the highest value for GOV is
three for firms with strong governance relating to IND, EXPERT, and MAT while the lowest value
is zero for weak governance relating to the three measures.
As explained in the previous section, the determinants of RFDs are SIZE, LEV, ETR, LIT,
CPIChange, and SD_EARN. I expect all determinants will be positively associated with RFDs.
The control variables in this study are log of total assets (LASSET), book to market ratio
(BTM), return on assets (ROA), dummy for negative earnings (LOSS), audit quality (BIGN),
oZ_SCORE for bankruptcy prediction, times interest earned (TIE), industry and year fixed effects.
Extant research has shown that these variables are associated with risk disclosure. For example,
Khlif and Hussainey (2014) showed that risk reporting has a positive association with size,
leverage, profitability, and risk factor (Beta, probability of bankruptcy). In addition to these control
variables, I also control for disclosure comprehensiveness, using the variable FILE_TW measured
as total number of words in the annual 10-K report. Relying on Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986)
prediction that larger companies disclose more information and are more susceptible to regulatory
scrutiny, I expect large firms, profit making firms, firms with lower risk of bankruptcy, and firms
audited by large auditors to have more scrutiny over the reporting process and more transparent
disclosure. Loss making firms may attempt to hide risk information to avoid further losses and are
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likely to have less transparent RFDs. Consistent with prior literature I expect all control variables,
except LOSS, to be negatively associated with discretionary reporting in RFDs.
The continuous variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% and the regressions are clustered
by firms. The details of the variables are presented in Table 2.

4.4. Results
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 3a presents a general overview of descriptive statistics for the governance measures, RFD
measures and its determinants, cost of debt, and control variables. The corporate governance
measures (GOV and CGOV) have mean values of 1.44 and 0.46, respectively, suggesting corporate
governance for the sample is slightly below average. However, the median value gives more insight
on the distribution of the data. GOV and CGOV have median values of 1 and zero respectively.
These values imply that most of the firms in the sample have strong corporate governance. The
average number of words in the 10-K file (FILE_TW) is 263,769, while the mean total number of
words in Item 1A (1A_TW) is 16,418. The mean of total number of risk words (1A_CRW) is 813,
financial risk words (1A_CFRW) is 116, systematic risk words (1A_CSRW) is 285, idiosyncratic
risk words (1A_CIRW) is 299, and the mean of the number of legal risk words (1A_CLRW) is 85.
The average RATING is 9 which translates into a BBB debt rating. The borrower
characteristics indicate average firm size of $19 billion.36 As explained in Chapter 3, most of the
firms in this study are large firms because Item 1A disclosure is only mandatory for firms with
more than $75 million in assets. The control for firm leverage (LEV) has a mean of 0.26 implying
that most of the firms have low solvency risk. The mean of the control for audit quality (BIGN) is

36

The value in the descriptive table is the log value.
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0.99 meaning that most of the firms are audited by large audit firms. In addition, average ROA is
0.05 indicating the average firm is profitable, and most of the firms have low risk of bankruptcy
as indicated by the average Z_SCORE of 4.11.
4.4.2 Univariate analysis
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3b. Cost of debt (RATING) is negatively correlated
with the corporate governance measures (GOV&CGOV) providing initial evidence that firms with
strong corporate governance may have a lower cost of debt. RATING is positively correlated with
all RFD measures. These positive correlations support the findings in Chapter 3 that the risk
profiles of firms are reflected in their cost of debt. The disclosure comprehensiveness proxy
(FILE_TW) is negatively correlated with RATING, suggesting that more comprehensive
disclosures may have cost of debt benefits. As expected, RATING is positively associated with
leverage (LEV), book to market ratio (BTM), and loss firms (LOSS), suggesting firms with high
leverage, long maturity period, secured loans, growth firms, and firms reporting losses have higher
cost of debt. Also, RATING is negatively correlated with standard deviation of earnings
(SD_EARN), firm size (SIZE), and the proxy for large firms (LASSET). RATING is also negatively
associated with profitable firms (ROA), firms audited by large auditors (BIGN), low bankruptcy
firms (oZ_SCORE), and low liquidity risk (TIE). These negative correlations suggest that firms
with low volatility in earnings, large and profitable firms, firms audited by large auditors, and firms
with low probability of bankruptcy have lower cost of debt. These negative correlations are not
surprising as large and profitable firms will have better debt ratings.
As expected, GOV and CGOV are positively correlated. GOV is positively associated with
systematic (1A_CSRW) and legal (1A_CLRW) risk words. This correlation provides preliminary
evidence of the influence of corporate governance on disclosure transparency in line with the
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prediction of H1. Predictably, GOV and CGOV are positively correlated with disclosure
comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) and firm size (SIZE and LASSET). GOV and CGOV are also
positively associated with volatility of earnings (SD_EARN) which contradicts the expectation that
strong corporate governance will reduce earning fluctuations. The corporate governance measures
(GOV and CGOV) are negatively associated with the proxy for litigation risk (LIT), probability of
bankruptcy (Z_SCORE), and times interest earned (TIE). This negative correlation suggests that
firms with strong corporate governance usually have lower litigation risk, lower probability of
bankruptcy, and lower liquidity risk.
Furthermore, all the RFD measures are positively correlated with one another, as expected.
Financial risk words (1A_CFRW) and legal risk (1A_CLRW) words are positively correlated with
leverage (LEV). All risk words, except idiosyncratic risk (1A_CIRW), are positively associated
with the control for growth firms (BTM) and negatively associated with firm profitability (ROA).
These correlations suggest firms with more risk disclosures are less profitable growth firms.
4.4.3 Multivariate analysis
The results to test H1 for the association between corporate governance and managerial discretion
in RFDs are presented in Tables 4a and 4b. Table 4a shows the result of the regression of the six
RFD measures on the determinants of RFDs. The residual from this regression is the measure of
managerial discretion in RFDs: ARFD. Table 4a reveals a significant negative association between
SIZE and RFD for all risk measures except legal risk words (1A_CLRW) suggesting that larger
firms have less transparent disclosures. This is contrary to expectation since larger firms generally
experience greater exposure and should be more transparent in their risk disclosures. A possible
explanation for the negative association is the cost of proprietary information. These firms may be
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conservative in disclosing information about the firm’s risk to avoid competitors gaining access to
sensitive information.
The proxy for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows significant positive results
for all the RFD measures, as expected. This is because Item 1A-RFD has been identified as one of
the disclosures responsible for the increased size of the 10-K report (Dyer, Lang, & SticeLawrence, 2016). Financial risk proxy (LEV) is significant for total number of words in Item 1A
(1A_TW) and idiosyncratic risk words (1A_CIRW). Unexpectedly, ETR is negatively associated
with all the RFD measures except financial risk words (1A_CFRW). The proxy for macroeconomic
risk (CPIChange) and idiosyncratic risk (SD_EARN) are not significantly associated with any of
the RFDs. A possible explanation for some of the insignificant results is variation in the types of
risk words included in the categories. For example, the systematic risk words variable (1A_CSRW)
contains risk words relating to war, currency fluctuations, and natural disasters, etc. The proxy for
macroeconomic risk (CPIChange), however, is associated with risks relating to inflation and price
changes.
Table 4b presents the results for the main test of the association between corporate
governance and managerial discretion in reporting RFDs. In line with H1, Table 4b reveals a
positive association between GOV and ARFD for all determinants. This result supports the
expectation that strong corporate governance will enhance transparency in reporting RFDs. For the
control variables, LASSET is negatively associated with ARFD for total words in Item 1A (1A_TW),
as expected, implying larger firms show less deviation in their risk factor reporting. The negative
association between oZ_SCORE and ARFD for all risk word measures, except financial risk words
(1A_CFRW) and legal risk words (1A_CLRW), was also predicted. These negative associations
imply firms with low bankruptcy risk have less deviation in their reporting. Similarly, the proxy
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for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows positive association with ARFD for
systematic risk words (1A_CSRW). This is consistent with the assumption that larger files will have
more RFDs. On the other hand, leverage (LEV) is positively associated with ARFD. A possible
reason is that high leverage firms disclose less risk to avoid the potential negative effect of
disclosing risk information. The controls for loss making firms (LOSS) and audit quality (BIGN)
are negatively associated with ARFD, as expected. Surprisingly, the controls for growth firms
(BTM) and liquidity (TIE) are not significant for any of the ARFD measures. The overall results
support H1 that corporate governance will promote more transparent disclosure.
The results to test H2a and H2b are presented in Tables 5a and 5b. The first stage regression
for H2a and H2b is the same for H1 and can be found in Table 4a. Table 5b presents the results for
the test of H2a of the association between PARFD and the cost of debt for firms with strong
corporate governance (CGOV=1). Unexpectedly, three measures of ARFD (1A_TW, 1A_CRW, and
1A_CSRW) have positive associations with cost of debt (RATING). This result suggests that strong
corporate governance is not recognized by public lenders as a credible signal of lower risk.
Therefore, the higher cost of debt for these PARFD firms observed in Chapter 3 persists in the
presence of strong corporate governance. It is possible that public lenders are more concerned
about risk and are not sophisticated enough to adjust for the effect of strong corporate governance
in evaluating firm risk. As expected, the control for firm size (LASSET) and profitability (ROA)
show a negative correlation with cost of debt. Thus, large and profitable firms with strong corporate
governance have lower cost of debt. The control for growth firms (BTM), however, shows positive
association with RATING which contradicts the expected negative correlation. A possible
explanation for the higher cost of debt is that growth firms do not yet have the reputation or
resources to command more favourable debt ratings. As expected, the control for leverage (LEV)
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and LOSS firms have positive associations with cost of debt. The control variables for audit quality
(BIGN), bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE), liquidity (TIE), and disclosure comprehensiveness
(FILE_TW) are not significant for all RFDs measures.
Table 5b presents the result for H2b examining the association between PARFD and cost
of debt for firms with weak corporate governance (CGOV=0). It is expected that these firms will
have higher cost of debt as penalty for greater risk which is further underscored by the weak
corporate governance structure. The results confirm this expectation as all RFDs, except total
number of words (1A_TW) and financial risk words (1A_CFRW), are positively associated with
RATING. Similar to the results for strong corporate governance firms, controls for firm size
(LASSET) and profitability (ROA) have negative associations with cost of debt, while leverage
(LEV) and LOSS have positive associations with cost of debt. Consistent with the expectation, the
control for disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) shows positive association with RATING.
The controls for audit quality (BIGN), bankruptcy risk (oZ_SCORE), liquidity risk (TIE), and
disclosure comprehensiveness (FILE_TW) are not significant.
In summary, the results do not support H2a that strong corporate governance can mitigate
cost of debt for public firms but agrees with H2b that risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate
governance will still have a higher cost of debt.

4.5 Robustness Test
4.5.1 Individual Corporate Governance Measures
In order to examine the individual effect of corporate governance measures, I examine the
hypotheses in this chapter using the three corporate governance variables (IND, EXPERT, and
MAT). Untabulated results for H1 show positive associations between proportion of independent
directors (IND) and all RFD measures. The results also show significant positive associations
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between proportion of expert directors (EXPERT) and two RFD measures (1A_CFRW and 1ACSRW). However, the results are not significant for board maturity (BMAT). The overall result is
similar to that of the composite measure of governance and also supports H1 that corporate
governance promotes transparency in reporting. The results for H2a show significant positive
associations between two corporate governance measures (IND and BMAT) and RATING for risky
firms (PARFD) with strong corporate governance. These results do not support H2a on the role of
strong corporate governance in mitigating cost of debt. Similar to the results using the composite
measure of corporate governance, the results for the individual corporate governance measures
support H2b that risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance still have higher cost of
debt.
Overall, the results of this test support the main findings in this chapter for H1 and H2b.
4.5.2 Alternate Risk Factor Disclosure Measures
To further examine whether the usefulness of RFDs is only limited to Item1A-RFD, I measure
RFDs using Campbell et al.’s (2014) risk words from Item 7-Management Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A). Contrary to the results obtained using Item 1A-RFDs, the results show a negative
association for legal risk words (1A_CLRW). While the results for H2a did not show any significant
association for risky firms with strong corporate governance, the results for H2b show positive
associations between PARFD and RATING in support of H2b. This is similar to the result for H2b
for using Item 1A-RFD. Overall results using Item 7-MD&A only support H2b.

4.6. Conclusion
This study examines the effect of corporate governance on managerial discretion in reporting RFDs
and the subsequent effect on cost of debt in the public debt market. Agency theory predicts that
strong corporate governance promotes disclosure transparency. To investigate the effect of
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corporate governance on risk disclosure, I first examine the association between the composite
score (GOV) of three corporate governance measures (independent directors (IND), expert
directors (EXPERT), and board maturity (BMAT)) and managerial discretion in RFDs (ARFD).
Then, I examine the role of strong and weak corporate governance (CGOV) on the relationship
between cost of debt and ARFD for higher risk firms (PARFD). I expect riskier firms with strong
corporate governance will have lower cost of debt in line with the risk mitigating effect of strong
corporate governance. Similarly, I expect riskier firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance
to have higher cost of debt.
Using the public debt sample from Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I find positive associations
between GOV and discretionary reporting of RFDs (ARFD) in support of the transparency effect
of corporate governance. Unexpectedly, however, I find that risky firms with strong corporate
governance still have a high cost of debt. Similarly, risky firms with weak corporate governance
have high cost of debt, as predicted. The results suggest public lenders are concerned about firm
risk and do not evaluate the effect of corporate governance on risk.
Similar to the findings for the composite corporate governance measure, alternate tests
using the individual corporate governance measures (IND, EXPERT, and BMAT) show consistent
results. A second alternate test using risk information in Item 7-MD&A disclosure only
corroborates the higher cost of debt for risky firms (PARFD) with weak corporate governance.
A limitation noted in this study is the weak results for some determinants of RFDs.
However, this is the first study to examine the role of corporate governance on discretionary
reporting of Item1A-RFD using these determinants. There is opportunity for future studies to
develop other proxies for similar research. My study contributes to the mandatory disclosure,
corporate governance, and capital market research, and these findings are useful to organizations
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implementing corporate governance structures and to regulators recommending mandatory
disclosures.
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Tables
Table 1: Data Summary
Public debt with corporate governance variables

6,053

Drop Item 1A <30 words

(1,987)

Incomplete data for all variables

(1,917)

Final data

2,149
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Table 2: Description of Variables
1

Variable
RATING

2

IND

3

EXPERT

4

BMAT

5
6

GOV
CGOV

7

1A_TW

8

1A_CRW

9

1A_CFRW

10 1A_CIRW
11 1A_CSRW
12 1A_CLRW
13 ARFD
14 7_TW
15 7_CRW
16 7_CFRW
17 7_CIRW
18 7_CSRW
19 7_CLRW
20 NARFD

Description
S&P debt issuer rating. RATING takes values from 1 to 22 from the best to
the worst: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA- =4, A+=5, A=6, A- =7, BBB+=8,
BBB=9, BBB- =10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB- =13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16,
CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, D=21, SD=22.
Dummy=1 if IND>median (IND). Where, IND is the proportion of
Independent Directors. These Directors are stated as Independent in the
data
Dummy=1 if EXPERT>median (EXPERT). Where, EXPERT is the log of
the number of directors employed in academia, accounting, law, consulting,
financial services, investing, and medicine
Dummy=1 if MAT<median (MAT). Where, MAT is the log of the average
age of directors, or board maturity
GOV is the sum of IND+EXPERT+BMAT
CGOV is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if GOV>median and 0
otherwise
Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure Item
IA + 1
Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure
Item IA + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10K disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10K disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure Item 1A + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Equals absolute value of residuals from the regression of risk disclosure on
its determinants
Log of total number of words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure Item
7+1
Log of total number of risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K disclosure
Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of financial risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10K disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of systematic risk words that appear in the firm’s 10K disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Log of total number of legal risk words that appear in the firm’s 10-K
disclosure Item 7 + 1, based on Campbell et al. 2014
Equals absolute value of negative residual from the regression of risk
disclosure on its determinants if residual is less than zero
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Variable
21 FILE_TW
22 LEV
23 LIT
24
25
26
27
28

SIZE
ETR
CPIChange
BTM
BIGN

29 LOSS
30 oZ_SCORE
(Altman)
31 SD_EARN
32
33
34
35
36

LASSET
TIE
ROA
INDUSTRY
YEAR

Description
Log of total number of words in the 10-K report
Book value of debt divided by total assets
Litigation =1 for firms within SIC code 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3676,
5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 8731-8734
Market value of equity
Total tax expense divided by pre-tax income
Change in CPI (Inflation) from CRSP Treasury and Inflation Index
Book value of equity divided by market value of equity
Equals 1 for large auditors and zero otherwise. Large auditors are coded 18 in Compustat data AU
Equals 1 if firm have negative earnings or zero otherwise
Orthogonized Z_score = 1.2 * (working capital/ total assets)
+1.4*(Retained earnings) +3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/total
assets) +0.6*(market value of equity/total liability) +0.999*(Sales/total
asset)
Standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past three years starting
from the current quarter
Log of total assets
Times Interest earned is tax expense divided by income before taxes
Return on asset measured as net income divided by total assets
Fama_French 12-industry classification
Control for year effects
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RATING
GOV
CGOV
IA_TW
IA_CRW
IA_CFRW
1A_CSRW
1A_CIRW
1A_CLRW
FILE_TW
SD_EARN
CPIChange
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
Z_SCORE
TIE

Mean
9.31
1.44
0.46
16,417.61
813.83
115.62
284.87
299.43
85.07
263,769.20
181.40
0.00
0.48
0.26
8.76
0.22
8.89
0.49
0.05
0.04
0.99
4.11
13.10

Table 3a: Descriptive Analysis
(N=2,149)
Standard
Median
Deviation
9.00
2.92
1.00
0.87
0.00
0.50
6,373.00
22,182.72
448.00
963.01
46.00
302.46
130.00
403.83
180.00
306.70
61.00
80.92
212,666.00
240,440.10
47.70
616.22
0.00
0.00
0.32
9.33
0.25
0.14
8.67
1.45
0.00
0.41
8.77
1.28
0.43
0.40
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.19
1.00
0.11
3.74
2.29
4.89
77.02

Lower
Quartile
7.00
1.00
0.00
3,501.00
251.00
21.00
75.00
90.00
34.00
71,382.00
17.59
0.00
0.23
0.17
7.73
0.00
7.97
0.27
0.03
0.00
1.00
2.45
2.43

Upper
Quartile
11.00
2.00
1.00
25,660.00
1,102.00
165.00
339.00
411.00
108.00
401,541.00
122.73
0.00
0.37
0.33
9.74
0.00
9.77
0.64
0.09
0.00
1.00
5.08
9.42

Table 3a reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses. Statistics presented include the number
of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation, lower quartile and upper quartile. All the variables are defined
in table 2. RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator
variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and
otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of expert directors greater
than the sample median and otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log
of directors’ age greater than the sample median and otherwise zero. 1A_TW is the total number of words in Item- 1A.
1A_CRW is total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is total number of financial risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CIRW is total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is total number of systematic risk words
in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is total number of words in annual
10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for economic
risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is log of market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for
litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for
secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. REV is the proxy for revolving loans. LASSET is the log of
total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for
firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman
(1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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RATING
GOV
CGOV
1A_TW
1A_CRW
1A_CFRW
1A_CIRW
1A_CSRW
1A_CLRW
FILE_TW
SD_EARN
CPIChange
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
oZ_SCORE
TIE

RATING GOV CGOV TW
1
-0.08
1
-0.08
0.87
1
0.09
0.04
0.03
1
0.10
0.04
0.03
0.96
0.24
0.02
0.01
0.90
0.08
0.01
0.00
0.92
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.87
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.78
-0.06
0.17
0.17
0.07
-0.14
0.07
0.09 -0.07
0.00 -0.04
-0.04 -0.02
0.00 -0.01
0.00 -0.03
0.36
0.01
0.01 -0.01
-0.71
0.11
0.12 -0.10
-0.06 -0.08
-0.06
0.00
-0.56
0.16
0.16 -0.08
0.27
0.02
0.02
0.06
-0.37 -0.03
-0.03 -0.06
0.26
0.01
0.03 -0.02
-0.16
0.02
0.02 -0.01
-0.17 -0.13
-0.13 -0.07
-0.10 -0.05
-0.04 -0.02

Table 3b: Correlation
CRW CFRW CIRW

1
0.90
0.93
0.94
0.83
0.12
-0.06
-0.05
-0.03
0.00
-0.09
-0.05
-0.06
0.06
-0.07
-0.01
-0.01
-0.13
-0.03

1
0.78
0.84
0.70
0.09
-0.08
-0.04
-0.01
0.07
-0.22
-0.09
-0.14
0.10
-0.14
0.03
-0.03
-0.17
-0.06

1
0.78
0.75
0.11
-0.07
0.00
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05
0.07
-0.07
0.01
-0.02
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
-0.01

CSRW

1
0.74
0.11
-0.03
-0.07
-0.03
0.00
-0.09
-0.14
-0.04
0.10
-0.09
0.01
0.00
-0.20
-0.04

CLRW

1
0.21
-0.05
-0.09
-0.03
0.08
-0.03
-0.10
0.01
0.04
-0.07
-0.03
0.03
-0.19
-0.05

FILE_TW

1
0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.10
0.21
-0.04
0.25
-0.06
-0.04
-0.04
0.00
-0.15
-0.02

SD

1
-0.01
0.00
-0.05
0.31
0.05
0.38
0.07
0.00
0.10
0.03
-0.05
0.01

CPI

1
-0.03
-0.14
0.03
0.22
-0.04
-0.07
0.08
0.00
0.02
0.19
0.06
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Table 3b (continued)
ETR
ETR
LEV
SIZE
LIT
LASSET
BTM
ROA
LOSS
BIGN
oZ_SCORE
TIE

1
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00

LEV
1
-0.24
-0.15
-0.12
-0.15
-0.27
0.09
-0.06
-0.42
-0.18

SIZE

1
0.17
0.88
-0.33
0.32
-0.15
0.16
0.13
0.10

LIT

1
0.12
-0.06
0.08
0.02
-0.01
0.27
0.12

LASSET

1
-0.06
0.09
-0.07
0.14
-0.12
0.03

BTM

1
-0.21
0.15
-0.10
-0.21
-0.07

ROA

1
-0.4
0.06
0.38
0.15

LOSS

1
0.00
-0.16
-0.04

BIGN

1
-0.01
0.02

oZ_SCORE

1
0.21

TIE

1

Table 3b presents Pearson correlation matrix for the study sample. Variables significant at 5% and below are in bold. All the variables are defined in table 2.
RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with
proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with
proportion of expert directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log of
directors’ age greater than the sample median and otherwise zero. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk
words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in
Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW
is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. SD_EARN is standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years. CPIChange is the proxy for
economic risk. ETR is the proxy for tax risk. LEV is firm leverage. SIZE is market value of equity. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. FACAMT is the facility
amount in $’m. MAT is the proxy for loan maturity. SEC is the dummy for secured loans. RES is the proxy for restructuring loans. REV is the proxy for revolving
loans. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the dummy for firms with
negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. Z_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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SIZE
FILE_TW
LEV
ETR
1.Lit
CPIChange
SD_EARN
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Industry FE

Table 4a: H1 Stage 1
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
+
-0.11*** -0.08*** -0.20***
-0.08***
-0.07**
-0.03
(-3.28)
(-3.02)
(-5.38)
(-2.89)
(-2.34)
(-1.11)
+
0.18*** 0.16***
0.21***
0.15***
0.17***
0.17***
(2.98)
(3.00)
(3.27)
(2.70)
(3.06)
(3.13)
+
-0.52**
-0.32
0.05
-0.45*
-0.34
0.04
(-1.98)
(-1.40)
-0.16
(-1.89)
(-1.35)
-0.15
+
-0.00*** -0.00***
0.00
-0.00*** -0.00***
-0.00***
(-3.02)
(-3.42)
(-1.04)
(-2.70)
(-3.28)
(-4.54)
+
0.14
0.07
-0.03
0.10
0.11
-0.12
(1.05)
(0.68)
(-0.17)
(1.01)
(0.92)
(-1.19)
+
-0.79
1.05
-8.54
0.98
5.37
-3.09
(-0.08)
(0.12)
(-0.68)
(0.10)
(0.56)
(-0.39)
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(-1.11)
(-1.07)
(-0.64)
(-1.29)
(-0.69)
(-1.36)
8.30*** 5.45***
3.37***
4.90***
3.79***
2.47***
(9.88)
(7.33)
(3.78)
(6.24)
(4.99)
(3.44)
2,149
0.10
Yes
Yes

2,149
0.12
Yes
Yes

2,149
0.15
Yes
Yes

2,149
0.12
Yes
Yes

2,149
0.20
Yes
Yes

2,149
0.17
Yes
Yes

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 4a present coefficient estimates from the regression of RFDs on the determinants for the public debt sample. tstatistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables
are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2.1A_TW is the log of total number of words in
Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of
financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of
legal risk words in Item-1A. SIZE is the proxy for regulatory risk and measured as the market value of equity.
FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in annual 10-K report. LEV is firm leverage. ETR is the proxy for tax
risk. LIT is the proxy for litigation risk. CPIChange is the proxy for economic risk. SD_EARN is the proxy for
idiosyncratic risk and is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 3 years.
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Table 4b: H1 Stage 2
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
GOV
+
0.06*** 0.05***
0.07***
0.06***
0.06***
0.04***
(3.89)
(3.70)
(3.73)
(3.97)
(4.01)
(2.97)
LASSET
-0.03**
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
(-2.29)
(-0.81)
(-0.91)
(-0.41)
(-0.19)
(0.48)
BTM
-0.03
-0.03
-0.06
0.01
-0.06
-0.04
(-0.88)
(-0.86)
(-1.34)
(0.24)
(-1.64)
(-1.25)
LEV
+
-0.62*** -0.50*** -0.41***
-0.46*** -0.52***
-0.39***
(-5.68)
(-4.99)
(-3.06)
(-4.33)
(-4.79)
(-3.52)
ROA
0.25
0.15
0.34
0.14
-0.04
0.16
(1.40)
(0.95)
(1.58)
(0.81)
(-0.24)
(0.90)
LOSS
+
-0.09
-0.05
-0.15*
-0.07
-0.02
-0.06
(-1.20)
(-0.80)
(-1.68)
(-0.94)
(-0.31)
(-0.84)
BIGN
-0.08
-0.07
0.05
-0.10
-0.02
-0.36***
(-0.76)
(-0.66)
(0.37)
(-0.93)
(-0.22)
(-3.22)
oZ_SCORE
-0.08*** -0.06***
-0.03
-0.06***
-0.04*
-0.02
(-4.03)
(-3.34)
(-1.05)
(-3.12)
(-1.87)
(-0.97)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(1.59)
(1.42)
(1.46)
(1.10)
(0.61)
(0.22)
FILE_TW
+
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.04*
-0.03
(1.34)
(0.89)
(0.61)
(0.36)
(1.74)
(-1.39)
Constant
0.91***
0.73**
0.76*
0.91***
0.47
1.54***
(2.80)
(2.46)
(1.90)
(2.84)
(1.46)
(4.68)
Observations
2,149
2,149
2,149
2,149
2,149
2,149
R-squared
0.16
0.13
0.10
0.12
0.11
0.08
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 4b present coefficient estimates from the regression of ARFD obtained in Table 4a on the governance
including the control variables for the public debt sample. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated
using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are
defined in table 2. GOV is the composite score of: IND an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with
proportion of independent directors greater than the sample median and otherwise zero, EXPERT an indicator
variable taking the value of 1 for firms with proportion of expert directors greater than the sample median and
otherwise zero, and BMAT an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with log of directors’ age greater than
the sample median and otherwise zero. 1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of
total number of risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CIRW is the log of total number of idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of
systematic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. LASSET is
log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity. ROA is return on assets. LOSS is the
dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score
based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Table 5a: H2 Stage 2 Strong Governance
RATING
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
PARFD
0.15*
0.24***
0.09
0.06
0.20**
0.09
(1.88)
(2.69)
(1.32)
(0.69)
(2.26)
(0.85)
LASSET
-0.67*** -0.65*** -0.62***
-0.66*** -0.67***
-0.70***
(-13.03) (-13.49)
(-12.61)
(-13.71)
(-13.43)
(-15.02)
BTM
0.80*** 0.82***
0.73***
0.79***
0.78***
0.56***
(5.57)
(5.98)
(5.04)
(5.79)
(5.76)
(3.82)
LEV
+
4.18*** 4.23***
4.36***
3.97***
4.01***
3.78***
(8.34)
(8.73)
(9.03)
(8.43)
(8.19)
(8.14)
ROA
-0.69
-0.75
-2.29**
-0.89*
-0.66
-3.88***
(-1.45)
(-1.62)
(-2.57)
(-1.90)
(-1.41)
(-4.14)
LOSS
+
0.39
0.68**
0.57**
0.51*
0.75***
0.21
(1.28)
(2.45)
(2.13)
(1.75)
(2.83)
(0.81)
BIGN
-7.63
-7.66
-7.57
-7.49
-7.50
-7.07
(-0.04)
(-0.05)
(-0.05)
(-0.04)
(-0.04)
(-0.05)
oZ_SCORE
-0.10
-0.10
-0.09
-0.09
-0.11
-0.10
(-1.15)
(-1.24)
(-1.10)
(-1.09)
(-1.25)
(-1.18)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(-1.23)
(-1.23)
(-0.68)
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(0.07)
FILE_TW
+
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.08
(0.55)
(0.13)
(0.37)
(0.15)
(0.50)
(1.01)
Observations
422
459
467
472
442
525
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.21
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 5a presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals from Table 4a for
strong corporate governance. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2. PARFD is
the positive residuals from stage 1 regression in Table 5a. RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating.
1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in
annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity.
ROA is return on assets LOSS is the value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large
auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Table 5b: H2 Stage 2 Weak Governance
RATING
Sign 1A_TW 1A_CRW 1A_CFRW 1A_CIRW 1A_CSRW 1A_CLRW
PARFD
+
0.10
0.17*
0.06
0.17**
0.31***
0.19**
(1.19)
(1.81)
(0.92)
(1.99)
(3.46)
(2.06)
LASSET
-0.78*** -0.77*** -0.71***
-0.80*** -0.79***
-0.79***
(-14.88) (-15.34)
(-14.76)
(-16.42)
(-15.31)
(-16.44)
BTM
0.94*** 0.95***
1.10***
0.85***
1.07***
0.88***
(6.22)
(6.67)
(7.25)
(5.99)
(6.99)
(6.59)
LEV
+
3.62*** 3.58***
3.65***
3.34***
3.47***
3.33***
(8.31)
(8.59)
(8.94)
(8.30)
(8.09)
(8.36)
ROA
-4.76*** -4.50*** -3.33***
-5.66*** -4.22***
-4.86***
(-5.19)
(-5.57)
(-3.87)
(-6.67)
(-5.18)
(-6.57)
LOSS
+
0.56**
0.48*
0.56**
0.54*
0.56**
0.65***
(1.98)
(1.78)
(2.04)
(1.92)
(2.14)
(2.59)
BIGN
0.30
0.16
0.20
0.22
0.11
0.06
(0.81)
(0.46)
(0.54)
(0.66)
(0.32)
(0.19)
oZ_SCORE
-0.08
-0.03
-0.09
-0.06
-0.08
-0.08
(-1.13)
(-0.47)
(-1.34)
(-0.86)
(-1.17)
(-1.24)
TIE
+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.37)
(0.16)
(-0.07)
(1.23)
(0.26)
(1.26)
FILE_TW
+
0.10
0.10
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.14*
(1.15)
(1.10)
(0.89)
(1.01)
(0.90)
(1.68)
Observations
488
522
554
559
516
608
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.21
0.21
0.19
0.22
0.21
0.20
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(significant variables at two-tailed test)
Table 5a presents coefficient estimates from the regression of RATING on the positive residuals from Table 4a for
weak corporate governance. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using robust standard errors
clustered by firm. The variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%. All the variables are defined in table 2 PARFD is
the positive residuals from stage 1 regression in Table 5a. RATING is the numerical value of S&P issuer debt rating.
1A_TW is the log of total number of words in Item- 1A. 1A_CRW is log of total number of risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CFRW is the log of total number of financial risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CIRW is the log of total number of
idiosyncratic risk words in Item-1A. 1A_CSRW is the log of total number of systematic risk words in Item-1A.
1A_CLRW is the log of total number of legal risk words in Item-1A. FILE_TW is the log of total number of words in
annual 10-K report. LASSET is the log of total assets. BTM is the book value of equity to market value of equity.
ROA is return on assets LOSS is the value of dummy for firms with negative earnings. BIGN is the dummy for large
auditors. oZ_SCORE is bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968). TIE is times interest earned ratio.
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Chapter 5: Summary
In light of recent discussions on the boilerplate nature of RFDs and the SEC’s concern about how
to improve this disclosure, this dissertation examines the topics and contents of RFDs and
empirically investigates the usefulness of this disclosure in the private and public debt markets.
In addition, I examine the effect of strong corporate governance on managerial discretions in
disclosing risk factors including the impact on cost of debt for risky firms in the public debt
market.
In the first essay, I provide directions for future research relating to the content of RFDs, its
usefulness to investors and for debt and compensation contracts, as well as its usefulness to other
market participants. The literature review and the proposed research topics from this dissertation
provide a platform for future research on RFDs. The findings can be used by regulators in setting
mandatory disclosure requirements, by debt providers in evaluating firm risk, and by management
in implementing corporate governance structures. Further research on debt and contracting
usefulness of RFDs can provide insight to the SEC on other stakeholders that are most likely to
value RFDs. Similarly, future research examining the length of RFDs using different lexical
quality proxies can provide information to the SEC on investor’s ability to understand lengthy
RFDs.
In the second essay, I use content analysis to show that the risk profile of firms is reflected
in the cost of debt. I also find evidence that in the private debt market firms with RFDs above and
below expectation have lower cost of debt. However, in the public debt market, my results show
that disclosing higher risk than that expected is associated with higher cost of debt while disclosing
lower risk below expectation is associated with a lower cost of debt. Considering current evidence
on the usefulness of RFDs in the equity market, providing similar evidence on the usefulness of
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this disclosure in the debt market closes out discussion on whether RFDs are boilerplate or not.
The SEC can subsequently focus on improving the disclosure by providing mandate on what is
disclosed and asking companies to provide information on how the disclosed risks will be
addressed. Furthermore, providing evidence on institutional differences between the private and
public debt market can provide guidance to the SEC on the targeted audience for future disclosure
regulations.
In the third essay, I provide evidence that strong corporate governance promotes greater
transparency in reporting RFDs in the public debt market. I find that risky firms with weak
corporate governance have a higher cost of debt. There is however no cost of debt mitigating effect
for risky firms with strong corporate governance. Strong corporate governance aligns the interest
of shareholders and managers and also enhances transparency in disclosures. Examining the
influence of strong corporate governance on RFDs provide more information to the SEC that can
guide future regulations that promote transparency and accountability.
Although, RFDs are only mandatory for large firms in the US, the Canadian Securities
Administrators can also extend this disclosure to Canadian firms. Such disclosure will aid
investors and other capital market participants in evaluating firm risk and making appropriate
investing and financing decisions.
Limitations of this study are the loss of data through the data extraction software due to the
format of the 10-K files and the weak results for some RFD determinants. It is possible that there
are some other determinants of RFDs that are not captured in my manual matching of RFD topics.
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